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ABSTRACT 
Nudges are psychologically informed tools designed to promote behaviour change that 
improve health and wellbeing. As nudges gain global appeal through government 
administrations, their implementation as a tool within social policy are subject to stricter 
scrutiny. The need for inspection of the current underpinning theoretical framework of nudges 
is particularly critical given the diversity of nudge-type interventions and the mixed evidence 
for their effectiveness. The thesis first conceptualised nudge into Type 1 and Type 2 differed 
according to the amount of re-evaluation and re-structuring of knowledge representations 
needed to bring in alignment the evidence base and choice behaviour. Based on this 
conceptualisation, evidence base in the health domain were critically examined to determine 
which type of nudges is effective. The literature review showed that Type 2 nudges are more 
effective at sustaining behaviour change than Type 1 nudges. The thesis then explored the 
extent to which nudge undermines autonomy. From a welfarist perspective, nudges such as 
default rules bypass people’s reflective thinking and make general presumption about people’s 
choices which may not align with their underlying wishes. Indeed, two online questionnaires 
revealed that third-party judgements of choices made under pro-self default in pension 
enrolment and pro-social default in organ donation were less likely to represent the individual’s 
“true” preference compared to when an active choice is made. The welfare consequence of 
implementing defaults were discussed in these respective contexts. From a transparency 
perspective, influencing people’s behaviour without their awareness can be regarded as 
manipulation and hence a violation of autonomy. The online survey findings revealed that the 
public generally find interventions easier to identify, perceive them as more effective and 
acceptable, and more likely to align with people’s values or interest when they are transparent, 
and have a positive rationale for how they work. In closing, the proposed theoretical framework 
corroborated the empirical findings which suggest that Type 1 nudges are more likely to bypass 
people’s reflective thinking and infringe upon personal autonomy. Conversely, Type 2 nudges 
that work in a transparent manner are more likely to promote behavioural change in line with 
the chooser’s higher-order desire. For policy makers, the important practical point is that Type 
2 nudges are more likely to preserve autonomy in a way that will trigger sustainable 
behavioural change at a population level compared to Type 1 nudges. 
Keywords: nudge; theory; evidence; ethics; autonomy; welfare; transparency 
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CHAPTER 1: General Introduction  
In this chapter, the main focus will be on setting the critical themes of this thesis. The first 
section provides an introduction to nudge and how it arose from a line of research in 
behavioural economics. As the use of nudges gain global recognition through government 
administrations, their application is also subject to increasing scrutiny. More specifically, their 
implementation as a tool for social policy should be based on a sound theoretical framework 
with systematic evidence and ethical justification. The current evidence base on the 
effectiveness of nudge-type interventions is scarce with only a limited number of systematic 
reviews of domain-specific interventions. Overall, the mixed evidence base is due to 
heterogeneity in nudge intervention designs and a lack of randomised controlled trials at the 
population level. In part, this heterogeneity can be attributed to a lack inspection/scrutiny of 
the theoretical framework underpinning the mode of how nudges function to shape human 
behaviour. Following this, the second section outlines the first objective of this thesis to explore 
the theoretical complexities concerning nudges - drawing on two critical issues related to the 
current underlying mechanism of nudge - with the aim of proposing an alternative framework 
to account for the current evidence base of nudge based research in the health domain. The 
third section examines ethical issues of nudge utilization with regard to infringement of 
autonomy. The second objective of the thesis is to empirically examine the extent to which 
nudge undermines autonomy: 1) If nudges do not align with the chooser’s higher order desire 
- the welfarist argument; and 2) If people cannot discern the nudge intervention and how it is 
used to change their behaviour - the transparency argument. On welfare grounds, I demonstrate 
how defaults that bypass people’s reflective thinking typically impose value substitution. To 
explore the welfare consequence of implementing such defaults, a distinction between pro-self 
and pro-social nudges was emphasized due to their differing objectives. This motivated two 
empirical studies to examine third party judgements of perceived true preference of nudges in 
the context of pension enrolment and organ donation respectively. On transparency grounds, I 
illustrate how the publicity principle loses its ground and why we need to redefine transparency 
from the perspective of those being nudged; this led to the third empirical study to investigate 
public’s judgement on transparency of interventions in order provide relevant information for 
consideration of ethical issues regarding autonomy.  
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1.1.Nudge: An Introduction 
Economist Richard Thaler and legal scholar Cass Suntein’s seminal book on “Nudge: 
Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness” outlined an alternative governance 
intervention that uses subtler approaches in the design of policies to influence the behaviour of 
citizens. The objective of nudges is therefore to steer people’s choices in a welfare-promoting 
direction while preserving their freedom of choice. In their original definition, a nudge is 
defined as “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour in a 
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic 
incentives.” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p6). This basically means that the choice context can 
be (cleverly) rearranged to increase the likelihood that people will select the option that is better 
for their health, wealth, and happiness. The concept of nudge has its roots in behavioural 
economics; a line of research that challenges neoclassical economic models of rational human 
behaviour which argued that humans are utility-maximizers with well-defined preferences and 
unlimited cognitive capacities. Despite this, evidence from lab experiments have illustrated 
that people are subject to bounded rationality, bounded self-interest, and bounded willpower 
(Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, 1998). Because of this, they rely on heuristics or rules of thumbs; 
such as availability, representativeness, and adjustment and anchoring when making judgement 
under uncertainties (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Although these heuristics are usually 
effective, they can lead to systematic biases such as optimism and overconfidence, loss 
aversion, status quo bias, framing, saliency bias, inconsistent preference over time, to name but 
a few (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). These cognitive biases lead people to make suboptimal 
decisions, for example, consume more food when served with a larger plate, reduce their 
potential saving for retirement because of procrastination, or overconsume alcohol because of 
a tendency to follow the crowd.  
 
Due to the extent that people are constrained by the choice environment in which they make 
decisions (i.e., how it is constructed and the way they are influenced by framing of choices), 
subtle changes to the way in which choices are presented can encourage decisions that promote 
their welfare. The concept of nudge is justified by the philosophical framework of ‘libertarian 
paternalism’. The libertarian aspect gives people the freedom to choose and to opt out of any 
arrangements if they want to, and the paternalistic aspect lies in the claim that it is legitimate 
for choice architects to influence people’s behaviour in a way that “make choosers better off, 
as judged by themselves” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p5). This relatively non-intrusive mode of 
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governance has been sought after by governments from across the globe. In 2010, the UK was 
the first to establish a “Nudge Unit” (later renamed “Behavioural Insights Team” or BIT for 
short) followed by the US. The BIT has since carried out large-scale experimental trials to 
inform policy making in a wide range of behavioural contexts such as organ donation, alcohol 
consumption, consumer empowerment, environment, and tax (Cabinet Office Behavioural 
Insights Team, 2011).  
 
1.2.Effectiveness of Nudge 
Since its inception, the views on the use of nudges range from those praising their potential 
benefits (Mills, 2013; Saghai, 2013; Sunstein, 2015b), to those that doubt how they are utilized 
(Goodwin, 2012; Mols, Haslam, Jetten, & Steffens, 2015; Osman, 2016; Selinger & Whyte, 
2012) and whether they are effective (Bonell, McKee, Fletcher, Wilkinson, & Haines, 2011; 
Kosters & Van der Heijden, 2015; Marteau, Ogilvie, Roland, Suhrcke, & Kelly, 2011). As 
nudge becomes increasingly applied to policy making, there is a need to understand the 
different ways in which nudge can lead to ethical, effective, and sustainable behavioural change. 
To date, there is a lack of research at the population level to indicate the effectiveness of nudge 
at sustaining behaviour change in the long-term (Marteau et al., 2011). In a scoping review of 
346 articles focusing on diet, physical activity, alcohol, and tobacco-related behaviours, G. J. 
Hollands et al. (2013) concluded that most studies were highly heterogeneous with respect to 
the populations, interventions, comparators or counterfactuals, outcomes, and moderators that 
were assessed. There were a small number of non-systematic reviews and broad overviews 
attempting to summarise parts of the overall evidence base, but only a few were of high-quality. 
Nørnberg, Houlby, Skov, & Peréz-Cueto (2016) reviewed 12 studies using interventions to 
promote vegetable consumption among adolescents and found no conclusive evidence for their 
effectiveness as the majority of studies were of weak or moderate quality. Similarly, Skov, 
Lourenço, Hansen, Mikkelsen, & Schofield (2013) found that a majority of 12 studies on 
changing eating behaviour in self-service eating settings were of very weak quality due to small 
sample sizes, inaccurate outcome measurement tools, short implementation durations, and a 
lack of descriptive information. Most recently, Lin, Osman, & Ashcroft (2017) examined a 
range of nudges implemented in the health domain. They found that the empirical support for 
nudge was not robust enough to make firm conclusions as to their current effectiveness, as too 
few studies make direct comparison of different nudge techniques against more conventional 
ways of inducing behavioural changes (e.g., taxes, fines, financial incentives) and against 
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control baseline conditions. Some studies were also conducted in the field, as with many field 
based studies the difficulties are running studies on a large sample with proper controls. 
Further, it is rare to find field studies that also carry out follow-ups to examine the effects of 
the nudges in the long term. Although the BIT has pioneered the use of randomised controlled 
trials to determine effectiveness of interventions with some considerable success, the Science 
and Technology Committee (2014) raised concerns regarding the availability of robust 
evaluation of data in the public domain to substantiate such claims about the success of some 
of its interventions.  
 
Another issue of concern in accessing efficacy of such interventions is the context-specific 
nature and generalisability of these interventions. That is, what works in one context with one 
groups of people may have limited effect in a different setting and a different group of people. 
The mixed evidence-base is due to their heterogeneous design which can be attributed to a lack 
inspection/scrutiny of the theoretical framework underpinning the mode of how nudges 
function to shape human behaviour. That is, if the theoretical framework on which nudge is 
proposed to work is founded problematic, then this has implication for the evaluation of nudge 
effectiveness. In order to establish effectiveness, it becomes apparent that there is a need for a 
conceptually sound framework. Currently, the broad definition and types of nudges mean there 
is no clear consensus on what counts as nudges and how they influence people’s behaviour, 
particularly as Thaler and Sunstein themselves offered examples of nudges that failed to 
conform to their initial definition (Selinger & White, 2012). For example, they offered an 
example of nudge in which teenagers were paid to not get pregnant while the definition of 
nudge explicitly stated that it should not significantly change people’s incentives. As of yet 
there is no precise, operational definition of nudge to indicate the mechanism by which choice 
architecture can be altered to change behaviour (Hollands, Shemilt, et al., 2013). This becomes  
a particular problem if policy maker were to design and implement nudges because there isn’t 
a clear picture of what nudge is, how it operates to change behaviour and the characteristic of 
the choice environment (Osman, 2016). With continuous policy interests worldwide, it is 
essential to establish clarity in the nudge concept so as to determine the effectiveness of 
interventions and to design effective interventions. The following section will outline the 
current underlying mechanism by which nudge is proposed to work and how this framework 
is potentially flawed for explaining the evidence base for nudge. 
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1.3.Theoretical Complexities 
The proposed underlying mechanism of nudge is the dual system theory (DST) which outlines 
two systems working together to influence choices and behaviours. System 1 is driven by 
immediate feelings and triggered by the environment. It is automatic, rapid, and instinctive, 
requiring no cognitive engagement. System 2 is a reflective, goal-oriented system that is 
deliberate, self-conscious, and has limited cognitive capacity. Nudge theorists (Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2008) claim that the basis of poor lifestyle choices is commonly through activation 
of System 1 type processes. Hence, a practical way of generating positive behavioural change 
is to target System 1 processes by re-orienting the features of the choice contexts on which 
heuristics and biases are invoked; this is typically achieved covertly without the decision-
maker’s awareness. The distinction between these two kinds of thinking have been extensively 
debated in the areas of reasoning, judgment and decision making, and social cognition (Evans 
& Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000). Some claim that the systems are 
interactive (Sloman, 1996); that they operate in parallel (Epstein, 1973; Evans & Over, 1996); 
that they have a sequential relationship (Gilbert, 1989)  whilst others claim that System 1 is the 
default and tends to dominate over other systems (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Although the 
DST had enjoyed considerable popularity over the last few decades, it has been challenged on 
the basis of empirical evidence (Osman, 2004, 2013, 2014a; Osman & Stavy, 2006). The core 
issues are associated with the distinction between implicit and explicit processes 
whereby implicit processes occur without awareness, and explicit processing is deliberate and 
accompanied by awareness (Evans & Over, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000). More specifically, 
there are two core issues with the System 1/System 2 distinction: 1) the nature of the interaction 
between the two systems; and 2) the lack of precision around the details of key distinctions 
between the two systems (Gigerenzer & Regier, 1996; Osman, 2016).  
 
At present, the exact relationship between these two systems is unclear, and more profoundly 
still, whether the distinctions between Systems 1 and 2 are an over simplification of a single 
system (Osman, 2013; Osman, 2014). The key point being that nudge is an indirect way of 
influencing lifestyle choices by tapping into System 1 which means that people’s choices are 
changed without them knowing that they are being influenced. Yet, if changes in behaviours 
are occurring at a non-conscious level then it is unlikely to bring about any substantive shift in 
people’s value structure needed to solve society’s major problems in the long term (Goodwin, 
2012). Conversely, if nudges work, it might be the case that they could lead to sustained 
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behavioural change if they deliberately targeted conscious processing over a long period of 
time. Furthermore, if the theoretical basis on which nudge is founded is problematic, then this 
will raise implications for ethical issues around free choice and whether or not this is infringed 
upon through the use of nudges. Consequently, a sound conceptual framework is a pre-
condition for assessing the effectiveness and acceptability of nudge as an intervention strategy 
(Baldwin, 2014). 
 
In an attempt to address the two critical issues with the DST, the first objective of this thesis is 
to propose an alternative theoretical framework to account for the current nudge evidence-base. 
Based on the proposed framework, the idea is to apply a new conceptualisation to understand 
lifestyle behaviours such as poor diet, physical inactivity, alcohol overconsumption and 
tobacco use. These four main risk factors were selected for investigation due to their significant 
role in development of non-communicable diseases (NCDs). NCDs, principally heart diseases, 
stroke, cancer, diabetes, and chronic lung diseases are responsible for almost 70% of the global 
death (WHO, 2017a). Since we make choices in our day to day lives based on heuristics and 
biases that potentially drive poor lifestyle choices, therefore, gaining evidence on the 
effectiveness of these interventions can help determine how to best target NCDs in the future. 
Having established the critical concerns regarding the current DST, and presented the broad 
details of an alternative theoretical foundation, the next section introduces the ethical issues 
concerning the nudge programme, in particular, with respect to its working mechanism. 
 
1.4.Nudge and Autonomy 
By definition, nudges are designed to influence choice behaviour so to increase the likelihood 
that certain options will be selected. At the heart of nudge philosophy is libertarian paternalism 
which preserve people’s rights to freely choose the preferred option (Sunstein, 2016d; Thaler 
& Sunstein, 2008). The justification for nudge is that the choice architecture is never neutral 
because choices have to be presented in one way or another (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). This 
approach is designed to spare policy makers any ethical concerns, because a certain choice 
behaviour is being encouraged by the state that promotes a certain value-based lifestyle 
approach, yet preserves the right of an individual to do otherwise (for an in depth discussion 
see Osman, 2016). With regards to nudges, the concern is whether they easily allow people to 
make their own decisions; thus preserving their right to choose. Debates have arisen because 
some argue that the way in which nudges operate in changing choice behaviour is 
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predominately influenced by exploiting people’s cognitive biases without their awareness 
(Ashcroft, 2013; Blumenthal-Barby & Burroughs, 2012; Bovens, 2009; Dworkin, 2012;  
Osman, 2016; Rebonato, 2013). Ultimately, if one is choosing an option without any awareness 
of how and why it is being chosen, it would be hard for people to opt out even if they wanted 
to. For this reason, a persistent criticism of nudge is infringement upon autonomy (Hausman 
& Welch, 2010). According to Dworkin (1988, p. 105), autonomy is “… understood as a power 
of self-determination”. A second-order capacity of a person is to critically reflect upon one’s 
first-order preferences, values, and the ability to identify or change in light of these preferences. 
Put simply, autonomy is an individual’s capacity to self-govern, and to make their own choices 
free from coercion.  
 
Proponents of nudge argue that human beings have limited bandwidth – that is the cognitive 
capacity to consciously process all the choices they make is limited; hence, nudges actually 
enhance autonomy because it gives people the freedom to focus on other matters that are more 
important in people’s life (Sunstein, 2016a). In this light, Felsen and Reiner (2015) argue that 
nudge improves autonomy if it counteracts a bias as it promotes a choice that is in line with 
one’s higher-order desires. Similarly, Sunstein (2013) argues that the strongest objection to 
autonomy is welfare, that is, infringement of autonomy may not be a serious problem as long 
as we are guided towards welfare-promoting ends. The underlying support for these arguments 
is based on the assumptions that the choice architecture should be primarily focused on 
facilitating individuals’ pursuit of their own goals and there is an acceptably low opt out cost, 
so long as the intervention meets the conditions of transparency. In reality, however, these 
conditions are rarely satisfied, because firstly the choice architect often face the knowledge 
problem as they do not possess information about the chooser’s “true” preference hence they 
will inevitably impose value substitution based on making some presumption about the 
chooser’s higher-order desire. Secondly, the way nudges work involves bypassing the 
chooser’s cognitive capacities for reasoning making her less in control of her actions (Bovens, 
2009). This means it is difficult for the choosers to opt out of the arrangement if they wanted 
to. Therefore, for individuals to exercise autonomy over their own choices, they should be able 
to discern the implemented intervention, that is, the intervention should be transparent.  
 
Following this, the second objective of the thesis is to empirically examine the extent to which 
nudge undermines autonomy: 1) If nudges do not align with the chooser’s higher order desire 
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- the welfarist argument; and 2) If people cannot discern the nudge intervention and how it is 
used to change their behaviour - the transparency argument. The following subsections will 
explicate these two arguments in further detail. 
1.4.1. The Welfarist Argument 
Value Substitution. The objective of nudge is to steer people’s behaviour in a welfare-
promoting direction as judged by themselves but because the way some of the nudges work is 
by influencing people in a non-transparent way, for example, implementing default options, 
altering plate sizes, and visual illusions to reduce speed. These nudges deprived people of the 
ability to make their own choices according to their value as they do not engage in people’s 
cognitive capacity for reasoning and deliberation. Instead, the choice architect selects among 
the individual’s inconsistent preference based on some “general presumptions” to determine 
an individual’s “true” preference” (Whitman & Rizzo, 2015). The problem with choice 
architects, including government officials, is that they lack sufficient information about the 
chooser’s genuine wants. The fact that people are susceptible to nudges suggest that their 
preferences are less well defined (Sunstein and Thaler, 2003) and cannot be determined through 
simple observation of their choices. So, for this reason the choice architect will inevitably 
impose their value in substitution of the chooser’s, otherwise known as “value substitution”. 
This means people might be trapped with the options that do not align with their higher-order 
desire. The prospect of value substitution as a governing philosophy therefore violates people’s 
autonomy and threatens welfare by projecting one’s interest onto another (Rebonato, 2013; 
White, 2013). In line with this, Sunstein (2013) states that whatever the origins of the objection 
to paternalistic government, the force of those objections should depend on whether 
paternalism from government threatens to reduce people’s welfare or intrudes on people’s 
autonomy. 
 
In order to evaluate the welfare consequence of nudging in public policy, it is necessary to 
categorise each nudge according to its objective, that is, pro-self or pro-social. Pro-self nudges 
seek to counterbalance irrational behaviour in order to maximise individual welfare (e.g., 
automatic enrolment onto pension plans), whereas pro-social nudges primarily seeks to 
maximize social welfare (e.g., automatic enrolment onto organ donor registers) (Hagman, 
Andersson, Västfjäll, & Tinghög, 2015). This distinction allows evaluation of respective 
consequences from their implementation. Consider one of the most well-known nudges - 
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default rules, which work by automatically enrolling people into a programme without having 
them make a deliberative choice. These form part of the choice architecture and because there 
is always a default setting within a particular choice context - they are unavoidable. In the 
context of default options, two of the most commonly implemented nudges are pro-self default 
in pension enrolment and pro-social default in organ donation registration. Here, individuals 
are nudged into making the “right” choices by the government under a default opt-out system. 
Pro-self pension enrolment defaults, automatically enrolls individuals onto a pension scheme 
upon entering into the workplace. Whereas the pro-social organ donation defaults 
automatically enrol citizens as organ donors. In both these cases, opting out requires 
administrative efforts on behalf of the individual because to do so requires filling out necessary 
paperwork. However, it has been argued that there is little value in having a nominal right to 
opt out because nudge is effective by exploiting cognitive biases of the choosers. This means 
that due to the power of default, the ability to opt out would likely be subject to the same 
cognitive biases (Rebonato, 2013). The problem with the force of inertia is that people will 
find it difficult to opt out of unsuitable defaults (Sunstein, 2015c). So, what would this entail 
for autonomy and actual welfare? The welfare consequence of being defaulted into these 
schemes are subtly different. In the former, being defaulted into an inappropriate contribution 
rate would impact the level of future retirement savings because default options do not take 
into account different risk preferences and spending behaviours in a population. In the latter, 
welfare concerns the livings as they have to make a decision in relation to the deceased’s body 
after death which is dependent on whether there is a reason to respect the deceased’s wishes. 
Under default opt-out, they might find it difficult to identify a deceased relative’s beliefs about 
organ donation when there is no evidence of explicit consent (Whyte, Selinger, Caplan, & 
Sadowski, 2012).  
 
Although defaults in these contexts have been seeing increases in the number of people on the 
organ donation register or in retirement savings scheme, there is no empirical work examining 
people’s judgement around the use of defaults in these pro-self and pro-social contexts. From 
a welfarist perspective, nudge undermines autonomy if it does not align with people’s higher 
order desire. In order to explore the welfare-consequences of implementing defaults, part one 
of the second objective of this thesis sets out to empirically determine the extent to which third 
party perceive people’s true preference to donate or to register under a retirement savings 
scheme are sensitive to defaults. Chapter 3.1 will outline how defaults are applied in these 
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contexts respectively and how lack of autonomy may lead to misalignment with the chooser’s 
higher order desire. The findings for pro-self pension enrolment will be presented in Chapter 
4 and pro-social organ donation registration in Chapter 5.  
 
1.4.2. The Transparency Argument 
Another concern about nudging in public policy making is their covertness. This is particularly 
important because a government’s attempt to tackle societal problems may not be judged 
ethically acceptable if an intervention is covert or if it intrudes on an individual’s life (House 
of Lords, 2011). This transparency criterion has important implications on policy measures 
upon which accountability depends on. Thaler & Sunstein (2008) have stated that these are 
indispensable safeguards. From an autonomy perspective, the less transparent the nudge is, the 
greater is the threat to autonomy (Bovens, 2009). For people to exercise their autonomy, a 
certain degree of transparency is required. A lack of transparency blocks a person’s capacity 
for reasoning, and hence offends both autonomy and dignity (Sunstein, 2016d). As mentioned, 
non-transparent nudges, such as defaults, constrain people’s ability to opt-out of unsuitable 
options. Although Sunstein (2016c) argues that people will reject nudges that they see as unfit, 
the problem arises if people are not aware that a default has been implemented and so it is 
difficult for them to reject it, even if they want to. In order to avoid a nudge that is either ill 
intended or unfit, one needs to know that one is being nudged in the first place. 
 
Furthermore, nudges that lack transparency are more susceptible to the power of the 
manipulators because they can subvert the chooser’s decision-making. “Subverting” involves 
influencing people’s choice “to the extent that it does not engage or appeal to their capacity 
for reflection and deliberation” (Sunstein, 2016a, p11). In line with this, Hausman and Welch  
(2010) argue that “shaping” people’s choice that excludes rational persuasion is considered 
manipulative. They contend that there is a difference between attempting to persuade someone 
by means of facts and valid arguments and attempting to take advantage of people’s cognitive 
bias to get them to make a choice. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) attempted to address the issue 
of manipulation through one of their guiding principles: Transparency. Their notion of 
transparency was derived from Rawl’s publicity principle which “in its simplest form bans 
government from selecting a policy that it would not be able or willing to defend publicly to its 
own citizens” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p244). For this reason, subliminal advertising is 
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argued to have violated the publicity principle because it is invisible and thus impossible to 
monitor; whether or not there is any actual evidence for its existence (Osman, Lin, & Ashcroft, 
2017). However, Barton and Grüne-Yanoff (2015) argue that the publicity condition is 
hypothetical as it only states that policymakers can defend policies they are willing to defend 
publicly, but it does not require them to actually defend them publicly. The publicity principle, 
therefore, does not seem to guarantee against manipulative use of nudges or the prospect that 
they might infringe autonomy. In an ideal world, transparency should allow the chooser to 
identify the intentional action of the choice architect. Bovens (2009) argues that nudges should 
not only satisfy “type interference transparency” (how the nudge will interfere with our agency) 
but also “token interference transparency” (each specific intervention is made transparent to 
the nudgee). Transparency at this level means manipulation with ill intent is also less likely to 
be effective (Sunstein, 2016d).  
 
Although there are concerns that making nudges transparent would render it less effective 
(Bovens, 2009), previous research has found that disclosing a nudge does not undermine its 
effectiveness (Loewenstein, Bryce, Hagmann, & Rajpal, 2014). In fact, evidence suggests that 
the public generally prefer transparent nudges over opaque ones (Felsen, Castelo, & Reiner, 
2013). Indeed, in the House of Lords (2011) report, Luc Bovens concluded that ethical 
acceptability do not require governments to explain that an intervention has been implemented, 
but to render an intervention as acceptable those being nudged should have the ability to discern 
its implementation. In line with this view, Hansen and Jespersen (2013) suggested that 
distinguishing between transparent and non-transparent nudges will distinguish the 
manipulative use of nudges from other types. These points all highlight the importance of 
retaining transparency in policies. In this regard, people’s perception of transparency provides 
information for ethical considerations related to the introduction of a policy, as well as the 
expected effectiveness and acceptability of the intervention, and whether people would be 
willing to change their behaviour under these conditions. Part two of the second objective of 
the thesis is to empirically examine the extent to which nudge undermines autonomy if people 
cannot discern the intervention and how it is used to change their behaviour. Before going 
further, we would require a better understanding of transparency since the publicity principle 
has been objected on the grounds of being hypothetical. From the standpoint that nudge 
infringes upon autonomy, it makes sense to take the view of the nudgee rather than the nudger 
since their decisions are being influenced without awareness. Nonetheless, transparency is a 
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subjective concept, that is, an intervention may be deemed transparent by the choice architect 
but can be perceived otherwise by the nudgee. Chapter 3.2 includes a further discussion on 
transparency with the aim of establishing an account of transparency from the perspective of 
those being nudged. Chapter 6 will present the empirical findings on public attitudes toward 
transparent and non-transparent nudges. 
1.5.Summary  
With the rise of nudging in government administrations, stricter scrutiny should be 
implemented. Governments should take steps to ensure that behaviour change interventions are 
based on concrete evidence. However, there is currently insufficient evidence to draw firm 
conclusions on the effectiveness of nudges. Due to a lack of randomized controlled trials at a 
population level and the diversity of nudge-type intervention designs, one area that draws 
attention is the theoretical complexities concerning the underlying mechanism of nudge. Two 
critical issues associated with the DST were identified which prompted a need to establish 
further theoretical rigor before evaluating the effectiveness of nudge. The first objective of the 
thesis is to propose an alternative theoretical framework to account for the current evidence-
base of nudge interventions in the health domain; with regards to four lifestyle behaviours: 
poor diet, physical inactivity, alcohol overconsumption and tobacco use.  
 
The second objective of the thesis is to explore the extent to which nudge undermines 
autonomy: 1) If nudges do not align with the chooser’s higher order desire - the welfarist 
argument; and 2) If people cannot discern the intervention and how it is used to change their 
behaviour - the transparency argument. From a welfarist perspective, proponents of nudge 
argue that intrusion on autonomy may not be a serious problem so long as nudges influence 
people in a welfare-promoting direction. I have illustrated that the welfarist argument loses its 
ground as nudge is prone to value substitution. This motivates two empirical studies to examine 
third party judgements of people’s true preference when their choices are defaulted in the 
domain of pension enrolment (pro-self) and organ donation (pro-social).  
 
On transparency grounds, another concern that draws ethical issues toward nudge is its 
covertness. Governments’ attempt to solve societal problems might be judged as ethically 
unacceptable if an intervention lacks transparency. Similarly, an intervention that lacks 
transparency is also more likely to be considered manipulative. Although Thaler and Sunstein 
have attempted to address this issue by introducing the publicity principle, this condition is 
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often judged as insufficient due to its hypothetical nature. Since transparency is not in itself 
self-defining, this means government officials may perceive transparency differently from 
those being nudged. Hence, there is a need to establish a notion of transparency from the 
perspective of the nudgee rather than the nudger. This motivated the third empirical study to 
investigate public attitude towards transparent and non-transparent nudges as a way of 
providing information on ethical issues concerning transparency and autonomy. In sum, the 
thesis aims to critically examine nudge on theoretical, empirical and ethical grounds in order 
to guide policy making in designing ethically justified nudge-type interventions that are based 
on robust designs and which are more likely to sustain behavioural change at a population level. 
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CHAPTER 2 – Nudge: Theoretical and Empirical Re-consideration 
 
Chapter 1 introduced the concept of nudge and explained the need to examine the critical issues 
associated with the underlying mechanism of nudge. This is to allow evaluation of the current 
nudge evidence-base within the health domain. The main focus in this chapter is to pick up the 
critical themes laid out in Chapter 1. The first section will outline the critical issues concerning 
the DST. Based on this, I will explore why a connectionist approach offers a better account of 
the relationship between System 1 and System 2. In doing so, I will propose a single system 
framework which classifies nudges into two types: Type 1 and Type 2, based on quantitative 
rather than qualitative distinction. The second section will then evaluate the evidence-base for 
Type 1 and Type 2 nudges in the health domain with regards to four lifestyle behaviours: poor 
diet, physical inactivity, alcohol overconsumption and tobacco use. To further establish 
empirical rigor, the third section will outline the empirical issues associated with nudges in the 
health domain. Since randomised controlled trials are hard to introduce in the field, it is 
important to consider internal and external reliability in future empirical research so as to draw 
firm conclusions about the effectiveness of nudges. Building on the proposed framework, 
review of the evidence-base, and the empirical issues the final section will re-consider the 
nudge programme by taking into account all these findings. 
  
2.1.Critical issues with Dual-System theories 
One area which needs inspection is the theoretical framework on which nudges are built on, 
given that this forms the rationale for how they are supposed to operate (Baldwin, 2014). This 
section examines the current proposed psychological mechanisms that underpin nudges, and 
the problems associated with the theoretical framework adopted. Based on this, an alternative 
theoretical account of nudges is proposed as a way to reconsider the evidence base of nudge 
interventions in the health domain. Chapter 1 has already introduced the theoretical framework 
of nudges and the critical issues associated with the distinction between implicit and explicit 
processing. The two core issues in the evaluation of System 1/System 2 distinctions are: 1) the 
nature of the interaction between the two systems, 2) the lack of precision around the details of 
key distinctions between the two systems (Osman, 2016). This evaluation is designed to better 
understand how to target behaviour via nudges,  having a better idea of the actual underlying 
mechanism that guides decision-making should reveal where nudges are likely to be most 
   
 
 
26 
effective (Grüne-Yanoff, 2016; Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, 2015). The following section will 
examine these critical issues in further details.  
 
Issue 1. The nature of the relationship between System 1 and 2. Dual system theorists do not 
all make the same claims regarding the relationship between systems (Evans & Stanovich, 
2013). Some claim that the systems are interactive (Sloman, 1996), some claim that they 
operate in parallel (Epstein, 1973, 1994; Evans & Over, 1996), and others claim that they 
operate serially (Gilbert, 1989); System 1 is the default system, and only later does System 2 
kick in to monitor the outputs of System 1 (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2003) - 
known as the default-interventionist approach. If System 1 and 2 are dissociated and do not 
interact, then it makes better sense to try to directly tap into System 1 processes to generate 
behavioural change; this is the default system that gives rise to many of the core decision-
making and reasoning processes that drive sub-optimal lifestyle choices. As such, nudge 
theorists and practitioners need to identify common sub-optimal behaviours exclusively driven 
by System 1 processes, which thus far the program of nudges has yet to do.  
 
However, if it is the case that the two systems do interact, then does it still make sense to 
introduce an intervention solely on System 1?  If not, then nudges may not operate in the way 
that they are intended. In other words, if the grounds on which they are based are theoretically 
problematic, this may explain why nudges are not as effective as purported to be. To explore 
Issue 1 further we consider the bat and ball task (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002) that Thaler 
and Sunstein (2008) used to illustrate the relationship between System 1 and 2. The task 
involves presenting participants with a simple description and question: “A bat and ball cost 
$1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?”. Typically, 
a majority of participants will intuitively answer 10 cents (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), but 
the correct answer is in fact 5 cents. Just based on this task alone, DSTs vary significantly in 
their explanations for this common error. One interpretation is that System 1 is invoked 
automatically and is the sole driver of the error (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, 2005), this is 
the favoured interpretation of Thaler and Sunstein (2008). An alternative explanation is that 
System 2 is also in operation but fails to detect the error generated by System 1 (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1982), and a third interpretation is that because System 2 is slower than System 1, 
System 2 detects the error but cannot intervene quickly enough to prevent the error being made 
(Gilbert, 1989; Stanovich & West, 2000). The role that System 2 plays in this task, in turn has 
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implications for how researchers develop methods to effectively ameliorate the error. 
Similarly, when extended to nudges, the reasons behind a poor choice, in turn will impact what 
appropriate intervention will be required to reduce the chances of it continually being made.  
  
Issue 2. Lack of precision regarding the critical distinctions between the two systems. There 
are essentially three different proposals regarding the core qualitative difference between 
System 1 and System 2. One view is that they can be differentiated based on their demands on 
working memory (De Neys, 2006; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Oppenheimer, 2008). Working 
memory is a system for the temporary holding and manipulation of information during the 
performance of a range of cognitive tasks. A second claim is that they differ depending on the 
extent to which metacognitive processes are invoked (Thompson, 2009). This broadly refers to 
explicit knowledge or beliefs of factors that affect the outcome of a cognitive operation. The 
third is that they vary in the extent to which representations are accessible (Kahneman, 2003); 
the ease (or effort) with which particular mental contents come explicitly to mind. Essentially, 
the greater the dependency on working memory, or metacognitive processes, or difficulty in 
accessing representations suggests System 2 is in operation, and the opposite applies for 
System 1.  
 
There are three main problems with the apparent qualitative distinctions between System 1 and 
2. The first is, and as has been highlighted by DSTs, that in actual fact the three qualities 
essentially reduce to one single factor, namely dependency on working memory (Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013). This in and of itself is not necessarily a concern, since it suggests strong 
compatibility between the theoretical claims. However, what is a concern is that dependency 
on working memory is not all or nothing. Modelling and empirical demonstrations of the way 
in which high order cognition relies on working memory is based on quantitative differences, 
not qualitative ones (e.g., Schmiedek, Oberauer, Wilhelm, Süß, & Wittmann, 2007).  
 
Second is that the purported core qualitative distinction between System 1 and 2, be that 
working memory, metacognition, or accessibility of representations, is used to explain why 
one system is implicit/automatic, and the other is explicit. As with working memory, measures 
identifying automatic and explicit processes often rely on speed of response which is a 
continuous measure. This means that there are a variety of judgments, choices and inferences 
that are made, some of which are faster than others (Osman, 2004, 2007, 2013, 2014a; Osman 
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& Stavy, 2006). The relative nature by which implicit and explicit responses are identified, 
means that it makes better sense to claim that some responses are faster than others, rather than 
some are automatic/implicit and others are explicit. Thus far no DST theorist has presented the 
necessary and sufficient conditions by which to identify automatic/implicit responses 
independently of explicit responses (Osman, 2004). Moreover, not all behaviours associated 
with System 1 are fast, and not all behaviours associated with System 2 are slow, and to 
accommodate this some theorists have proposed a four system framework (Klaczynski, 2001; 
Sun, Slusarz, & Terry, 2005).  
 
Third, the same initial observations that led to the formation of DSTs; and used to theorize 
about the key qualitative property that determines the difference between the two systems, are 
re-described to form predictions of the same observations which identify differences between 
the two systems. Put simply, it would be akin to detecting that sometimes people make 
erroneous choices quickly, and correct choices slowly, and then theorize that this is because of 
two underlying systems one of which is fast, the other of which is slow; each of which differ 
based on ease of access of information. From this, a prediction is formed which outlines that 
when the slow system is being used people will make correct choices, but not when the fast 
system is invoked. This is referred to as a particular type of circular argument (self-dependent 
justification), which has been commonly found in the area of DSTs of decision-making, 
judgment and reasoning (Hahn, 2011). Given the serious concerns discussed around Issue 1 
and 2, the following section will propose an alternative.  
 
2.2.A Single System Account of Nudge 
Many dual system theorists (Evans & Over, 1996; Evans & Stanovich, 2013); as well as critics 
of them (Osman, 2004, 2013, 2014b; Gigerenzer & Regier, 1996) agree that a fully 
dissociationist view of System 1 and System 2 is not adequate for capturing the complexities 
in which decision-making processes operate. In light of this and other serious concerns with 
dual-system frameworks, several single-system frameworks have been proposed (e.g., 
Kruglanski, 2013; Osman, 2004, 2007, 2013; Osman & Stavy, 2006; Simon, Snow, & Read, 
2004). Building on these unitary system frameworks, we extend their proposals by suggesting 
that they reduce to a parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS) model (Simon et al., 2004). This is 
essentially a connectionist approach in which the spread of activation among nodes in the 
network is fully sufficient for the processing of an outcome, e.g. a choice, and the basis on 
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which a decision is made (knowledge, evidence, beliefs) is coded in the network through the 
pattern of weights among the nodes (Read, Vanman, & Miller, 1997). PCS processing is guided 
by the goal of maximizing consistency, which means the need to reconfigure, re-evaluate, 
update knowledge, evidence and beliefs from multiple (potentially conflicting) sources that 
bring about an outcome (i.e. judgment, choice, inference) so that both (representations and 
outcome) are in alignment (i.e. coherent). Where DSTs identify distinct types of processes that 
can be classified as System 1 or System 2, in a PCS model, variations in processing of 
information is predicted and modelled according to the degree of restructuring that needs to 
occur for coherence (between knowledge and behaviour) to be achieved (Simon & Holyoak, 
2002). 
 
The PCS single system framework is extended to help classify nudges into two types that differ 
according to the degree to which processing efforts are needed to maintain psychological 
coherence (See Table 1 for examples). Type 1 nudges target decision-making contexts which 
generate responses that are not typically accompanied by critical inspection to prompt 
reconsideration of the choices made. For instance, familiar consumer-based contexts such as 
supermarkets involving highly practiced patterns of behaviour leading to repetitive choices 
being made. So, in response, Type 1 nudges involve simple interventions such as re-arranging 
presentations of consumer items in food aisles to highlight options that would have ordinarily 
been ignored. Type 1 nudges minimally disrupt the choice context to prompt some adjustment 
in the way information is processed at the point of decision, but not enough that the decision-
maker detects any dissonance between the nudged choice and their general value-system. Type 
2 nudges aim to promote a sustained re-evaluation of the evidence base on which people make 
their choices and the choices themselves, by disrupting the coherence between the two. For 
example, information prompt placed at the bottom of stairwells to promote exercise by 
presenting the benefits of regular exercise as well as the harmful effects of a persistent 
sedentary lifestyle. Repeated exposure to information of this kind is designed to create 
dissonance resulting from the costs of maintaining poor habits and the benefits of changing 
them. Given the cognitive system’s need for coherence, a re-evaluation and restructuring of 
knowledge representations is needed to bring in alignment the evidence base 
(knowledge/beliefs) and choice behaviour. It is worth reiterating here that the two types of 
nudges differ according to the amount of re-evaluation of information on which peoples’ 
choices are made and actions taken based on it, it is not predicated on a difference between 
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qualitative differences in systems of thought. Based on this conceptualisation, the evidence 
bases will be critically examined in order to determine which type of nudge is shown to be 
effective.  
 
2.3.Empirical Evidence in Health Domain 
The proposed framework will have implication for evaluating the effectiveness of nudge 
because the distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 nudges allows for the classification of 
interventions according to their ability to bring in alignment the evidence base and choice 
behaviour, and in turn determine their respective effectiveness. This section examines a range 
of nudges (Table 1) implemented in four health domains based on the proposed distinction: 1) 
poor diet, 2) physical inactivity, 3) alcohol overconsumption and 4) tobacco use. This is not a 
comprehensive review of the evidence in the literature, but instead is a focused evaluation of 
core findings to illustrate the pattern of evidence in this area (see Appendix A for studies that 
were included in the review).  
 
Table 1. 
A summary of the evidence on the effectiveness of Type 1 and Type 2 Nudges. 
Health Domain Type 1 Nudges Type 2 Nudges 
Unhealthy Diet Smaller plate sizes 
to reduce 
consumption 
Limited 
effect 
Calorie labelling Ineffective 
Traffic light labelling Effective 
Physical 
Inactivity 
 
Footprints Ineffective Motivational posters Mixed evidence 
Harmful Use of 
Alcohol 
Adopt straight 
glassware 
Insufficient 
evidence 
Correct social norm 
misapprehension 
Mixed evidence 
 
Tobacco Use 
 
Shorter cigarettes 
 
Ineffective 
Health warnings on 
branded packs 
Mixed evidence 
 
Health Warnings on 
plain packs 
Effective 
 
Poor Diet 
A common Type 1 nudge approach to address overconsumption includes changes to visual 
cues in a food environment which may consist of the availability of certain foods, the variety 
of food assortments, size of food packages and portions, or shape/size of plates, glasses and 
bowls. These cues are often used to imply a consumption norm that helps regulate how much 
we eat or drink in a food environment (Wansink, 2004). In addition, many people adhere to the 
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norm of ‘plate clean’, which means that in a food establishment if the plate is large, and the 
portions match the size, people consume to the size of the portion on the plate, and not to the 
point of being sated (Schwarz, 1998). For example, depending on the plate size, up to 45% 
more food is consumed in a Chinese buffet setting (Wansink & van Ittersum, 2013). A 
comparison of 58 studies (6603 participants) in a recent Cochrane review found that people 
consistently ate more food when offered larger-sized portions, packages or items of tableware, 
than when offered smaller-sized versions (Hollands et al., 2015). Introducing Type 1 nudges 
that reduce plate size in food establishments was shown to have a reasonable effect in reducing 
intake, but was dependent on participants being unaware of the manipulation (Holden, 
Zlatevska, & Dubelaar, 2016). However, it isn’t clear that the intervention successfully 
generalizes to contexts beyond the one in which the nudge was implemented. Moreover, many 
factors can significantly influence our eating habits. Eating is often a social activity, and we 
take our cues as to how much to consume from our dining partners, as well as other distractions 
that might affect our consumption (e.g., watching television, watching movies at the cinema). 
This suggests that there are multiple countervailing factors that limit the scope of Type 1 
nudges (Wansink, 2004).  
 
In this context, as an alternative to Type 1 nudges, Type 2 nudges focus on improving the 
presentation of information on which people make their food choices, such as providing calorie 
counts on food menus to draw attention to both healthy and unhealthy options (Downs, 
Loewenstein, & Wisdom, 2009). However, evidence suggests that this has had limited effects 
in increasing healthy food choices (Loewenstein et al., 2012). One reason for this is that calorie 
labels do not provide an obvious reference point as to which specific options are best. In and 
of themselves, they do not reliably motivate people to systematically monitor and translate 
calorie counts to shift their choices over a sustained period of time. Indeed, a recent systematic 
review of the impact of reading calorie labels at the point of purchase or consumption had little 
to no effect on positively changing people’s choice behaviour (Kiszko, Martinez, Abrams, & 
Elbel, 2014; Sinclair, Cooper, & Mansfield, 2014). The review found that regardless of the 
length of the intervention, the Type 2 nudge was generally ineffective [4 week period (Elbel, 
Gyamfi, & Kersh, 2011; K. L. Webb, Solomon, Sanders, Akiyama, & Crawford, 2011); 2 
month period (Holmes, Serrano, Machin, Duetsch, & Davis, 2013), 13 month period 
(Finkelstein, Strombotne, Chan, & Krieger, 2011)]. To deal with these concerns, traffic light 
systems have been added to make calorie information more salient and intuitively simpler to 
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interpret (Sacks, Rayner, & Swinburn, 2009; Sonnenberg et al., 2013). By using simple visual 
cues (e.g., red = highly fat food, amber = moderately healthy foods, green = very healthy foods) 
the signals directly connect calorie counts to their impact on health (House of Lords, 2011), 
and provide a relevant reference point (Liu, Wisdom, Roberto, Liu, & Ubel, 2014). An 
independent field study conducted by Ipsos Mori showed that 35% of customers of a major 
UK supermarket actively look at traffic light labels when they shop, and 92% of those find 
these labels easy to understand. Also, over the 12-week period, sales of food items with mostly 
green traffic lights grew to 46.1% whereas those with mostly red traffic lights decreased by 
24% (House of Lords, 2011). Thus, in the UK alone several organizations (The National 
institute for Care and Health Excellence (NICE); The UK Food Standard Agency) have 
strongly encouraged food manufacturers and food establishments to use text and traffic lights 
on food labels/menus because they support greater alignment between knowledge (i.e., calorie 
information) and choice behaviour (i.e., be eat healthily).  
 
Physical Activity  
As with poor diet, another major global issue is the significant decreases in regular exercise 
(Hallal et al., 2012). A simple method of increasing physical activity through a Type 1 nudge 
involves a point-of-decision prompt which uses visual cues in relevant contexts to encourage 
people to take the more active of two options (e.g. a choice between taking the stairs rather 
than the escalator). For instance, painted footprints on stairwells have been used to guide people 
to take the stairs over elevators. The evidence base for this is not encouraging. Findings show 
that, perversely, the method increased the selection of the less physical option (Åvitsland, 
Solbraa, & Riiser, 2017). Similarly, Type 2 nudges also use a point-of-decision prompt, but 
instead of covert visual cues, educational information is presented that highlights the benefits 
of regular exercise. This often involves placing posters at start of stairwells or by elevators/ 
escalators that inform people about the calories they would burn or the net positive effects on 
their health (i.e. increased heart rate) (Andersen, Franckowiak, Snyder, Bartlett, & Fontaine, 
1998; Blamey, Mutrie, & Aitchison, 1995; Brownell, Stunkard, & Albaum, 1980; A. Lewis & 
Eves, 2012; Marshall, Bauman, Patch, Wilson, & Chen, 2002; Nomura, Yoshimoto, Akezaki, 
& Sato, 2009; O. J. Webb & Eves, 2007). A recent review of the evidence reported that across 
11 studies the improvement in observed stair use was 50% from baseline (Soler et al., 2010), 
but a second review reported an overall positive effect ranging between 0.3-10.6% (Nocon, 
Müller-Riemenschneider, Nitzschke, & Willich, 2010). A speculation in the difference 
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between these two reviews is that there is variability in the length of the intervention. The 
length of the intervention is often between 4-12 weeks, but with some notable exceptions [24 
weeks (Kerr, Eves, & Carroll, 2001a), 9 months (Lee et al., 2012)]. Another potential 
explanation for the mixed findings is that the locations in which the nudge was implemented 
varied, and so it is hard to compare like for like; for instance, comparing returning populations 
taking the stairs at train station versus those at a shopping mall. To further uncover the precise 
reasons for the variability of Type 2 nudges effectiveness in this domain, the types of 
informational prompts have been evaluated. A specific message such as ‘7 minutes of stair 
climbing protects your heart’ was shown to be more effective than a general message such as 
‘Stay healthy, use the stairs’(Puig-Ribera & Eves, 2010). It is also worth noting that studies 
examining Type 1 and 2 nudges typically involve point-of-decision prompts placed at stairwell 
with only one to two flights of stairs. In order to experience any significant impact on 
cardiorespiratory fitness women need to climb at least 6 flights of stairs daily (Boreham, 
Wallace, & Nevill, 2000), and men need to climb 25 flights to result in any significant 
improvement in aerobic power (Fardy & Ilmarinen, 1975).  
 
Alcohol Overconsumption  
The evidence base for nudges designed to reduce alcohol overconsumption only accounts for 
7.3% of all behavioural intervention studies in the health domain (Hollands, Shemilt, et al., 
2013), despite the severity of the problem (Magnusson, 2009). Akin to the Type 1 nudges used 
to reduce food consumption via altering the size of food containers, a similar rationale has been 
adopted in the context of alcohol consumption. This typically involves offering alcohol in tall, 
narrow glasses as opposed to short, wide glasses in drinking establishments (bars and public 
houses) (Wansink & van Ittersum, 2005). This is motivated by work showing that the rate of 
alcohol consumption is related to the shape of glassware, which is slower in a straight glass 
compared to a curved glass (Attwood, Scott-Samuel, Stothart, Munafò, & Campanella, 2012). 
A recent systematic review of studies examining the use of this nudge reported that there was 
not enough evidence to estimate the effect on reducing consumption (Hollands et al., 2015). 
In line with other Type 2 nudges discussed so far, a preferred method is to provide explicit 
information to generate behavioural change. For example, providing a more accurate idea of 
safe quantities to consume through the use of social norm cues. As social creatures, people are 
sensitive to majority influences and this can be a strong persuasive influence on behaviour 
(Bullers, Cooper, & Russell, 2001; Ennett et al., 2006; Pearson & West, 2003). A wealth of 
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evidence from social psychology shows that people behave in accordance to what their peers 
do (J. V. Wood, 1989), often as part of a group mentality; there is a strong drive to belong and 
be accepted by a group. Given that consuming alcohol is typically a social activity, the claim 
is that using social norm cues (i.e. the typical amount of alcohol a particular social group 
consumes) is a more efficient way of helping people regulate their alcohol consumption, by 
evaluating it relative to the consumption of their peers (Nishida, Akaoka, & Nishizawa, 1975). 
For instance, heavy drinkers often judge their alcohol consumption to be equal to or even less 
than their peers – even though it is substantially greater (Perkins, Meilman, Leichliter, Cashin, 
& Presley, 1999; they feel as if they can resonably justify their behaviour by rationalizing that 
it is no different to their peers). To correct misapprehensions of social norms in a student 
population, several studies using self-reported survey responses have shown that Type 2 social 
norm interventions (through educational campaigns) implemented over a period of one year 
(Laura Gomberg, Schneider, & DeJong, 2001) and five years (Haines & Spear, 1996) have 
successfully reduced alcohol consumption. However, a different review of 66 studies which 
analysed alcohol reduction at 4 months post intervention found that the effect sizes were small; 
and unlikely to have meaningful benefit in practice (Foxcraft, Moreira, Santimano, & Smith, 
2015). It is worth noting that when surveyed, students doubted the credibility of such 
educational campaign messages (Thombs, Dotterer, Olds, Sharp, & Raub, 2004). In addition, 
some have suggested that the effectiveness of the nudge needs to take into account campus 
sizes in which norm misperception may be harder to correct if “everybody knows everyone 
else” and thus students are more confident in their estimates of other’s drinking levels (Borsari 
& Carey, 2003). Moreover, it is possible that the average or typical norm used to compare 
drinking levels in these Type 2 nudges does not represent the ideal normative reference point 
(M. A. Lewis & Neighbors, 2006). In other words, feedback that involvse best friends’ drinking 
rather than typical student drinking level would be more specific and may have a stronger 
influence, assuming the peers are actually consuming alcohol within healthy limits (Baer, 
Stacy, & Larimer, 1991; Borsari & Carey, 2003; M. A. Lewis & Neighbors, 2006).  
 
Tobacco Use 
Another serious problem is tobacco consumption, which kills around 6 million people each 
year (WHO, 2016). Type 1 nudges promoting smoking cessation have focused on increasing 
the availability of shorter cigarettes, however, a systematic review found that when compared 
to standard sized cigarettes, there was no overall reduction in tobacco consumption (Hollands 
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et al., 2015). Alternatively, a more common route is to adopt educational campaigns typical of 
Type 2 nudges. A comprehensive review by Hammond et al. (2006) found that smokers’ 
knowledge of toxic constituents in tobacco smoke was very low even amongst smokers in 
affluent and educated countries in the world. This led to changes in legislation in many western 
countries where health warnings on cigarette packages were adopted as the most common 
means of increasing smoker’s awareness of the risks of smoking (Hammond et al., 2006). It is 
now mandatory that consumers of tobacco products have a ‘fundamental right to health 
information, including accurate information about the harms of tobacco use’ (WHO, 2015). 
While this is a common practice for many countries across the world, the style of presentation 
of health information differs between countries making it difficult to evaluate the effectiveness 
of these messages on reducing consumption.  
 
More recently, Type 2 nudges such as plain cigarette packaging which standardize the shape, 
colour, method of opening the package, as well as the health warning labels have been used. 
The aim is to fulfil several objectives that include reducing the attractiveness of consuming 
tobacco (Hammond, Daniel, & White, 2013; Hammond & Parkinson, 2009; Moodie & 
Mackintosh, 2013; Moodie, Mackintosh, Hastings, & Ford, 2011), restricting use of the 
packaging as a form of advertising and promotion, while at the same time increasing the size 
of the health warnings (Maynard, Munafò, & Leonards, 2013; Moodie et al., 2012; Munafò, 
Roberts, Bauld, & Leonards, 2011). A large review of 37 studies concluded that plain 
packaging was rated as less attractive and contained poorer quality products than branded 
packaging (WHO, 2017b). Empirical work looking at the impact of health warnings on tobacco 
consumption is still in its infancy, but the findings are promising, and suggest that they indeed 
reduce acute craving, and are often associated with more negative perceptions of smoking 
(Brose, Chong, Aspinall, Michie, & McEwen, 2014). In the short term, plain packaging has 
been shown to encourage cessation for up to 2 weeks (Moodie & Mackintosh, 2013). In the 
medium and long term, there is evidence to suggest that plain packaging decreased tobacco 
consumption for 6 months (Dunlop, Dobbins, Young, Perez, & Currow, 2014), and 12 months 
(Wakefield et al., 2015) post-intervention. Meanwhile, Australia, being the first WHO member 
to implement standardize packaging, has also seen a statistically significant decline in smoking 
prevalence as a result of this Type 2 nudge (Australian Government - Department of Health, 
2016).  
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2.4.Empirical Issues Concerning Nudge 
Having examined the available evidence of both Type 1 and Type 2 nudges, this section will 
evaluate the methodological issues concerning the implementation of nudges designed to 
promote health behaviours. As with any intervention designed to improve behaviour, the most 
reliable way to confidently make casual inferences about a manipulation and its possible effect 
is to compare it against a control condition (randomized control trials, RCTs). However, RCTs 
are hard to implement in the field, and so along with other factors, limits the ability to draw 
firm conclusions on the effectiveness of nudges. Beyond this, there are two further key points 
that needs to be taken into account when addressing future empirical research on nudge. 
 
Internal reliability of experiments examining nudges. Internal reliability refers to the extent 
to which a measure is consistent within itself – namely it generates the same behaviour each 
time it is used within the same context. The Type 1 nudges reviewed above suggest that overall 
the evidence-base is mixed, and replicability of positive nudge interventions is hard to 
establish. This raises questions about what the reasons are for when Type 1 nudges do work, 
and why the effects are hard to replicate. Loewenstein, Bryce, Hagmann, & Rajpal (2015) have 
speculated that the limited effectiveness of Type 1 nudges results from a lack of deep insight 
into how the nudge is designed to influence their behaviour. Ashcroft (2013) proposed that the 
effectiveness of both Type 1 and 2 nudges in general may depend on the various heterogeneous 
motivations/value systems people have with regards to changing their behaviour towards a 
healthier lifestyle. In addition, the fact that nudges are highly context dependent (Kosters & 
Van der Heijden, 2015), means that some Type 1 nudges are less likely to work in some 
contexts over others, and a clearer understanding of the context in which they are implemented 
is also needed. Thus, a critical step in devising research programs around nudging in health 
domains is to establish the internal reliability of nudges over time at an epidemiological level, 
but also at the individual level. However, the research practices so far have yet to adopt 
methodological techniques that tackle any of these issues in depth (i.e. assessing motivation 
needs, levels of awareness of nudges, characterizing the contexts in which they are 
implemented) in order to better establish internal reliability.  
 
External reliability of experiments examining nudge. External reliability refers to the extent 
to which a measure varies from one use to another. With most nudge field experiments, the 
difficulty is in reproducing the same conditions in different contexts under which the original 
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intervention was assessed. For instance, consider nudges designed to increase physical activity. 
The informational prompts have been used in various environmental settings such as libraries 
(Russell, Dzewaltowski, & Ryan, 1999), underground stations (Blamey et al., 1995), office 
buildings (Coleman & Gonzalez, 2001). In meta-analytic review of these studies (Andersen et 
al., 1998; Blamey et al., 1995; Brownell et al., 1980; Kerr et al., 2001a; Kerr, Eves, & Carroll, 
2001b; Marshall et al., 2002; Nomura et al., 2009), none suggested that there was a consistent 
pattern of evidence across the different contexts that were studied. The positive impact on 
behaviour as indicated in these studies increased stair use over elevators/escalators varied from 
around 2% to 12%, but not controlling for length of time in which the measure was 
implemented – i.e. 1 month or 3 months. Similar inconsistencies have also been noted for 
nudges that extend beyond the health domain. For instance, nudges used to increase civic 
behaviours, such as recycling, volunteering, voting, petitioning, donating, debating, have 
shown that the variation in how long, and where they are implemented may explain why overall 
effect size is as low as 9% (John et al., 2013). Thus, with findings such as this there needs to 
be more efforts in standardizing the ways in which nudges are examined in the wild in order to 
establish external reliability. 
 
Thus, from an empirical perspective the picture appears to be somewhat bleak with respect to 
establishing good evidence for the effectiveness of nudges in the health domain. The main 
problem being that it is hard to draw any firm conclusions as to their effectiveness in the long-
term (i.e. positive change over a year or more), which should be the ultimate goal of assessing 
their effectiveness. Often because the studies are conducted in the field, as with many field 
based studies, it is hard to run studies on a large sample with proper controls, further, it is rare 
to find field studies that also carry out follow-ups to examine the effects of the nudges in the 
long term. This does not undermine the program of nudge per se, but simply that the evidence 
to date does not allow researchers to draw strong conclusions about its general effectiveness in 
generating meaningful positive behavioural change. Moreover, as noted, the limitations in 
drawing firm conclusions is not restricted to their effectiveness and reliability over time, but 
also in establishing the generalizability of positive behavioural change beyond the context in 
which nudges were implemented. Furthermore, the small effect sizes reported in empirical 
studies means that translating their positive results at a population level may render them less 
effective than typical social policy methods used (i.e. mandates, bans, taxes). Given that there 
is a growing list of international governments wanting to apply nudge to public policy on 
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important issues such as health and wellbeing, there is clearly a need to establish further 
empirical rigor in order to better establish the effectiveness of these behaviour interventions 
(Osman, 2016).  
 
2.5.General Theoretical Re-Considerations of the Nudge Evidence-base 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, a concern for the nudge program is that the theoretical 
foundations in which it is built on is problematic. The first section of this chapter has proposed 
that the types of nudges can be put into two broad categories which differ depending on the 
extent to which they promote a re-evaluation of information that informs better decisions (i.e. 
maximizing long term gains), so as to bring the new information and choice behaviour into 
greater alignment (greater coherence). This is in contrast to the position of Thaler & Sunstein 
(2008) and Sunstein (2014b, 2016c); that nudges differ according to the underlying differences 
between System 1 and System 2 thought operations. Building on the proposed framework and 
the evidence reviewed, one reason why Type 1 nudges seem to be ineffective and short lived 
is because they do not engage the decision-maker on any substantial level to re-examine the 
basis on which their decisions are made so as to meaningfully shift their choice behaviour. This 
is consistent with Loewenstein et al.'s (2015) claim regarding the level of insight that people 
have as to the underlying basis on which Type 1 nudges are designed to influence their 
behaviour. Indeed, without prompting people to think and acknowledge that they might be 
consuming less as a result of smaller dinnerware/glassware, any behavioural change is not 
likely to become sticky (i.e. habitual), or reliably generalize to other contexts outside of where 
the nudge was implemented. It has long since been known that habits require sustained and 
explicit association between situational cues and learned behavioural responses (Hull, 1943), 
often through repetition of a behaviours in the same context (W. Wood, Quinn, & Kashy, 2002) 
for the behaviours to generalize beyond them.  
 
The evidence review for Type 2 nudges typically involve interventions that utilizes provision 
of explicit information directly connected to the pursuit of a clearly identified goal, which in 
turn is associated with a specific choice behaviour (e.g. reduce unhealthy eating, alcohol 
consumption, tobacco consumption); this has been used in the form of providing calorie 
information, peer group’s alcohol consumption, or health warnings on cigarette packages. 
More to the point, Type 2 nudges seem to be effective in reducing poor health behaviours such 
as alcohol consumption(Haines, Barker, & Rice, 2003; Haines & Spear, 1996) and cigarette 
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smoking ( Hancock & Henry, 2003; Linkenbach, Perkins, & DeJong, 2003; Hancock, Abhold, 
Gascoigne, & Altekruse, 2002) for a period equal to or greater than 12 months. The evidence 
shows that through repeated intervention over long periods, some Type 2 nudges (particularly 
those correcting misapprehensions of social norms), can lead to sustainable behavioural change 
over longer periods of time (i.e. over a year post intervention). Thus, in order to establish 
reliable methods that promote critical re-examination of one’s values, attitudes and 
motivations, it is advocated that Type 2 nudges should be more frequently used, and over 
sustained periods of time (i.e. at least 6-12 month educational campaigns). The rationale for 
this is that unlike Type 1 nudges, Type 2 nudges typically encourage a form of re-evaluation 
of behaviour through explicit means, and this helps to maintain greater coherence between the 
information on which new choice behaviours are made coherently. It is speculated for this 
reason that the evidence-based suggests that they are relatively more effective at sustaining 
behavioural change than Type 1 nudges (see Table 1). 
 
2.6.Summary 
In conclusion, the motivation for this chapter was to better understand how nudges work. With 
that in mind, once this is achieved, then the better armed we (social scientists, policy makers, 
practitioner) are in designing ways of intervening on behaviours to achieve the best outcome 
for individuals that need and want it. This chapter argued that any meaningful change in 
behaviour arises from developing a consistently coherent basis on which people understand the 
reasons for their decisions and how they enact them. If, through nudges, we want to encourage 
people to help themselves, particularly in targeting serious problems around NCDs, we need 
to make the goal of helping oneself making better lifestyle choices a coherent and sustained 
approach. For theoretical and empirical reasons, this is best achieved through Type 2 rather 
than Type 1 nudges. 
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CHAPER 3: Nudge and Autonomy 
Chapter 1 introduced the critical themes on which nudges are examined on theoretical, 
empirical, and ethical grounds. In Chapter 2, I explored the first objective of the thesis which 
was to examine the critical issues associated with the current underlying mechanism of nudge 
and propose an alternative single system framework to account for the current evidence-base 
in the health domain. This chapter will focus on the second objective of the thesis which is to 
empirically explore the extent to which nudge undermines autonomy: 1) If nudges do not align 
with the chooser’s higher order desire - the welfarist argument; and 2) If people cannot discern 
the intervention and how it is used to changed their behaviour – the transparent argument. The 
first section will explore the welfarist argument by introducing the concept of “true” preference 
and explain how nudges such as default rules may not promote people’s welfare. From this, I 
introduce two types of defaults based on the objective of the interventions: pro-self and pro-
social; and explore the welfare consequences of implementing these in the context of pro-self 
pension enrolment and pro-social organ donation. This motivates two empirical studies which 
compare third-party judgements of an individual’s underlying wishes and nudged choices 
along with a Bayesian approach. At the end of each section, I will outline the rationale for the 
corresponding proposed hypotheses. The second section examines the extent to which nudge 
undermines autonomy when influencing people’s behaviour without their awareness. I will 
explain the important implications in preserving one’s autonomy and to ensure the right level 
of transparency in policies, there is a need to take into account public attitudes towards 
interventions as these provide information for ethical considerations related to introducing a 
policy. This motivated the third empirical study to examine transparency as an independent 
variable and how public opinion may shift based on the transparency of interventions. 
Subsequently, I will introduce four factors which could influence public opinion with regard 
to transparency of interventions: ease of identification, willingness to change, perceived 
effectiveness, and acceptability; and their corresponding hypothesis.  
 
This following section will explore part one of the second objective of the thesis which is the 
extent to which nudge undermines autonomy when it does not align with the chooser’s higher 
order desire - the welfarist argument. In Chapter 1, I have already illustrated how defaults can 
potentially intrude on autonomy and threaten welfare on the grounds that 1) they may not 
represent what people would have wanted and 2) they are sticky, making it difficult for people 
to opt out of unsuitable options. With pro-self and pro-social defaults, I have briefly explored 
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the consequence of being defaulted in the respective retirement savings context and organ 
donation context. The following section will explain the notion of “true” preference, and delve 
further into the consequence of being defaulted in various contexts. 
 
3.1. The Welfarist Argument - “True” Preference in Default 
Sunstein and Thaler (2003) have argued that in many domains, people lack clear, stable, or 
well-ordered preferences because people are strongly influenced by the details of the decision 
context such as default rules and framing effects, and if we take these influences into account, 
then people’s preferences are less clear. But this is perhaps not so accurate because people’s 
preferences are formed during the process of a choice. A person may not have a well-formed 
preference until he/she engages in the decision-making process and gradually learns about his 
or her preferences. In this view, “the person has a true, underlying set of preferences to be 
uncovered” (Whitman & Rizzo, 2015). In fact, Mill argues that the individual “is the person 
most interested in his own well-being” and the “ordinary man or woman has means of 
knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed by anyone else” (Mill, 1863, 
p21-2). Therefore, having control over one’s life would help determine his/her own welfare.  
 
Given that one of the key underlying principles of nudge is to steer people’s behaviour in a 
welfare-promoting direction according to their own (true) preferences, this “true” preference 
has not been uncovered by choice architects. Instead, the choice architect designs the choice 
environment based on some general presumption of what people might want. For this reason, 
default rules often run into ethical objections. At a superficial level, defaults are suggestions 
for what people ought to be doing. In a sense, this is not manipulative if it simply conveys 
information, but the justification for default becomes complicated when considering the 
psychological mechanism that makes it effective. When implemented in organ donation, more 
than 99% of the population remained in the organ donor register (ODR) leading to an enormous 
difference in donation rate (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). In the retirement savings context, 
defaults lead to 95% participation within a few months of employment compared to 60% 
participants without the default (Beshears, Choi, Laibson, & Madrian, 2008). The effect of 
opting-in vs opting-out generated a significant number of registrations. There are four reasons 
that account for their powerful effect. First, they appeal to people’s inertia such that people will 
stick to the status quo  (Sunstein, 2015a). That is, moving away from this is perceived as a loss. 
The idea of loss aversion states that loss looms larger than gain (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). 
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In other words, loss has a greater impact than the equivalent gain. Second, default can bridge 
the gap between a good intention (e.g., donate one’s organs, save for the future) and the effort 
needed to implement that intention into practice (i.e., psychological barriers) (Shepherd, 
O’Carroll, & Ferguson, 2014). Third, defaults provide the decision-maker with important 
signals from policy-makers as to what ought to be the appropriate behaviour in situations of 
uncertainty (Davidai, Gilovich, & Ross, 2013; Johnson & Goldstein, 2003; McKenzie, Liersch, 
& Finkelstein, 2006). Whilst libertarian paternalists are tempted to assign the seemingly 
effectiveness of a default to people genuinely wanting to enrol in a pension scheme or to 
become an organ donor, it is possible that people are prevented from opting-out due to the very 
same cognitive bias that nudged people into the default option in the first place (Rebonato, 
2013).  
 
Given the way defaults are proposed to work, the choice architect is thought to exploit people’s 
tendency to inertia and procrastination because individuals are enrolled onto a programme 
without making some kind of conscious choice. Sunstein (2016d) contends that if a default is 
not presented in a salient manner such that those being nudged are aware of the intervention in 
place, then it is important to consider active choosing to ensure the actual expression of agency. 
In fact, Johnson, Bellman, and Lohse (2002) found that people’s own preferences are closer to 
choices made under no-default options and default opt-in options, suggesting that it is possible 
that active choosing is closer to some sense of “true” preference. The debate between active 
choosing and default choices will depend on which best represent people’s true preference 
(hence promote welfare) in a particular context. But first, there is a need to distinguish between 
two types of nudges each of which have different objectives, namely, pro-self or pro-social. 
This distinction allows the evaluation of the welfare consequence of implementing defaults. 
As aforementioned in Chapter 1, pro-self nudges seek to counterbalance irrational behaviour 
in order to maximise individual welfare (e.g., automatic enrolment to pension plans) whereas 
pro-social nudges primarily seeks to maximize social welfare (e.g., automatic enrolment onto 
organ donor registers) (Hagman et al., 2015). Given the successful uptake of defaults, what has 
yet to be shown is whether there are differences between defaults systems (opt-in, opt-out) in 
terms of their signalling of choosers’ “true” preferences (i.e., promote their welfare). In the 
following sections, I will first outline the background to two different implementations of 
defaults: pro-self and pro-social defaults. At the end of each section, I will discuss the extent 
to which these defaults signal one’s “true” preference based on the background literature, and 
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provide a rationale for the specific hypotheses that were tested in the empirical work in this 
thesis. In particular, the empirical studies will explore the relationship between true preferences 
and nudged preferences. Thus, the remainder of this section is organized as follows. The first 
section lays out the background literature and the hypotheses tested in a pro-self default scheme, 
and the second section does the same for a pro-social default scheme. 
 
3.1.1. Pro-self Default in Pension Enrolment  
While we are in fortunate times with increasing life expectancy, there are several economic 
and social problems we face as a result (OECD, 2013; World Bank, 2016). Crucially, people 
are not saving enough for their retirement, and a major concern is that many retirees may 
outlive their retirement savings (Hanna, Kim, & Chen, 2016; Shu & Payne, 2015). Though 
there are some countries such as Canada (Jog & Lee, 2016) and the Netherlands (Knoef et al., 
2016) that are bucking this trend. What might be the reason for the general failure to properly 
prepare for one’s retirement? Studies conducted in the US, China, Netherlands, and Germany 
have demonstrated a strong link between poor financial literacy and lack of planning for 
retirement (Anthes, 2004; Bucher-Koenen & Lusardi, 2011; Lusardi & Mitchell, 2011a, 2011b, 
2014; Song, 2015; Van Rooij, Lusardi, & Alessie, 2011). In addition, people hold negative 
attitudes towards future perceptions of a retired self (Mutran, Reitzes, & Fernandez, 1997; 
Noone, 2010), and lack the motivation and confidence in making complex investment decisions 
(Ameriks, Caplin, & Leahy, 2003; Lusardi & Mitchell, 2011a; Mandell & Klein, 2007). The 
general message from these findings is that social and economic issues regarding retirement 
protection require targeting psychological barriers. For this reason, the UK government was 
eager to incentivise people to save as well as invest in tax-efficient strategies (e.g., Individual 
Savings Account (ISA)). In addition, the Pension Act 2008 was introduced which placed the 
responsibility on employers to automatically enrol, through defaults, all eligible employees 
into a workplace pension; taking effect in the UK in 2012 (Department for Work & Pensions, 
2008). The impact of this has been positive, with surveys reporting enrolment into pension 
systems increasing from 41% to 60% (Horack & Wood, 2005). Similarly, automatic default 
enrolment systems in the US have also reported dramatic increases in employer pension 
scheme enrolments up from 20-40% to 90% (Choi, Laibson, & Madrian, 2004). As part of 
automatic enrolment, there is a second layer of defaults in which the employee has their funds 
automatically invested into an investment fund, known as a Defined Contribution (DC) 
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workplace pension. DC pension plans are becoming increasingly common forms of retirement 
income provision in the UK, in Hong Kong (HK), and in the US (Byrne, Blake, Cairns, & 
Dowd, 2007). For instance, the HK Government rolled out the Mandatory Provident Fund 
(“MPF”) in which the employer automatically enrols their employees into a pension, and each 
enrolled member’s savings are defaulted into pre-specified funds (Financial Services and the 
Treasury Bureau, 2015). The rationale here, as with automatic enrolment, is that the complexity 
of the investment products available on the market makes it difficult for people to make 
informed choices (Office of Fair Trading, 2013), so providing a defaulted investment fund 
takes away the effort of making a complex choice that might otherwise prevent them from 
adequately saving for their retirement.  
 
Examples of automatic defaults, such as the 401(K) pension plan which appears in the Internal 
Revenue Code taxation system of the US, have been around since the 70’s. Once an individual 
is automatically defaulted (opt-out) into a retirement saving scheme typically saving rates and 
investment portfolios are selected on behalf of the employee. On this point, there is evidence 
that employees will reject the defaulted option if they mistrust the intentions of their employer 
(Shu, Bang, & Weber, 2016). On the other hand, employees tend to assume that the investment 
they are defaulted into is the most appropriate for them (especially if it is endorsed by 
governments and employers). In practice, given that there are many fund options, it is unlikely 
that nuanced decisions are made at the level of specific defaulted investment funds that account 
for each individual employee’s personal preferences (Byrne et al., 2007). Moreover, successful 
uptake of enrolment into retirement saving systems does not necessarily reflect what people 
have a preference for, only that they are more likely to remain in a defaulted system when 
compared to a no-default system (Jachimowicz, Duncan, Weber, & Johnson, 2016). 
Furthermore, an automatic default opt-out system is argued to preserve freedom of choice 
because an individual always has the option to actively leave the system (Benartzi & Thaler, 
2013; Sunstein, 2013; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). However, as aforementioned, default sticks 
as it is designed in such a way as to make it harder to opt-out (administratively there is an effort 
in taking oneself out of an automatic enrolment system). So, what do these factors entail for 
the actual preservation of free choice? First, people’s agency in their choice behaviour matters 
(Osman, 2014a), so much so that they often perceive defaults as ways of rescinding personal 
autonomy (Chapman, 2014). Second, people need to evaluate whether the defaulted option is 
indeed appropriate for them, but quite often, as discussed earlier, people lack the confidence 
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and knowledge to choose between financial products. This means if people choose not to 
choose, then the effect of inertia and the power of suggestions will lead people to stick with 
the default option even when it does not fit their situation. In fact, more recent evidence has 
revealed that those automatically enrolled onto a pension plan were 6% less likely to continue 
to make contributions over time compared to those who actively participated (Burk, Huang, & 
Luoto, 2015). Taken together, these factors present potential challenges to the general use of 
defaults in retirement savings contexts. 
 
Thus far, there has been no empirical work examining people’s judgments around the use of 
defaults in the context of retirement savings, and in particular with regards to people’s 
sensitivity to defaults in countries where a mandated system is in place (i.e., Hong Kong), and 
where there is still some free choice exercised over investment schemes for retirement (i.e., 
UK). Therefore, when it comes to signalling an investor’s true preference to register in 
retirement savings scheme, this study investigates whether people perceive automatic default 
opt-out systems differently from active choice systems (free choice, default opt-in). It also 
considers the influence on perceptions resulting from actual enrolment systems that different 
samples experience (i.e., free-choice in the UK, mandated system in HK). The main set-up of 
the study involves three enrolment systems: 1) Mandated choice system - the investor is legally 
required to make an active choice as to register in a retirement savings scheme; 2) Default opt-
out system - the investor is automatically defaulted into a retirement savings scheme with a 
choice to opt out of the scheme; 3) Default opt-in system - the investor registers in a retirement 
savings scheme under an automatically defaulted opt-in system in which an active choice is 
made to opt in to the scheme. It is speculated that under an active choice system (i.e., default 
opt-in and mandated choice), decisions made overtly would provide a stronger signal of the 
decision-maker’s preference and intention. Under an automatic default option such as opt-out 
systems, decisions are made passively as opposed to actively, hence these signals are perceived 
as more ambiguous. Chapter 4 will empirically test the hypothesis that:  
 
H1 (pro-self welfare). Due to cultural differences between the samples, the UK and HK sample 
will differ in their probability estimate of the general assessment of people’s preference 
to register in the enrolment systems. 
H2 (pro-self welfare). People recognise the consequences of the different framings of the 
decision to be a registered investor in the enrolment system. They, therefore, see 
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registration as differentially representative of an investor’s true preference to register, in 
the following order: Default opt-in > Mandated choice > Default opt-out. 
 
3.1.2. Pro-social Default in Organ Donation Registration 
The shortage of transplantable organs remains a pressing global issue. In 2017, the US had 
over 116,000 people on the waiting list to receive an organ and it was estimated that 20 people 
die each day while waiting on the list (Organdonor.gov, 2017). Similarly, 6,388 people in the 
UK were on the waiting list and approximately 450 patients died while waiting on this list 
(NHSBT, 2017). Defaults have been implemented to target this worldwide societal problem. 
Several studies have shown that default opt-out systems have substantially increased registered 
donations (Abadie & Gay, 2006; McKenzie et al., 2006; Shepherd et al., 2014; van Dalen & 
Henkens, 2014). For instance, Rithalia et al. (2009) reviewed five ‘before and after’ studies in 
which donation rates in Austria rose from 4.6 donors per million population (pmp) to 27.2 
donors pmp over a 5-year period. In Belgium, kidney donations increased from 10.9 to 41.3 
pmp during a 3-year period, and in Singapore, kidney donations increased from 4.7 to 31.3 per 
year over a 3-year period. To date, there has been much interest in the effects of organ donation 
legislations, such as the effect of implementing defaults in different organ donation legislations 
to generate donors (van Dalen & Henkens, 2014), families’ attitudes and beliefs to decide 
whether to consent to organ donation (Exley, White, & Martin, 2002), and individual’s 
willingness to donate their own or their relative’s organs (Mossialos, Costa-Font, & Rudisill, 
2008). There has not, however, been any dedicated examination of whether there are 
differences between default systems (opt-in vs opt-out) regarding the strength of the signal of 
the donor’s true preferences to donate. Default appears to be effective in increasing donation 
rates so far but what remains outstanding then is whether default reflects people’s true 
preference to donate. Sunstein's (2015a) defence is that if publicity and transparency are 
guaranteed then there are far less threat to autonomy. However, this is conditional on the basis 
that people are made aware of the nudge and that people also genuinely want to be nudged into 
the default (i.e. become an organ donor). If the basis of this is founded problematic, then it will 
have implication on family veto rates because whether families consent to the donation of the 
deceased will depend on what signals are being perceived from their registration on the organ 
donation system (e.g., active choice or default opt-out).  
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Defaults and Veto Decisions. In most organ donation legislative systems, default or otherwise, 
include a clause that allows the final decision to donate to be made by family members (Den 
Hartogh, 2012). This means that in effect family members can veto the decision made by their 
deceased relative. In fact, families vetoing decision is claimed to be one of the leading reasons 
for the gap between supply and demand of organs (Abadie & Gay, 2006; Barber, Falvey, 
Hamilton, Collett, & Rudge, 2006). In 2010, NHSBT reported that more than 500 families have 
vetoed organ donations despite being informed that their relative was on the NHS Organ Donor 
Register (ODR); this translated into an estimated 1,200 people missing out on potential life-
saving transplants (NHSBT, 2016). Several studies have examined the factors that influence 
families’ decisions regarding the overruling of their deceased relative’s wishes (Exley et al., 
2002; Mossialos et al., 2008; Rosenblum et al., 2012; van Dalen & Henkens, 2014). There is 
good evidence to suggest that if the deceased relative had made their decision known to their 
family in advance (an unambiguous signal of preference), then the family is more likely to 
honour their deceased relative’s wishes (DeJong et al., 1998; Radecki & Jaccard, 1997; 
Siminoff & Lawrence, 2002). Consistent with this, evidence from survey work showed that 
96.7% of US citizens (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2013) and 88% of UK 
citizens (NHSBT, 2015) would consent to the donation of a deceased relative’s organs if the 
deceased's wishes were made known in advance to the family. In reality, however, the wishes 
of the donors are often not known to the family, as revealed by studies showing that less than 
half of Europeans and North Americans had raised the subject of organ donation with their 
family (Eurobarometer, 2007; Spital, 1995). From this, one speculation is that, just as the 
default option in a country’s organ donation legislative system may signal to the individual 
what ought to be the appropriate behaviour (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003), it can also act as a 
signal to the family as to their deceased relative’s true preference. In other words, when faced 
with decisions to consent on behalf of their deceased relative, defaults may also influence 
families’ perceptions of the deceased’s true preference to donate given that the deceased was 
registered to donate. This is because strength of preference and choice satisfaction vary 
between default systems (i.e. personally made choice in opt-in vs. externally made choice in 
opt-out); personally choosing leads to greater satisfaction in the choice made (Botti & McGill, 
2006; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). Therefore, strength of preference and choice 
satisfaction is likely to be perceived by families as weaker under a default opt-out system 
because it involves a passive choice to donate compared to a default opt-in system where an 
active choice to donate is made.  
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Why might this be the case? In an explicit consent system (i.e. default opt-in), consent is 
expressed through some overt communication which can be seen as providing reliable evidence 
that a decision was made. In addition, active choices of this kind are made through a free self-
selection process thereby affirming one’s personal agency in the choices one makes (Osman, 
2014a). The meaning attached to the act of donation is seen as an altruistic inclination hence 
representing a stronger strength of signal of true preference to donate. This is different from a 
presumed consent system (i.e. default opt-out), where the absence of an objection is recorded 
as consent which can potentially mute the strength of a signal of one’s true preference to donate. 
A default opt-out system also sends a signal to the potential donor and their family that organ 
donation is a socially preferred choice (or recommendation by policy makers) (I. G. Cohen, 
Lynch, & Robertson, 2016) rather than the individual’s true preference. Indeed, Davidai et al. 
(2013) has shown that participants assign a lower value to the act of being a donor in the default 
opt-out system compared to the default opt-in system. Given that donors rarely communicate 
their donation wishes with their families, their true preference to donate are often inferred from 
the ODR which is likely to be weaker and more ambiguous when a passive choice is made. 
The consequence of this is that it adds uncertainty to the families’ decision when deciding 
whether to donate their deceased relative’s organs. As mentioned, in the event of uncertainty, 
families are more likely to refuse consent. Therefore, by implication, the stronger the signal of 
true preference to donate is, given the type of organ donation legislative system, the less likely 
it is that families will refuse their relatives’ wishes to donate. 
 
The literature review shows that inferences of true preference from choice behaviour play an 
important role in the donation process and, without greater understanding, we cannot accurately 
predict or evaluate the consequences of new policies that involve defaults (Bowels, 1998). In 
other words, the effectiveness of such policies would depend both on the preferences they 
induce or evoke (Sunstein, 1993) and, in turn, the inferences relatives make in these instances. 
Chapter 5 will investigate people’s sensitivity to the influence of organ donation legislative 
systems under which registration was made across four systems: default opt-in (everyone is 
automatically a non-donor unless one registers to be a donor), default opt-out (everyone is 
automatically a donor unless one objects), mandated choice (everyone is required by law to 
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state in advance whether they are willing to be a donor), and mandatory donor (everyone is 
required by law to be a donor and there is no option to change this)1.  
Chapter 5 will empirically test the hypotheses that: 
H1 (pro-social welfare). People recognize the consequences of the different framings of the 
decision to be a registered organ donor. They, therefore, see registration as differentially 
representative of an individual’s true preference to donate, in the following order: Default 
opt-in > Mandated choice > Default opt-out > Mandatory Donor.  
H2 (pro-social welfare). If Hypothesis 1 is supported, then families making decisions on the 
basis of their beliefs about the deceased’s true preferences to donate will be perceived by 
participants as more likely to agree to donation in the order predicted by Hypothesis 1. 
 
3.1.3. Bayesian Approach 
In the empirical work that follows, a Bayesian approach has been adopted to infer people’s 
perceived true preference in both pro-self default in the retirement savings context and pro-
social default in the organ donation context. In Bayesian inference, probability is a way to 
represent an individual’s degree of belief in a statement and allows one to determine the 
probability of the model given data. Bayesian, therefore, provides people the tools to update 
their beliefs in the evidence of new data, or in other words, a normative standard for belief 
revision. This is useful because we can combine new data with prior knowledges to make 
inferences that better reflect the real-world decision making. The Bayes’ Theorem states that 
one’s posterior belief in a hypothesis, h (i.e. one’s true preference to register in retirement 
savings scheme or donate in an organ donation), in light of the evidence, e (their registration 
on the system) is P(h|e) which is a function of one’s prior belief, P(h), and the likelihood of 
observing that evidence if one’s initial hypothesis was true P(e|h), as opposed to if it was false, 
P(e|¬h).  
 
Using this approach, it is possible to explore the consequences of people being defaulted into 
a retirement savings scheme or organ donation system. To infer an individual’s true preference, 
                                                
1 The mandatory donor condition was added to the pro-social default study but not the pro-self 
default study because of differences in the contexts. In mandatory donor system, this is akin to 
being forced to donate and if people are giving sensible judgements then this option should be 
preferred the least. 
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third-party judgements2 are used to derive the diagnosticity of an item of evidence. From a 
Bayesian perspective, the diagnosticity of an item of evidence, here registration on the 
enrolment system/ODR, is determined by the likelihood ratio –its informativeness regarding 
the hypothesis in question which is typically viewed as a measure of quality of the evidence 
itself. The likelihood ratio is the ratio of obtaining that evidence in the event that the underlying 
hypothesis is true (the - ‘hit’ rate) as opposed to obtaining that evidence in the event that the 
underlying hypothesis is false (‘false positive’ rate), . Where the likelihood ratio is 1, 
the evidence is just as likely to occur whether the hypothesis is true or false and is therefore 
maximally uninformative. A greater likelihood ratio, P(e|h) > P(e|¬h) will be associated with 
an increase in belief in h. The intuitiveness of this result is in line with Laplace's (1814/1951) 
observation that the probability calculus is “nothing but formalized common sense.” In line 
with this, there is evidence to suggest that people are sensitive to subtle sources of influences 
on the diagnosticity of evidence (Harris, Corner, & Hahn, 2013; Lagnado, Fenton, & Neil, 
2012).  
 
3.1.4. Summary – Pro-social and Pro-self nudges 
So far, this chapter has illustrated how defaults can potentially intrude on autonomy from a 
welfare perspective: 1) they may not represent what people would have wanted and 2) they 
stick, making it difficult for people to opt out of unsuitable options. With pro-self and pro-
social defaults, I have explored the consequence of being defaulted in the respective retirement 
savings context and organ donation context which motivates the empirical studies to examine 
third party judgement with regard to people’s true preference under different systems of 
registration (i.e., default opt-in, default opt-out, mandated choice, etc). This will be investigated 
along with a Bayesian approach, in which the empirical work and the analyses are presented in 
Chapter 4 (pro-self default) and Chapter 5 (pro-social default).  
 
                                                
2 In the pro-social default context, third party judgements reflect a real-world situation when one would 
make a decision on behalf of the deceased. To maintain this consistency, third party judgements were 
also adopted in the pro-self default context. This difference should not in principle impact the findings 
from the Bayesian analyses that are conducted; though there may well be subtle differences in the 
interpretation of the results. This is discussed in the general discussion section. 
P(e h)
P(e ¬h)
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3.2. The Transparency Argument: Public Attitudes Towards Nudge 
In this section, I will explore part two of the second objective of the thesis which is the extent 
nudge undermines autonomy when people cannot discern the intervention and how it is used 
to change their behaviour - the transparency argument. Nudges are less explicit compared to 
typical social policy tools such as mandates, taxes and bans which more explicitly and heavy-
handedly steer people to behave in a manner that maximizes their own and society’s good (i.e. 
seatbelt laws, fat tax, smoking bans). However, if nudge is included as part of a social policy 
tool, then disclosing the intention and implementation is a prerequisite, at least for any 
democratic society upon which accountability and responsibility are important. But because 
the mechanism by which nudges work is by triggering behaviour change without the chooser’s 
awareness, this type of nonconscious influence poses profound questions regarding the 
manipulative nature of nudge (Bovens, 2009; Vallgårda, 2012). Manipulation is objectionable 
because it involves some underhanded interferences with the ways in which people see their 
options and consequently make their choices. In this respect, manipulation violates autonomy 
even if the goal is to make people better off (Wilkinson, 2013). In fact, scholars have found 
that citizens object to manipulations, such as visual illusions to reduce speeding (Jung & 
Mellers, 2016) and subliminal advertising (Reisch & Sunstein, 2016). This means that the 
ethical acceptability of nudge to a certain extent depends on whether a nudge interferes with 
one’s life and whether it is covert (Tomer, 2017). 
 
Previous findings have shown that people judged the acceptability of a nudge and its moral 
implications in different ways. For example, Felsen et al. (2013) found that individuals tend to 
prefer overt rather than covert influence, and those who favoured overt nudges also perceived 
the nudge as more “authentic”. Similarly, Jung and Mellers (2016) and Sunstein (2016c) found 
that System 2 nudges that target deliberative processing were perceived as more popular than 
System 1 nudges that target automatic processing. These findings suggest that public attitudes 
can be influenced by the transparency of an intervention but it is worth noting that none of 
these studies have directly assessed transparency as a measurement but rather the transparency 
of these interventions were defined by the type of nudge presented (e.g., System 1 or System 
2). If as shown, people are less favourable of non-transparent/covert nudges then it makes better 
sense to examine the extent to which public attitudes are influenced by the transparency of 
different nudges. As mentioned, the concept of transparency in itself is not self-defining and in 
the context of nudging, those being nudged can perceive transparency differently from those 
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that designed the nudge. To successfully select and implement nudge, policy makers need a 
psychological understanding of how transparency is being perceived by those being nudged 
and base the implementation on which factors shape their attitude towards nudge. These factors 
include ease of identifying the intervention, the expected effectiveness and acceptability of the 
intervention, and whether people are willing to change their behaviour. All of these helps to 
determine public attitudes towards different types of nudge interventions (i.e., Type 1 and Type 
2 – as I have specified them) which is a central issue for ethical considerations related to the 
introduction of a policy.  
 
To provide empirical support for the transparency argument, the thesis empirically investigates 
the extent to which public attitudes towards these four factors are dependent on the 
transparency of an intervention, as well as the rationale presented for nudge-type interventions 
and the agent that proposed the intervention. These predictors are discussed in more detail 
below. Given that, in the introductory chapters of this thesis, I have evaluated the effectiveness 
of nudges in the health domain, to ensure consistency, the empirical study examining public 
attitudes also focuses on four health contexts, namely, smoking, food, alcohol, and exercise. 
As a relevant addition, the fifth context in which public attitudes was  chemes. In the following 
section, I will outline the background to the four factors and the corresponding rationales for 
the hypotheses that are empirically tested in Chapter 6. But before going further, I will redefine 
the notion of transparency from those being nudged as this form the basis on which nudges 
infringe upon autonomy. 
 
Transparency Redefined. To combat manipulation, Thaler and Sunstein (2008) proposed 
Rawl’s Publicity Principle which in essence bans government from selecting a policy that it 
would not be able or willing to defend publicly to its citizens. However, it has been argued in 
Chapter 1 that this is an insufficient condition in guaranteeing against non-legitimate 
government manipulation because it is a hypothetical condition that does not require policy 
makers to actually publicly defend their policy. As with any social policy tools, the public 
should be able to review and scrutinize nudges no less than government actions of any kind. 
For this reason, Thaler and Sunstein’s definition of transparency needs to be redefined from 
the perspective of those being nudged. To ensure the right level of transparency involves telling 
people about a nudge intervention directly or for a perceptive person to discern for themselves 
that a nudge intervention has been implemented (House of Lords, 2011). In line with this, 
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Bovens (2009) suggested the principle of token-interference transparency which states that a 
watchful individual should be able to discern the intention of the change in the choice 
architecture and to blow the whistle if he or she sees the nudge as unfit. Building on these, 
Hansen and Jespersen (2013) provided a more comprehensive definition of transparency, 
which states that  a transparent nudge should be provided in such a way that the intention 
behind it, as well as the means by which behavioural change is pursued could reasonably expect 
to be transparent to the agent being nudged, as a result of the intervention. Conversely, a non-
transparent nudge works in a way that the citizen in the situation cannot reconstruct either the 
intention or the means by which behavioural change is pursued. 
 
Based on this, the key components of transparency of an intervention can be extracted to 
include discern the “implementation” and “intentions/means” of behaviour change. The former 
refers to identifying the actual intervention used to change people’s behaviour, whereas as the 
latter refers to identifying the psychological method used to change people’s behaviour. Taken 
together, it is possible to offer a definition from the perspective of those being nudged on two 
ends of the transparency scale from definitely transparent to definitely non-transparent so as to 
empirically test the extent to which individuals can discern that an intervention has been 
implemented: 
 
A transparent nudge works in a such a way that anyone can easily identify the actual 
psychological method used to change their behaviour, as well as easily identify how 
their behaviour is changed by it.  
 
A non-transparent nudge works in a way that no one can identify the actual 
psychological method used to change their behaviour, and no one can identify how their 
behaviour is changed by it.  
 
This distinction is important because transparency may serve as a basis for evaluating nudges 
as working by manipulation (Hansen & Jespersen, 2013). Certainly, if an agent can identify 
the nudge, then she possesses the autonomous power to either accept or reject the nudge. In 
turn, this will mitigate the likelihood of welfare-reducing nudges that threaten personal 
autonomy. Given the above definition, it can be hypothesised that:  
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H1 (transparency). Across the five domains, the public will find it easier to identify the actual 
behavioural intervention and how their behaviour will be changed by the psychological 
method in the transparent condition and in turn, more accurately classify these as 
transparent interventions.    
 
Willingness to Change Behaviour. What is currently missing from the nudge programme is 
people’s internal willingness to change. Philosopher Ervin Laszlo (1989, p25) suggested that 
“only by redesigning our thinking and acting, not the world around us” can we solve the causes 
of our problems. As aforementioned, if a nudge intervention is going to work, then it is most 
likely work by targeting the conscious system. Type 1 nudge, for example, typically focuses 
on external influences which have limited effects. Eating less because the plate is smaller does 
not necessarily transfer to eating less at home. What matters is people’s willingness to change 
their behaviour as this reveals their willingness to engage in the particular context in which the 
nudge is present. This reveals the intrinsic value they assign to the act of changing behaviour 
and whether it aligns with their higher purposes (e.g. wanting to save more, eat healthily). 
Indeed, there is evidence suggesting that the ability to deliberately engage in a behaviour will 
encourage a shift towards intrinsic value (Hogg, 2011). Deliberation requires consciousness 
which works on the basis that the intervention is transparent so that people can detect how and 
why an intervention is used to change their behaviour as well as to determine whether the 
behaviour change aligned with their value. It can thus be hypothesised that:  
H2 (transparency). Across the five domains, the public will be more willing to change their 
behaviour when presented with transparent nudges compared to non-transparent nudges. 
 
Perceived Effectiveness. Bovens (2009) suggested that nudges typically work best when 
people are unaware of it. For example, if we tell students that the order of food has been 
rearranged for dietary purposes or if we explain to employees that they are being defaulted into 
the pension scheme because of their inclination to inertia, then the intervention is likely to be 
less successful. Similarly, Sunstein (2016d) raised the question that if people can discern the 
nudge, and are explained why and how the nudges are implemented, would the nudge still be 
deemed less effective? There is evidence suggesting that revealing the default option does not 
undermine its effectiveness (Arad & Rubinstein, 2015; Loewenstein et al., 2014). These 
findings suggest that people generally prefer nudges that are transparent and effective, and so 
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there are empirical grounds to believe that people will generally judge a transparent 
intervention as more effective than a non-transparent one. 
H3 (transparency). Across the five domains, the public will generally perceive an intervention 
as more effective in the transparent condition than the non-transparent condition. 
 
Public Acceptability. To the extent that the acceptability of nudge have been extensively 
debated (Hansen & Jespersen, 2013; Hausman & Welch, 2010; Marteau et al., 2011), there has 
been a lack of primary research in the public acceptance of nudge interventions (Marteau et al. 
2011). The level of public acceptance is relevant in determining how ethical a nudge is 
perceived to be. There is some evidence suggesting that transparency of an intervention – i.e. 
whether it is overt or covert – also has an influence on public acceptability with interventions 
that operate via conscious processes (i.e., overt nudges) gain higher acceptability (Felsen et al., 
2013). However, Petrescu, Hollands, Couturier, Ng, and Marteau (2016) were not able to 
replicate these findings. Instead they found no evidence to suggest that highlighting the 
conscious or non-conscious processes of interventions affected acceptability. They argued that 
the difference in the findings are due to the use of different wordings to describe non-conscious 
process, for instance, they used the wording “people will not be conscious (i.e. not aware)” 
whereas Felsen et al. used the wording “subconsciously driven bias”. Further, Pestescu et al.’s 
study assessed acceptability directly, whereas Felsen et al. used a proxy measure which asked 
participants whether or not they prefer working for a company that employs the intervention. 
Due to the lack of consensus in these findings, further empirical work is needed to establish 
whether the transparency of an intervention influences the public’s judged acceptability of the 
nudge. Based on this, it can be hypothesized that:  
H4 (transparency). Across the five domains, the public will generally perceive an intervention 
as more acceptable in the transparent condition than the non-transparent condition. 
 
3.2.1. Other Predictors 
Rationale of Interventions. Is it manipulative if we do not tell people how an intervention 
influences their behaviour? The obligation to inform people about the specific mechanism that 
makes nudges effective is also one of Bovens’ (2009) concerns. Even though, previous studies 
have presented participants with simple rationale for how the specified intervention works 
(Felsen et al., 2013; Petrescu et al., 2016), little is known about whether revealing the 
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psychological mechanism will influence public opinion with regards to the ease of 
identification, perceived effectiveness and acceptability of an intervention, and to the extent it 
will affect people’s willingness to change. To test for this, the psychological mechanism of 
nudges will be presented positively (how it does work), negatively (how it does not work) and 
both positive and negative. Intuitively, people would be more persuaded by psychological 
mechanism of nudge that has a positive rationale since people are more supportive of nudges 
when there is evidence to suggest that it is effective (Sunstein, 2016c). It can be hypothesised 
that:  
H5 (transparency). Public opinion with regard to ease of identification, perceived effectiveness 
and acceptability of an intervention, and their willingness to change will be influenced by 
the presentation of rationale for these interventions and judgements will follow the 
direction of: positive > positive + negative > negative.  
 
Behaviour Agent. The question of who is nudging also influences public opinion. The intention 
and motivation of nudger/choice architect can be perceived differently, for example, people 
tend to perceive that default options are implicit recommendation by policymakers (McKenzie 
et al., 2006). Typically, support for nudges diminishes when people distrust the motivations of 
the choice architects or they fear that they would end up with outcomes that are inconsistent 
with their value (Sunstein, 2016b). An international survey conducted by Ipsos MORI on 
18,500 adults across 24 countries found while the majority are in support of many specific 
interventions, as many as half of them say that they do not think the government should get 
involved in people’s choices. A third of the public would endorse tougher interventions but 
think that the state should not get involved in people’s choices around how they eat, save, or 
live sustainably (Branson, Duffy, Perry, & Wellings, 2012). It is the intentional component of 
the nudge that is of greater importance in explaining why manipulation is viewed as wrong 
(Wilkinson, 2013). Given that the intention of the agent can be perceived differently depending 
on who proposes the nudge, the study will explore this by introducing three types of agents, 
namely, government officials, advertisers and researchers. It is speculated that, researchers in 
this case act as the “neutral” group because they are seen as potentially having less of an 
obvious agenda to introduce an intervention as compared to advertisers and policy makers. 
Therefore, it can be hypothesized that: 
H6 (transparency). Public opinion with regard to ease of identification, perceived effectiveness 
and acceptability of an intervention, and their willingness to change will be influenced by 
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the behaviour agent that proposed the intervention, such that judgments overall will be 
most favourable towards scientists proposing nudges as compared to advertisers and 
policy makers. 
 
3.2.2. Summary – Public Attitude Towards Nudges 
This chapter explored the importance of transparency in preserving a person’s autonomy to act 
in accordance with his/her preference. Even though previous survey findings have revealed 
that people generally prefer transparent over non-transparent nudges, none have explicitly 
determined people’s perception of transparency and how that impacts other judgments such as 
ease of identifying the transparency of interventions, their willingness to change their 
behaviour, as well as how acceptable and effective the nudges are perceived to be.  
 
As argued in this chapter, transparency can be perceived differently by the nudger and the 
nudgee. If transparency is needed to preserve people’s autonomy then those being nudged 
should be able to discern the intention and means of behaviour change for themselves. If they 
cannot, then the nudge, at least for them, is not transparent. Having redefined transparency, the 
study will explore public attitude related to four factors: ease of identification, willingness to 
change, perceived effectiveness and acceptability; and the extent to which these factors are 
dependent on the transparency of interventions, the agent that proposes the intervention and 
the presentation of rationale behind these interventions in five contexts (i.e., smoking, food, 
alcohol, exercise, and banking). To summarize the hypotheses, across the five contexts it is 
predicted that people will find it easier to identify the intervention and will more accurately 
classify it as transparent, perceive it as more effective and acceptable and are more willing to 
change their behaviour in the transparent condition as opposed to the non-transparent 
condition. Their attitude towards nudge will also be affected by the agents that proposed the 
intervention and the rationales presented for the intervention. The implication of these findings 
will provide relevant information for thinking about the support for nudge type interventions 
and its appropriateness as a social policy tool. 
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CHAPTER 4: Underlying Wishes and Nudged Choices in Pro-self Context 
 
Chapter 3.1 examined part one of the second objective of the thesis – the welfarist argument – 
under which nudge undermines autonomy in pro-self and pro-social contexts. I have argued 
that choice architects have insufficient information about the chooser’s underlying wishes and 
because of this, they inevitably impose value substitution. In this Chapter, I will provide the 
empirical evidence for  the welfare consequence of implementing pro-self defaults in pension 
enrolment. The present study (Experiment 1a, 1b and 2a, 2b) investigates the differences in 
judgement between choices made under different nudged choice contexts. The main focus of 
this chapter will be on providing empirical findings on people’s judgement of an individual’s 
“true” preference to register in a retirement savings scheme, based also on the application of a 
Bayesian approach. This will be investigated with respect to two samples: UK and HK. 
 
First, given that different retirement savings schemes are implemented in these countries, the 
study first explores the differences in perceptions between the UK and HK samples by eliciting 
their prior belief, P(h). This is the probability estimates of the general assessment of people’s 
preference to register before taking into account evidence ‘e’ (i.e., their registration in the 
enrolment system). Given their current experiences of different enrolment systems in their 
country, P(h) is explored through two measures: 1) by comparing judgements of P(h) between 
UK and HK samples in Experiment 1a and 1b; and 2) investigating the effect of the presentation 
of different enrolment systems on the elicitation of P(h) in Experiment 2a and 2b. The prior 
belief in Experiment 2 was elicited after presentation of the respective retirement savings 
schemes to see if these influence people’s judgement of priors. This set-up is different from 
the pro-social context because Experiment 2 was initially conducted as a pilot study. But due 
to the fact that there was a difference in the elicitation of priors as a result of the order of 
presenting the schemes, the results from Experiment 2 was also included to offer additional 
insights. 
 
Second, in order to infer an investor’s true preference, third-party judgements are used to derive 
the diagnosticity of an item of evidence which is determined by the likelihood ratio. This is the 
ratio of obtaining that evidence in the event that the underlying hypothesis, h, is true (the 
investor’s true preference was to register to invest in a retirement savings scheme, ‘hit’ rate) as 
opposed to obtaining that evidence in the event that the underlying hypothesis is false (the 
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investor’s true preference was not to register to invest in a retirement savings scheme, ‘false 
positive’ rate), . Based on this, the perceived diagnosticity of an 
investor’s true preference to register in a retirement savings scheme is investigated across three 
experimental conditions, namely default opt-in (everyone is automatically a non-investor 
unless one actively registers in the enrolment system), default opt-out (everyone is 
automatically an investor unless one objects to register in the enrolment system), mandated 
choice (everyone is required by law to state in advance whether or not they are willing to 
register in the enrolment system).  
 
The specific hypothesis investigated here is:  
H1 (pro-self welfare). Due to cultural differences between the samples, the UK and HK sample 
will differ in their probability estimate of the general assessment of people’s preference 
to register in the enrolment systems. 
H2 (pro-self welfare). People recognise the consequences of the different framings of the 
decision to be a registered investor in the enrolment system. They, therefore, see 
registration as differentially representative of an investor’s true preference to register, in 
the following order: Default opt-in > Mandated choice > Default opt-out.  
 
Given the set-up of the study explained above, the present study will be presented in the format 
of Experiment 1a &1b; and Experiment 2a & 2b, where “a” represents the UK sample, and “b” 
represents the HK sample. For all four experiments ethics approval was granted by Hang Seng 
Management College Research Committee.  
 
In all four experiments, three enrolment systems (default opt-in, default opt-out, mandated 
choice) were set in the context of retirement savings schemes. In Experiment “a”, the sample 
consisted of UK residents, in which a common investment option is the ISA. Though not 
exclusively a retirement savings scheme, it is often considered as such; it is exempt from 
income tax, and capital gains tax, much like other retirement savings scheme in other countries. 
Participants were presented with adapted versions of the ISA to reflect hypothetical 
descriptions of three different type of enrolment system: a mandated choice, default opt-in, or 
default opt-out. In Experiment “b”, participants were HK residents in employment and were 
Cantonese speakers; this meant that the materials were prepared in Chinese; and were 
P(registration want toinvest)
P(registration DON 'T want toinvest)
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translated by a Senior Researcher at Hang Seng Management School in HK, and back-
translated to check for consistency in the UK and HK materials. The three descriptions of the 
enrolment systems were also adapted to the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF – employer 
automatically enroll employees into a pension with savings being defaulted into pre-specified 
funds) for the HK sample. For full details of questionnaires and the specific instructions, please 
see Appendix B. 
 
1.6.Participants and Design 
Experiment 1a (UK sample). A total of N = 155 participants took part in an online survey (83 
women; aged 18-77 years, Mage = 45.12 years, SD = 15.10 years). They were all UK residents 
recruited from the Qualtrics panel, an online platform for running experiments. A fixed 
payment was received by each participant as an incentive (10.00 GBP approximately 12.97 
USD at the time of the study). Participants were randomly allocated to one of the three 
enrolment systems: Default opt-in (n = 53), default opt-out (n = 51), and mandated choice (n = 
51). The dependent variable here is the general assessment of people’s preference to register, 
perceived belief of an investor’s true preference to register, perceived diagnosticity of people’s 
intention to register in the retirement savings scheme measured by Bayesian Likelihood Ratio, 
and likelihood estimates of participants registering in a retirement savings scheme under the 
same enrolment system as Mark. 
  
Experiment 1b (HK sample). A total of N = 155 participants took part in an online survey (76 
females; aged 18-63 years, Mage = 32.86 years, SD = 8.90 years). They were all HK residents 
recruited from the Qualtrics panel, an online platform for running experiments. A fixed 
payment was received by each participant as an incentive (10.00 GBP approximately 12.97 
USD at the time of the study). Participants were randomly allocated to one of the three 
enrolment systems: Default opt-in (n = 51), default opt-out (n = 51), and mandated choice (n = 
53). The dependent variables were identical to Experiment 1a. 
 
Experiment 2a (UK sample). A total of N =155 participants took part in an online survey (71 
women, 84 men; aged 25-65 years, Mage = 44.45 years, SD = 10.53 years). They were all UK 
residents recruited from the Qualtrics panel, an online platform for running experiments. A 
fixed payment was received by each participant as an incentive (10.00 GBP approximately 
12.97 USD at the time of the study). An independent design was used in which participants 
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were randomly allocated to one of the three enrolment systems: Default opt-in (n = 52), default 
opt-out (n = 51), and mandated choice (n = 52). The dependent variables are the effect of 
enrolment systems on the general assessment of people’s preference to register, perceived 
belief of an investor’s true preference to register, and perceived diagnosticity of an investor’s 
intention to register in a retirement savings scheme under the different enrolment systems.  
 
Experiment 2b (HK sample). A total of N =150 participants took part in an online survey (86 
women, 74 men; aged 18-64 years, Mage = 36.91 years, SD = 9.78 years). They were all HK 
residents recruited from the Qualtrics panel, an online platform for running experiments. A 
fixed payment was received by each participant as an incentive (100 HKD approximately 
equivalent to 12.89 USD at the time of the study). An independent design was used in which 
participants were randomly allocated to one of the three enrolment systems: Default opt-in (n 
= 52), default opt-out (n = 41), and mandated choice (n = 57). The dependent variables are 
identical to Experiment 2a. 
 
1.7.General Materials and Procedure 
Experiment 1a (UK sample). Participants read a brief description of the ISA scheme and were 
asked to answer Question 1 to elicit their prior belief, P(h): “Out of 100 people who live in the 
UK, for how many do you think their true preference is to be registered in the ISA scheme?”, 
on a scale of 0 to 100. This was designed to investigate participants’ general assessment of 
people’s preference to register for the ISA scheme. Next, participants read details about a 
person named Mark living in an area that falls under a hypothetical enrolment system (they 
were assigned to one of the experimental conditions which reflected the three different 
enrolment types: Default opt-in, default opt-out, and mandated choice – see Figure 1). Under 
each enrolment system, participants were told that Mark is registered in the ISA scheme. Based 
on the definition of the enrolment system, participants were required to answer the following 
questions in the following order: Question 2 elicited their perceived belief about an investor’s 
(i.e., Mark’s) true preference to register for the ISA scheme: “How likely do you think it is that 
Mark’s true preference was to be registered in the ISA default scheme?”, on a scale of 0 (Mark 
definitely did NOT want to be registered in the ISA default scheme) to 100 (Mark definitely 
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DID want to be registered in the ISA default scheme).3 Question 3 asked “If we assembled 100 
people whose true preference is to be registered in an ISA scheme, how many of them do you 
think will be registered in the ISA scheme on … system?”, and Question 4 asked “If we 
assembled 100 people whose true preference is NOT TO be registered in an ISA scheme, how 
many of them do you think will be registered in the ISA scheme in the … system?”, on a scale 
of 0 to 100, where “…” represents the enrolment system they were assigned to. Question 3 and 
Question 4 were designed to elicit for calculating the 
likelihood ratio. Finally, participants were asked to imagine that they now live in the same city 
as Mark (in which … system is in place). Based on this, they were asked Question 5: “How 
likely do you think that you will be registered in the ISA default scheme?”, on a scale of 0 
(very unlikely) to 100 (very likely), to assess the likelihood estimates of participants registering 
in the same retirement savings scheme as Mark. 
 
Experiment 1b (HK sample). The design and materials were the same as Experiment 1a with 
the exception that the details regarding the retirement savings scheme were changed from ISA 
to MPF (Figure 1) in order to reflect the current retirement savings scheme available in HK.  
 
                                                
3 A frequency format was adopted to elicit the relevant Bayesian parameters as this has been 
shown to be an easier way for participants to provide responses (see also, e.g., Gigerenzer & 
Hoffrage (1995)). 
P(registration want toinvest)
P(registration DON 'T want toinvest)
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Figure 1. Description of the enrolment systems in each experimental condition for both the 
UK sample and HK sample. 
 
 
Experiment 2 aimed to replicate the main results from Experiment 1. The experimental set up 
of Experiment 2 was the same as Experiment 1 with the exception of the prior belief question 
being asked after the presentation of the different enrolment systems. In addition, Questions 5 
in Experiment 1 which elicited the likelihood of participants registering in the same retirement 
savings scheme as Mark was excluded in Experiment 2. Lastly, wording of the prior belief 
question and likelihood ratio question was modified to better reflect the cover story (see more 
details in below). 
 
Experiment 2a (UK sample). Participants read a brief description of the ISA scheme and 
details about a person named Mark living in an area that falls under a hypothetical enrolment 
system (they were assigned to one of the experimental conditions which reflected the three 
different enrolment types: Default opt-in, default opt-out, and mandated choice – see Figure 
1). Under each enrolment system, participants were told that Mark is registered in the ISA 
scheme. Based on the definition of the enrolment system, participants were required to answer 
the following questions in the following order: Question 1 elicited their perceived belief about 
an investor’s (i.e., Mark’s) true preference to register for the ISA scheme: “How likely do you 
think it is that Mark’s true preference was to be registered in the ISA default scheme?”, on a 
scale of 0 (Mark definitely did NOT want to be registered in the ISA default scheme) to 100 
(Mark definitely DID want to be registered in the ISA default scheme); Question 2 elicited 
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their prior belief, P(h): “Out of 100 who live in the same area as Mark, for how many do you 
think their true preference is to be registered in the ISA default scheme?”, on a scale of 0 to 
100. This was designed to investigate participants’ general assessment of people’s preference 
to register for the ISA scheme. Question 3 asked “If we assembled 100 people whose true 
preference is to be a member of the ISA default scheme, how many of them do you think will be 
registered in the ISA default scheme on … system?”, and Question 4 asked “If we assembled 
100 people whose true preference is NOT TO be a member of the ISA default scheme, how 
many of them do you think will be registered in the ISA default scheme on the … system?”, on 
a scale of 0 to 100. Question 3 and Question 4 were elicited to calculate the likelihood ratio  
.  
 
Experiment 2b (HK sample). The design and materials were the same as Experiment 2a with 
the exception that the details regarding the retirement savings scheme were changed from ISA 
to MPF in order to reflect the current retirement savings scheme available in HK.  
 
 
1.8.Results 
Experiment 1a and 1b: General assessment of people’s preference to register, P(h) 
 UK participants’ general assessment of people’s preference to register, P(h), in the ISA 
scheme [M = 44.46, SD = 19.58] was significantly higher than HK participants’ P(h) in the 
MPF scheme [M = 37.51, SD = 26.13], t(308) = 2.65, p = .008, d = .30, 95% CI[1.79, 12.12]. 
 
Experiment 2a and 2b: Effect of enrolment systems on P(h) 
In both samples, participants who read about the different enrolment systems (Experiment 2) 
were more likely to give higher general assessment of people’s preference to register, P(h),  
compared to Experiment 1 (i.e., P(h) elicited prior to reading about the different enrolment 
systems), t(613) = 5.26, p < .001, d = .42, 95% Cl [6.28, 13.76]; but there was no difference in 
P(h) between the three different enrolment systems in Experiment 2a, F(2, 152) = 2.79, p = 
.065, h2 = .04; and in Experiment 2b, F(2, 147) = 2.49, p = .086, h2 = .03. Nonetheless, 
consistent with Experiment 1, UK participants’ P(h) in the ISA scheme [M = 49.57, SD = 
21.82] were significantly higher than HK participants’ P(h) in the MPF scheme [M = 42.29, 
SD = 25.77], t(613) = 3.78, p < .001, d = .30, 95% Cl [3.50, 11.06].   
P(registration want toinvest)
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Perceived belief of an investor’s true preference to register  
Experiment 1a (UK sample). The findings are broadly consistent with our prediction such that 
the perceived belief of an investor’s (i.e., Mark’s) true preference to register in the ISA scheme 
reflected sensitivity to the three different enrolment systems, and decreased in the following 
order: Mandated choice = Default opt-in > Default opt-out (Figure 2). A one-way ANOVA 
revealed that the enrolment systems had a significant effect on participants’ perceived belief of 
an investor’s (i.e., Mark’s) true preference to register for the ISA scheme, F(2, 152) = 6.81, p 
= .001, h2 = .08. The default opt-in system was judged as a stronger indicator of true preference 
to register for the ISA scheme when compared with the default opt-out system, t(152) = 
3.40, p = .001, d = .65, 95% Cl [4.96, 27.77]. The mandated choice system was judged as a 
stronger indicator of true preference when compared with the default opt-out system, t(152) = 
2.96, p = .004, d = .62, 95% Cl [2.88, 25.90]. There was no significant difference between the 
default opt-in system and mandated choice system, t(152) = .410, p = .683, d = .08, 95% Cl [-
9.43, 13.38].  
 
Experiment 1b (HK sample). The findings were broadly consistent with our prediction that the 
perceived belief of an investor’s true preference to register for the MPF scheme reflected 
sensitivity to the three different enrolment systems (with the exception of mandated choice), 
and decreased in the following order: Default opt-in > Mandated choice = Default opt-out 
(Figure 2). A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of the enrolment systems on 
participants’ perceived belief of an investor’s (i.e., Mark’s) true preference to register in the 
MPF scheme, F(2, 152) = 6.53, p = .002, h2 = .08. Planned pairwise comparison show that the 
default opt-in system was judged as a stronger indicator of true preference when compared 
with the default opt-out system, t(152) = 3.52, p = .001, d = .71, 95% Cl [6.18, 31.62], and the 
mandated choice system, t(152) = 2.49, p = .014, d = .46. 95% Cl [.65, 25.85]. There was no 
significant difference between the default opt-out system and the mandated choice 
systems, t(152) = 1.06, p = .290, d = .22, 95% Cl [-6.95, 18.25].  
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Figure 2. Mean perceived belief of an investor’s (i.e. Mark’s) true preference to register in 
the ISA scheme (Experiment 1a, UK sample) and in the MPF scheme (Experiment 1b, HK 
sample) across the three experimental conditions. Error bars are 95% CI. 
 
Experiment 2a (UK sample). The findings supported our general prediction that the perceived 
belief of an investor’s true preference to register in the ISA scheme reflected sensitivity to the 
three different enrolment systems, and decreased in the following order: Mandated choice = 
Default opt-in > Default opt-out (Figure 3). This is consistent with the patterns found in 
Experiment 1a. The evidence revealed that the enrolment systems had a significant effect on 
participants’ perceived belief of an investor’s (i.e., Mark’s) true preference to register in the 
ISA scheme, F(2, 152) = 11.95, p < .001, h2 = .14. Planned pairwise comparisons confirmed 
the trend indicated in Figure 4. The default opt-in system was judged as a stronger indicator of 
true preference when compared with the default opt-out system, t(152) = 4.32, p < .001, d = 
.83, 95% Cl [9.34, 32.04]. The mandated choice system was judged as a stronger indicator of 
true preference when compared with the default opt-out system, t(152) = 4.16, p < .001, d = 
.86, 95% Cl [8.61, 31.31]. There was no significant difference between the default opt-in 
system and the mandated choice system, t(152) = .15, p = .878, d = .03, 95% Cl [-10.56, 12.02].  
 
Experiment 2b (HK sample). The pattern of findings from Experiment 2b was broadly similar 
to those reported in Experiment 1b (and also in line with our general prediction). The default 
opt-in system was perceived as more indicative of an investor’s true preferences, than the 
default opt-out system: Default opt-in > Default opt-out, Default opt-in = Mandated choice, 
Default Opt-out = Mandated choice (Figure 3). The evidence revealed that the enrolment 
system had a significant effect on participants’ judgments of Mark’s true preference, F(2, 147) 
   
 
 
67 
= 3.26, p = .041, h2 = .04. Planned pairwise comparisons revealed that the default opt-in system 
was judged as a stronger indicator of an investor’s (i.e., Mark’s) true preference when 
compared with the default opt-out system, t(147) = 2.54, p = .012, d = .53, 95% Cl [.93, 26.74]. 
However, there was no significant difference between the default opt-in system and the 
mandated choice system, t(147) = .96, p = .337, d = .18, 95% Cl [-7.04, 16.67], and between 
the default opt-out system and the mandated choice system, t(147) = 1.69, p = .094, d = .36, 
95% Cl [-3.64, 21.67].  
 
 
Figure 3. Mean perceived belief of an investor’s (i.e. Mark’s) true preference to register in 
the ISA scheme (Experiment 2a, UK sample) and in the MPF scheme (Experiment 2b, HK 
sample) across the three experimental conditions. Error bars are 95% CI. 
 
Perceived diagnosticity of people’s intention to register 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to analyse perceived diagnosticity of evidence inferred 
from the likelihood ratio . 
 
Experiment 1a (UK sample) and Experiment 1b (HK sample). The analysis revealed a non-
significant effect of enrolment system on the perceived diagnosticity of people’s intention to 
register in the ISA scheme, F(2, 143) = .622, p =.538, h2 = .01 (default opt-in [M = 3.35, SD = 
7.53], default opt-out [M = 2.08, SD = 3.69], and mandated choice [M = 2.73, SD = 5.26]). 
Similarly, there was also a non-significant effect of enrolment system on the perceived 
diagnosticity of people’s intention to register in the MPF scheme, F(2, 115) = .542, p =.583, 
P(registration want toinvest)
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h2 = .01 (Default opt-in [M = 3.26, SD = 3.91], default opt-out [M = 4.49, SD = 14.74], and 
mandated choice [M = 2.35, SD = 2.54]).  
 
Experiment 2a (UK sample) and Experiment 2b (HK sample). Consistent with Experiment 1, 
the analysis revealed a non-significant effect of enrolment system on the perceived 
diagnosticity of people’s intention to register for the ISA scheme, F(2, 137) = 1.40, p = .249, 
h2 = .02 (Default opt-in [M = 2.99, SD = 7.50], default opt-out [M = 1.32, SD = .91], and 
mandated choice [M = 2.09, SD = 3.36]). Similarly, there was also a non-significant effect of 
enrolment system on the perceived diagnosticity of people’s intention to register for the MPF 
scheme, F(2, 132) = 1.71, p =.185, h2 = .03 (Default opt-in [M = 5.98, SD = 14.36], default 
opt-out [M = 2.64, SD = 7.82], and mandated choice [M = 2.75, SD = 4.07]).  
 
Likelihood estimates of participants registering in a retirement savings scheme under the 
same enrolment system as Mark4 
Experiment 1a (UK Sample). When asked to imagine that they lived in the same city as Mark, 
with the same enrolment system implemented, a one-way ANOVA revealed a non-significant 
effect of enrolment systems on the likelihood estimates of participants registering in the ISA 
scheme, F(2, 152) = 2.23, p =.11, h2 = .03. 
 
Experiment 1b (HK Sample). A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of enrolment 
systems on the likelihood estimates of participants registering in the MPF scheme, F(2, 152) = 
3.16, p = .045, h2=.04 (Figure 4). Planned pairwise comparison show that participants were 
significantly more likely to register for the MPF in the default opt-out system than the mandated 
choice system, t(152) = 2.48, p = .014, d = .20, 95% Cl [.65, 27.92]. There was no significant 
difference between the default opt-in system and the mandated choice system, t(152) = .85, p = 
.395, d = .28, 95% Cl [-8.72, 18.54]; and between the default opt-out system and default opt-
in system, t(152) = 1.61, p = .109, d = .11, 95% Cl [-4.39, 23.14].  
 
                                                
4 This question was only asked for Experiment 1a and 1b. 
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Figure 4. The likelihood estimates of participants registering in a retirement savings scheme 
under the same enrolment system as Mark across the three experimental conditions in 
Experiment 1a (UK Sample) and Experiment 1b (HK Sample). Error bars are 95% CI. 
 
1.9.Discussion  
The focus of the present study was to examine part one of the second objective of the thesis – 
the welfarist argument – under which nudge undermines autonomy. To do so, the study 
considered judgments regarding whether nudges capture people’s true preferences to register 
in retirement savings schemes. This is of particular importance given the complexity of the 
domain in which people are required to make decisions, and the limited knowledge people 
generally have around financial products (Anthes, 2004; Bucher-Koenen & Lusardi, 2011; 
Lusardi & Mitchell, 2011a, 2011b; Song, 2015; Van Rooij et al., 2011). This study investigated 
judgments on the perceived belief of an investor’s true preference across three enrolment 
systems (Default opt-in, Default opt-out, Mandated choice) using samples which have 
experience of different enrolment systems in their country (i.e., free choice system in the UK, 
mandated system in HK).  
 
Experiments 1a and 1b. The findings (both the UK and HK samples) supported the main 
hypothesis which is that when a hypothetical investor has been ‘defaulted’ into a retirement 
savings scheme under a default opt-out system, their true preference to register is perceived as 
weaker than when the choice was made actively (under the mandated choice and default opt-
in system); with the exception of Experiment 1b where there was no significant difference 
between the mandated choice system and the default opt-out system. Subsequently, when asked 
to imagine that they live in the same city as Mark with the same enrolment system 
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implemented, HK participants were less likely to register in the MPF scheme under the 
mandated choice system compared to the default opt-out system. Based on the analysis of the 
general assessment of people’s preference to register, P(h), the suspected difference observed 
between the samples reflects their prior experience of enrolment systems in their respective 
countries, as HK participants generally gave lower P(h) compared to their UK counterparts. 
Lastly, the perceived diagnosticity of evidence inferred from the likelihood ratio did not reveal 
a significant difference between the three enrolment systems.  
 
Experiment 2a and 2b. Given the differences in the pattern of findings are potentially 
influenced by the different prior experiences between the samples, Experiment 2a and 2b were 
conducted to replicate the main behavioural results in Experiment 1a and 1b and explore the 
extent to which P(h) is sensitive to the framing of the three different enrolment systems. In line 
with the main hypothesis, the pattern of results obtained from Experiments 2a and 2b suggests 
that the enrolment system impacted people’s perceived belief of an investor’s (i.e., Mark’s) 
true preference to register in a retirement savings scheme. More specifically, when an investor 
has been ‘defaulted’ into a retirement savings scheme under a default opt-out system their 
perceived true preference for that option was judged as weaker than when the choice was made 
actively under the mandated choice or default opt-in systems (with the exception of Experiment 
2b whereby the mandated choice system was not judged significantly different from the default 
opt-out system – this is consistent with Experiment 1b).  
 
These observed differences between the samples can be explained by the prior experiences of 
the different enrolment systems in the samples’ respective countries. Consistent with 
Experiment 1, HK participants’ general assessment of people’s preference to register, P(h), 
were judged as weaker than those of UK participants. In addition, introducing the enrolment 
systems lead to overall higher P(h) compared to those elicited in Experiment 1, but there were 
no differences in P(h) between the three different enrolment systems. This may suggest that 
the introduction of the enrolment systems did not influence participants prior experience of 
different enrolment systems in their respective countries whilst their perceived belief of an 
investor’s true preference to register was based on their prior experiences. Lastly, also 
consistent with Experiment 1, the perceived diagnosticity of evidence inferred from the 
likelihood ratio did not reveal significant differences between the three enrolment systems.  
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Overall, the findings supported the hypothesis that people are sensitive to the different framings 
of the decision to be a registered investor in the enrolment system and they, therefore, see 
registration differentially representative of an investor’s true preference to register. In two 
experiments, the general pattern of findings within the respective samples was similar. For the 
UK sample (Experiment 1a and 2a), there was no difference between the mandated choice 
system and the default opt-in system in participants’ perceived belief of an investor’s true 
preference to register in the ISA scheme, but both were judged as more indicative of an 
investor’s true preference than the default opt-out system. For the HK sample (Experiments 1b 
and 2b), there was no difference between the mandated choice system and the default opt-out 
system, but both were judged as a weaker indicator of an investor’s true preference to register 
in the MPF scheme than the default opt-in system (with the exception of Experiment 2b, where 
no differences were found between the default opt-in system and the mandated choice system). 
Across both samples, and across both experiments, the default opt-out system was generally 
judged as the weakest indicator of the investor’s true preference to register for a retirement 
savings scheme. This finding satisfies the welfarist argument, because a lack of autonomy to 
make one’s own decisions is perceived as a weaker indicator of one’s true preference. I will 
discuss the implication of these findings in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 5: Underlying Wishes and Nudged Choices in Pro-social Context 
 
Chapter 3.1 examined part one of the second objective of the thesis – the welfarist argument – 
under which nudge undermines autonomy in pro-self and pro-social contexts. In this Chapter, 
I will provide the empirical evidence for the welfare consequence of implementing pro-social 
defaults in the organ donation context. The findings from Chapter 4 (pro-self context) revealed 
that people’s judgments of an individual’s true preference were sensitive to the framing of 
enrolment systems. The default opt-in system was generally perceived as a stronger indicator 
of an individual’s true preference to register in a retirement savings scheme than the default 
opt-out system. The main focus of this chapter will be on providing empirical findings on 
people’s judgement of individual’s “true” preference to register in the organ donation systems 
in a pro-social context, based also on the application of a Bayesian approach, and to see if the 
main findings replicate those in the retirement savings context. 
 
The present study examines third-party judgements of people’s choices made under different 
choice systems (default and non-default). This is because decisions made under a default opt-
out system (a passive choice) is perceived as more ambiguous than decisions under a default 
opt-in or mandated choice system (an active choice). This has implication on family consent 
rate because they have the opportunity to consent or veto organ donation on behalf of their 
relative depending on what signals are being perceived from the organ donation systems. This 
issue is consequential in the context of increasing actual donation rates.  
 
In line with the methodology adopted in Chapter 4, this study investigates people’s perceptions 
of an individual’s true preference from their registration on an organ donation register, here we 
are interested in the perceived diagnosticity of this evidence for inferring their true preference. 
From a Bayesian perspective, the diagnosticity of an item of evidence, registration on the ODR, 
is determined by the likelihood ratio. The likelihood ratio is the ratio of obtaining that evidence 
in the event that the underlying hypothesis is true (the relative’s underlying wishes were to 
donate their organs - ‘hit’ rate) as opposed to obtaining that evidence in the event that the 
underlying hypothesis is false (the relative’s underlying wishes were to not donate their organs 
- ‘false positive’ rate),  ( )
( )'
P registration want todonate
P registration DON T want todonate
½
½
. 
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This study included an additional independent variable “mandatory donor” to ensure that 
people are giving proper judgements because if people are providing sensible/genuine 
judgements then this option should be the least preferred; thus, acting as a type of control. The 
present study also included additional demographic data to provide further insights on the 
influence of individual donor status on the dependent measures. 
 
The specific hypotheses investigated here are:  
H1(pro-social welfare). People recognize the consequences of the different framings of the 
decision to be a registered organ donor. They, therefore, see registration as differentially 
representative of an individual’s true preference to donate, in the following order: Default 
opt-in > Mandated choice > Default opt-out > Mandatory Donor.  
H2 (pro-social welfare). If Hypothesis 1 is supported, then families making decisions on the 
basis of their beliefs about the deceased’s true preferences to donate will be perceived by 
participants as more likely to agree to donation in line with the predictions of Hypothesis 
1. 
 
Davidai et al. (2013) found that the meaning individuals attach to participating in organ 
donation was different between default opt-out and default opt-in countries. More specifically, 
the willingness to donate one’s organs in an opt-in country was considered roughly akin to 
giving away one’s wealth to charity upon one’s death, and in an opt-out country, this fell 
between letting other get ahead of one in line and volunteering some time to help the poor. 
Their study showed that when asked explicitly to consider the meaning of the relevant choices, 
people are capable of discerning this difference in meaning. Therefore, to eliminate this as a 
factor in the study, the current study investigated third party’s judgement of an individual’s 
true preference to donate in both opt-in and opt-out countries. In general, the materials 
presented in Experiment 1-3 were the same, except for some additional questions in Studies 2 
and 3. These additional questions were based on the manipulations regarding the samples used: 
Experiment 1 involved US citizens (the US has a default opt-in system), Experiment 2 involved 
citizens from European countries that has a default opt-in system, and Experiment 3 involved 
citizens from European countries that has a default opt-out system. It was essential to present 
a set of studies that systematically address the main hypotheses, therefore as few details as 
possible were carefully changed between the studies. Given the similarities between these 
studies, and to assist the reader, methods and results of the three studies are presented together 
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to facilitate a better understanding of the overall pattern of findings. For all three experiments 
ethics approval from QMUL college ethics board was granted, QMERC2014/54. For full 
details of questionnaires and specific instructions, please see Appendix C. 
 
5.1. Participants and Design 
Experiment 1. A total of N = 493 US citizens (Opt-in Policy) recruited from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk took part in the online survey (256 females; aged 18-72 years, Mage = 35.65 
years, SD = 11.65 years), and were compensated $0.50 for their participation.  
 
Experiment 2. A total of N = 401 European citizens from countries with a default opt-in system 
(Germany, Denmark, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Romania, UK) were recruited from Prolific 
Academic (244 females; aged 18-72 years, Mage = 35.50 years, SD = 12.76 years), and were 
compensated $0.50 for their participation.  
 
Experiment 3. A total of N = 400 European citizens from countries with a default opt-out 
system (Austria, Spain, France, Italy, Belgium, Sweden, Greece, Finland, Poland, Portugal, 
Turkey, Slovenia, Croatia, Czech Republic, and Norway) were recruited from Prolific 
Academic (261 females; aged 18-60 years, Mage = 29.01 years, SD = 8.27 years), and were 
compensated $0.50 for their participation.  
 
5.2.General Materials and Procedure 
In each experiment, participants were randomly allocated to one of four experimental 
conditions (Figure 5):  
Experiment 1: Default opt-in (n = 122), mandated choice (n = 128), default opt-out (n = 118), 
and mandatory donor (n = 125) with four dependent variables (Perceived belief of the donor’s 
true preference to donate; Perceived likelihood estimates of a relative consenting to donate; 
Relative’s consent expressed as a binary choice; Perceived diagnosticity of people’s intention 
to donate measured by Bayesian Likelihood Ratio).  
 
Experiment 2: Default opt-in (n = 101), mandated choice (n = 100), default opt-out (n = 101), 
mandatory donor (n = 99). In addition to the dependent variables in Experiment 1 (except for 
relative’s consent expressed as a binary choice which was replaced with dropdown list reasons 
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for relatives consenting or vetoing donation), we also included two other questions (these are 
presented in more detail below), and minor modifications to the elicitation of prior belief 
question.  
 
Experiment 3: Default opt-in (n = 99), mandated choice (n = 100), default opt-out (n = 99), 
mandatory donor (n = 102). The dependent variables were identical to those included in 
Experiment 2. 
 
 
Figure 5. The scenario described in each organ donation legislative systems: Default Opt-In, 
Default Opt-out, Mandated Choice and Mandatory Donor. 
 
Experiment 1. Participants were presented with an online questionnaire. They were told that 
this was a social experiment designed to investigate the topic of organ donation. The 
questionnaire first provided the definition of organ donation and, based on this information, 
participants were required to answer a question to elicit prior beliefs about people’s true 
preferences to donate, 1) P(want to donate): “Out of 100 people in the U.S., for how many do 
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you think their true preference is to donate their organs?”5 A fictional scenario immediately 
followed in which participants read details about a person named Mark who lives in an area 
that falls under a particular organ donation legislative system (depending on the experimental 
condition participants were randomly assigned to one of the four organ donation legislative 
systems: default opt-in, default opt-out, mandated choice, or mandatory donor – see Figure 5).  
 
In all four conditions participants were explicitly told that Mark was registered as a donor. 
They were also told that Mark was involved in a fatal accident leaving his vital organs intact. 
Following on from this, participants were asked 2) “How likely do you think it is that Mark’s 
true preference was to donate his organs?” to elicit perceived belief of true preference to 
donate, on a scale of 1(Mark definitely did not want to donate his organs) to 100 (Mark 
definitely did want to donate his organs). In addition, two other questions were presented to 
assess what actions should follow given the news that Mark suffered a fatal accident. 
Participants were asked 3) “How likely is it that John will agree to his Uncle’s (Mark) organs 
being donated?”; responses were provided on a scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (very likely) 
to elicit perceived likelihood estimates of a relative consenting to the donor’s decision to 
donate. Finally, participants were asked 4) “What will John decide to do, will he donate his 
Uncle’s organs?” so as to elicit a binary response (consent, veto) as to the relative’s decision. 
 
Questions 5 and 6 elicited the relevant conditional probabilities for calculating the likelihood 
ratio, which is a measure of the perceived diagnosticity of the deceased’s registration on the 
ODR. Participants were asked 5) “If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is to 
DONATE their organs, how many of them do you think will be registered as organ donors on 
the …. system?”. And then asked 6) “If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is NOT 
TO DONATE their organs, how many of them do you think will be registered as organ donors 
on the …. system?”, on a scale of 0-100 (where “…” is the organ donation legislative system 
participants were assigned to). 
 
Experiment 2 and Experiment 3. The main set-up is the same as in Experiment 1 but with 
minor modifications. First, questions that had the term “true preference” were replaced with 
                                                
5 A frequency format was adopted to elicit the relevant Bayesian parameters as this has been 
shown to be an easier way for participants to provide responses (see also, e.g., Gigerenzer & 
Hoffrage (1995)). 
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the word “want” so that the question is better understood. Second, the cover story now 
describes the respective organ donation legislative systems before eliciting participant’s prior 
belief, Question 1) “Out of 100 people living in this country, for how many do you think would 
want to donate their organs?”. Followed by Question 2) “How likely do you think it is that 
Mark wanted to donate his organs?”, the scale has now explicitly labelled the midpoint which 
ranges from 0 (Mark definitely did not want to donate his organs, 50 (Mark is equally likely to 
donate or not donate his organs), to 100 (Mark definitely did want to donate his organs). After 
responding to questions 1 and 2, participants were then told about John and were asked to 
provide ratings to two additional new questions 3) “To what extent does being registered to 
donate under the …  system provide a clear indication that Mark wanted to donate his 
organs?”, on a scale of 0 (Not at all clear) to 100 (Absolutely clear); this question was designed 
to elicit perceived signal of intent to donate, and 4) “How likely it is that John believes that 
Mark wanted to donate his organs?”, on a scale of 0 (John believes Mark definitely did not 
want to donate his organs), 50 (John thinks it is equally likely that Mark wanted to donate his 
organs as didn’t), to 100 (John believes that Mark definitely wants to donate his organs); this 
question was designed to elicit the likelihood estimates of relative’s belief of the donor’s true 
preferences to donate.  
 
Depending on the response to Question 5) “How likely it is that John will agree to his Uncle’s 
organs being donated?”, participants were presented with additional new question 6) “Why do 
you think it is highly unlikely/moderately unlikely/likely/moderately likely/highly likely that 
John will donate Mark’s organs?”, which replaced Question 4 (relative’s consent expressed as 
a binary choice) in Experiment 1. Participants were presented with up to eleven options as 
candidate reasons and an option for “none of the above” (five different reasons were presented 
for a “highly likely”, “moderately likely” and “likely” judgments, and eleven different reasons 
were presented for “highly unlikely” and “moderately unlikely” judgments) from a dropdown 
menu. The options presented to people were based on a prior study on potential causes for 
family refusal decisions (Ghorbani et al., 2011) and the most frequent reasons that emerged in 
practice (Vincent & Logan, 2012). The reasons participants could select from were: it is a 
highly traumatic time for relatives and it is just not something they can think about; lack of 
understanding of the organ donation process; denial and rejection of brain-death criteria; the 
hope for a miracle; fear about organ donation trade and unknown organ destination; religious 
beliefs; insecurity about the brain-death diagnosis; unsure about the deceased’s wish to donate; 
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belief in body integrity about death; fear of objection by other family members; and there is 
lack of evidence to indicate that the deceased wanted to donate; but note that this is by no 
means an exhaustive list. Finally, participants were presented with two questions to elicit the 
likelihood ratio, Question 7) “If we assembled 100 people who want to DONATE their organs, 
how many of them do you think will be registered as organ donors on the … system?” and 
Question 8) “If we assembled 100 people who DO NOT WANT to DONATE their organs, how 
many of them do you think will be registered as organ donors on the … system?”, on a scale of 
0-100.  
 
For all three studies, participants were asked a series of demographic questions (e.g., age, 
gender, religion), questions regarding their own organ donation status and their view on organ 
donation (e.g. whether they agree with a default opt-out system, willingness to agree to 
donation if loved one’s wishes are unknown, who should decide donation in the event of death, 
etc.) 
 
5.3.Results 
Perceived belief of the donor’s true preference to donate 
The findings were broadly in line with our first hypothesis such that the participant’s perceived 
belief of the donor’s (i.e. Mark’s) true preference to donate reflected sensitivity to the four 
different organ donation legislative systems (Figure 6). Overall, the evidence revealed that the 
organ donation legislative system had a significant effect on participants’ perceived belief of 
the donor’s perceived true preference to donate [Experiment 1: F(3, 492) = 74.69, p < .001, η2 
= .31; Experiment 2: F(3, 400) = 41.55, p < .001, η2 = .24; Experiment 3: F(3, 399) = 24.39, p 
< .001, η2 = .16]. 
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Figure 6. Mean perceived belief of the donor’s (i.e. Mark’s) true preference to donate across 
the four experimental conditions for Experiment 1, 2 and 3. Error bars are at 95% CI. 
 
 
For Experiment 1 and 2, the participants’ perceived belief of the donor’s true preference to 
donate decreased in the following order: Mandated choice = Default opt-in > Default opt-out 
> Mandatory donor. Planned pairwise comparisons confirmed this pattern: The default opt-in 
system was perceived as a stronger indicator of true preference to donate when compared with 
the default opt-out system [Experiment 1: t(489) = 9.00, p < .001, d = 1.20; Experiment 2: 
t(188) = 5.75, p < .001, d = 0.81]; and the mandatory donor system [Experiment 1: t(489) = 
12.65, p < .001, d = 1.51; Experiment 2: t(194) = 7.47, p < .001, d = 1.06]. The default opt-out 
system was judged as a stronger indicator of true preference to donate when compared with the 
mandatory donor system [Experiment 1: t(489) = 3.49, p = .001, d = 0.43; Experiment 2: t(195) 
= 2.23, p = .027, d = 0.32]. The mandated choice system was judged as a stronger indicator of 
true preference to donate when compared with the default opt-out system [Experiment 1: t(489) 
= 7.78, p < .001, d = 1.07; Experiment 2: t(198) = 8.14, p < .001, d = 1.15]; and the mandatory 
donor system [Experiment 1: t(489) = 11.46,  p < .001, d = 1.40; Experiment 2: t(192) = 9.96,  
p < .001, d = 1.41]. There was no significant difference in true preference to donate between 
the default opt-in system and mandated choice system [Experiment 1: t(489) = 1.34, p = .181, 
d = 0.18;  Experiment 2: t(182) = 1.11, p = .269, d = 0.16]. 
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For Experiment 3, the participants’ perceived belief of the donor’s true preference to donate 
decreased in the following order: Default opt-in > Mandated choice > Default opt-out = 
Mandatory donor. Planned pairwise comparisons confirmed this pattern: The default opt-in 
system was judged as a stronger indicator of true preference to donate when compared with the 
default opt-out system [Experiment 3: t(195) = 7.31, p < .001, d = 1.04]; mandated choice 
system [Experiment 3: t(196) = 3.16,  p = .002, d = 0.45]; and mandatory donor system 
[Experiment 3: t(198) = 7.35, p < .001, d = 1.04]. The mandated choice system was judged as 
a stronger indicator of true preference to donate when compared with the default opt-out system 
[Experiment 3: t(197) = 3.99, p < .001, d = 0.57]; and the mandatory donor system [Experiment 
3: t(200) = 4.06,  p < .001, d = 0.58].  There was no significant difference in true preference to 
donate between the default opt-out system and the mandatory donor system [Experiment 3: 
t(199) = .17, p = .864, d = 0.02]. 
 
Perceived signal of intent to donate 
The findings were broadly in line with our first hypothesis. Participants’ perceptions of the 
donor’s (i.e. Mark’s) intention to donate reflect sensitivity to the four different organ donation 
legislative systems (Figure 7); this question was not asked in Study 1, but was asked in 
Experiment 2: F(3, 400) = 98.77, p < .001, η2 = .43, and Experiment 3: F(3, 399) = 60.73, p < 
.001, η2 = .32.  
 
  
Figure 7. Mean perceived signal of the donor’s (i.e. Mark’s) intention to donate across the 
four experimental conditions for Experiment 2 and 3. Error bars are at 95% CI. 
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For Experiment 2, the participants’ perceptions of the donor’s intention to donate decreased in 
the following order:  Mandated choice = Default opt-in > Default opt-out > Mandatory donor. 
This is consistent with the pattern found for perceived belief of the donor’s true preference to 
donate. Planned pairwise comparisons confirmed this pattern: Default opt-in system was 
perceived as a stronger signal of intent to donate when compared with the default opt-out 
system [Experiment 2: t(188) = 8.37, p < .001, d = 1.78]; and the mandatory donor system 
[Experiment 2: t(159) = 12.66, p < .001, d = 1.79]. The mandated choice system was perceived 
as a stronger signal of intent to donate when compared with the default opt-out system 
[Experiment 2: t(166) = 9.77, p < .001, d= 1.38]; and the mandatory donor system [Experiment 
2: t(140) = 13.93, p < .001, d = 1.98]. Similarly, the default opt-out system was perceived as a 
stronger signal of intent than the mandatory donor system [Experiment 2: t(185) = 5.23, p < 
.001, d = 0.74]. There was no significant difference for signal of intent to donate between the 
default opt-in system and the mandated choice system [Experiment 2: t(190) = .93, p = .355, d 
= 0.13].  
 
For Experiment 3, the participants’ perceptions of the donor’s intention to donate decreased in 
the following order: Default opt-in > Mandated choice > Default opt-out > Mandatory donor. 
Planned pairwise comparisons confirmed this pattern: The default opt-in system was perceived 
as a stronger signal of intent to donate when compared with the default opt-out system 
[Experiment 3: t(180) = 9.80, p < .001, d = 1.39]; the mandated choice system [Experiment 3: 
t(195)= 3.00, p = .003, d = 0.42]; and the mandatory donor system [Study 3: t(171) = 11.43, d= 
1.61, p < .001]. The mandated choice system was perceived as a stronger signal of intent to 
donate when compared with the default opt-out system [Experiment 3:  t(189) = 6.89, p < .001, 
d= 0.98]; and the mandatory donor system, [Experiment 3:  t(181) = 8.74,  p < .001, d= 1.23]. 
Similarly, the default opt-out system was perceived as a stronger signal of intent to donate than 
the mandatory donor system [Experiment 3: t(196) = 2.25, p = .025, d= 0.32].   
 
Perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s belief of the donor’s true preference to 
donate 
The findings were broadly in line with our second hypothesis such that the perceived likelihood 
estimates of the relative’s belief of the donor’s true preference to donate reflected sensitivity 
to the four different organ donation legislative systems (Figure 8). Overall, the evidence 
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revealed that the organ donation legislative system had a significant effect on participants’ 
perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s belief of the donor’s true preference to donate 
[this question was not asked for Experiment 1, but was asked in Experiment 2: F(3, 400) = 
64.23, p < .001, η2 = .33; and Experiment 3: F(3, 399) = 29.84, p < .001, η2 = .18]. 
 
  
Figure 8. Mean perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s belief of the donor’s (i.e. 
Mark’s) belief of the donor’s (i.e. Mark’s) true preference to donate across the four 
experimental conditions for Experiment 2 and Experiment 3. Error bars are at 95% CI. 
 
 
For Experiment 2, the perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s belief of the donor’s true 
preference to donate decreased in the following order: Mandated choice = Default opt-in > 
Default opt-out > Mandatory donor. Planned pairwise comparisons confirmed this pattern: 
Perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s belief of the donor’s true preference to donate 
were higher in the default opt-in system compared to the default opt-out system [Experiment 
2: t(199) = 7.06, p < .001, d = 0.99]; and the mandatory donor system [Experiment 2: t(197) = 
9.06, p < .001, d = 1.28]. Similarly, the default opt-out system had higher perceived likelihood 
estimates compared with the mandatory donor system [Experiment 2: t(198) = 2.10, p = .037, 
d = 0.30]. The mandated choice system had higher perceived likelihood estimates when 
compared with the default opt-out system [Experiment 2: t(181) = 10.41, p < .001, d = 1.47] 
and the mandatory donor system [Experiment 2: t(178) = 12.78,  p < .001, d = 1.81]. There was 
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no significant difference between the default opt-in system and the mandated choice system 
[Experiment 2: t(174) = 1.86, p = .064, d = 0.26]. 
 
For Experiment 3, the perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s belief of the donor’s true 
preference decreased in the following order: Mandated choice = Default opt-in > Default opt-
out = Mandatory donor. Planned pairwise comparisons confirmed this pattern: Perceived 
likelihood estimates of the relative’s belief of the donor’s true preference to donate were higher 
in the default opt-in system compared to the default opt-out system [Experiment 3: t(396) = 
6.43, p < .001, d = 0.90]; and the mandatory donor system [Experiment 3: , t(396) = 8.18, p < 
.001, d = 1.18]. The mandated choice system has higher perceived likelihood estimates 
compared with the default opt-out system [Experiment 3: t(396) = 4.75, p < .001, d = 0.66] and 
the mandatory donor system [Experiment 3: t(396) = 6.50, p < .001, d = 0.93]. There was no 
significant difference for perceived likelihood estimates between the default opt-in system and 
mandated choice system [Experiment 3: t(396) = 1.69, p = .092, d = 0.24]; and between the 
default opt-out system and mandatory donor system [Experiment 3 :t(396) = 1.71,  p = .088, 
d= 0.24]. 
 
Perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s decision to consent 
The findings broadly supported our second hypothesis such that perceived likelihood estimates 
of the relative’s decision to consent to donate their family member’s organs reflected sensitivity 
to the four different organ donation legislative systems (Figure 9). Overall, the evidence 
revealed that the organ donation legislative system had a significant effect on participants’ 
perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s decision to consent to donate [Experiment 1: 
F(3, 492) = 21.78, p < .001, η2 = .12; Experiment 2: F(3, 400) = 22.12, p < .001, η2 = .14; 
Experiment 3: F(3, 399) = 5.88, p = .001, η2 = .08]. 
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Figure 9. Perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s decision to consent across the four 
experimental conditions for Experiment 1, 2 and 3. Error bar at 95% CI. 
 
In Experiment 1, the perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s decision to consent to 
donate their family member’s organs decreased in the following order: Mandated choice = 
Default opt-in > Default opt-out > Mandatory donor. This is consistent with the pattern found 
for the perceived belief of the donor’s true preference to donate. Planned pairwise comparisons 
confirmed this pattern: Participants’ perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s decision 
to consent to donate were significantly higher under the default opt-in system compared to the 
default opt-out system [Experiment 1: t(489) = 3.02, p = .003, d = 0.40] and the mandatory 
donor system [Experiment 1: t(489) = 6.57, p < .001, d = 0.79]. Similarly, perceived likelihood 
estimates were higher under the mandated choice system compared to the default opt-out 
system [Experiment 1: t(489) = 3.90, p < .001, d = 0.53] and the mandatory donor system 
[Experiment 1: t(489) = 7.50, p < .001, d = 0.92]. The default opt-out system was also perceived 
as more likely to lead to family consent than the mandatory donor system [Experiment 1: t(489) 
= 3.47, p = .001, d = 0.45]. There was no significant difference in perceived likelihood 
estimates when comparing the mandated choice system and the default opt-in systems 
[Experiment 1: t(489) = .84, p = .399, d = 0.11].  
 
For Experiment 2, the perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s decision to consent to 
donate their family member’s organs decreased in the following order: Mandated choice = 
Default opt-in > Default opt-out = Mandatory donor. Planned pairwise comparisons confirmed 
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this pattern: Participants’ perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s decision to consent to 
donate were significantly higher under the default opt-in system compared to the default opt-
out system [Experiment 2: t(195) = 3.86, p < .001, d = 0.55] and the mandatory donor system 
[Experiment 2: t(197) = 5.74, p < .001, d = 0.81]. Similarly, perceived likelihood estimates 
were higher under the mandated choice system compared to the default opt-out system 
[Experiment 2: t(174) = 5.44, p < .001, d = 0.77], and the mandatory donor system [Experiment 
2: t(181) = 7.68, p < .001, d = 1.09]. There was no significant difference in perceived likelihood 
estimates of the relative’s decision to consent when comparing the mandated choice system 
and the default opt-in system [Experiment 2: t(188) = 1.34, p = .181, d = 0.19]; and between 
the default opt-out system and the mandatory donor system [Experiment 2: t(196) = 1.52, p = 
.131, d = 0.21]. 
 
In Experiment 3, the perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s decision to consent to 
donate their family member’s organs decreased in the following order: Mandated choice = 
Default opt-in = Default opt-out > Mandatory donor. Planned pairwise comparisons confirmed 
this pattern: Participants’ perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s decision to consent to 
donate were significantly higher under the default opt-in system compared to the mandatory 
donor system [Experiment 3: t(396) = 4.06, p < .001, d = 0.59]. Similarly, perceived likelihood 
estimates were higher under the mandated choice system compared to the mandatory donor 
system [Experiment 3: t(396) = 2.93, p = .004, d = 0.41]. The default opt-out system has a 
higher perceived likelihood estimates than the mandatory donor system [Experiment 3: t(396) 
= 2.20, p = .028, d = 0.31]. There was no significant difference in the perceived likelihood 
estimate of relative’s decision to consent when comparing the mandated choice system and the 
default opt-in system [Experiment 3: t(396) = 1.14, p = .257, d = 0.16], and between the default 
opt-in system and the default opt-out system [Experiment 3: t(396) = 1.85, p  = .065, d = 0.26]; 
as well as between the mandated choice system and the default opt-out system [Experiment 3: 
t(396) = .72,  p = .474, d = 0.10]. 
 
The type of organ donation legislative systems was also significantly related to the binary 
decision of whether or not participants thought the relative would donate their deceased family 
member’s organs: Experiment 1 (the only experiment in which this question was included), 
χ(3) = 18.71, p < .001. We present the percentage of participants that believe the relative would 
consent to donation under each organ donation legislative system: Default opt-in system 
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(92.6%), default opt-out system (94.9%), mandated choice system (96.1%), and mandatory 
donor system (82.4%). However, this measure was less sensitive, as compared to the other 
questions presented in the three studies.  
 
Reason for Donating 
In general, the organ donation legislative system in the participants’ country (default opt-in or 
default opt-out) was significantly related to the reason they gave as to why the relative would 
consent to donate the deceased family member’s organs (this question was not asked for 
Experiment 1, but was asked for Experiment 2 and Experiment 3), χ(9) = 23.90, p = .004; but 
not significantly related to the reasons for the relatives veto decision, χ(13) = 17.55, p = .176. 
Table 2 and Table 3 show the frequency of each of the reasons chosen for consenting or vetoing 
decisions under each organ donation legislative system. 
 
Table 2.  
The combined general reasons in frequencies for opt-in and opt-out countries that John will 
consent to donate Mark's organs in each organ donation legislative system, where ‘´’ means 
this option was not displayed for that system. 
 
Reason for likely/moderately 
likely/highly likely to donate 
Opt-In Opt-Out Mandated 
Choice 
Mandatory 
Donor 
It is important to respect the 
deceased’s wish 
50 22 64 24 
This is a gift of life 8 23 15 33 
The act of good citizenship 7 18 7 39 
There is evidence to suggest that 
Mark wanted to donate his organs 
32 20 40 13 
He actively made a choice to opt-in 
and donate his organs 
95 10 68 16 
Mark didn’t opt-out during his 
lifetime means he wanted to donate 
x 85 x x 
Mark couldn’t opt-out of becoming a 
donor anyway 
x x x 56 
None of the above 0 7 1 9 
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Table 3.  
The combined general reasons in frequencies for opt-in and opt-out countries that John will 
refuse to donate Mark's organs in each organ donation legislative system, where ‘´’ means 
this option was not displayed for that system. 
 
Reason for moderately 
unlikely/highly unlikely to donate 
Opt-In Opt-Out Mandated 
Choice 
Mandatory 
Donor 
It is a highly traumatic time for relatives 
and it is just not something they can 
think about 
1 5 3 1 
Lack of understanding of the organ 
donation process 
0 1 0 2 
Denial and rejection of brain-death 
criteria 
0 1 0 1 
The hope for a miracle 0 2 0 0 
Fear about organ trade and unknown 
organ destination 
1 0 0 0 
Religious belief 2 0 0 0 
Insecurity about the brain-death 
diagnosis 
1 0 0 0 
Unsure about Mark's wish to donate 0 4 1 2 
Belief in body integrity 1 0 0 1 
Fear about objection by other family 
members 
0 0 0 0 
There is a lack of evidence to indicate 
that Mark wanted to donate his organs 
2 1 1 2 
Because Mark didn't opt-out does not 
mean he wanted to donate his organs 
x 1 x x 
Mark was forced to donate his organs x x x 2 
Mark was forced to make a choice when 
he wasn't ready 
x x 0 x 
None of the above 0 0 0 0 
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Perceived diagnosticity of people’s intention to donate 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to analyse perceived diagnosticity of evidence inferred 
from the likelihood ratio ( )
( )'
P registration want todonate
P registration DON T want todonate
½
½
.  
 
The findings broadly supported the hypothesis that perceived diagnosticity of people’s 
intention to donate, as assessed by the revealed likelihood ratios, again, reflected sensitivities 
to the four different organ donation legislative systems (Figure 10). A one-way ANOVA 
revealed a significant effect of organ donation legislative system on perceived diagnosticity of 
people’s intention to donate [Experiment 1: F(3, 415) = 9.53, p < .001, η2 = .065; Experiment 
2: F(3, 304) = 14.82, p < .001, η2 = .13; Experiment 3: F(3, 336) = 12.78, p < .001, η2 = .103].  
 
  
Figure 10. Mean perceived diagnosticity of people’s intention to donate across the four 
experimental conditions for Experiment 1, 2 and 3. Error bar at 95% CI. 
 
For Experiment 1, the perceived diagnosticity of people’s intention to donate decreased in the 
following order: Mandated choice = Default opt-in > Default opt-out = Mandatory donor. 
Pairwise comparisons confirmed this pattern: The default opt-in system was perceived as more 
diagnostic of true preferences to donate than the default opt-out system [Experiment 1: t(73) = 
3.30, p = .001, d = 0.55];  and the mandatory donor system [Experiment 1: t(77) = 3.35, p = 
.001, d = 0.55]. The mandated choice system was also perceived as more diagnostic than the 
default opt-out system [Experiment 1: t(111) = 3.15, p = .002, d = 0.43]; and the mandatory 
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donor system [Experiment 1: t(124) = 3.19, p = .002, d= 0.43]. There was no significant 
difference in perceived diagnosticity between the default opt-in system and the mandated 
choice system [Experiment 1: t(140) = .82, p = .414, d = 0.13]; and between the default opt-
out system and the mandatory donor system [Experiment 1: t(184) = .42, p = .679, d = 0.05]. 
 
For Experiment 2, the perceived diagnosticity of people’s intention to donate decreased in the 
following order: Mandated choice > Default opt-in > Default opt-out > Mandatory donor. 
Pairwise comparisons confirmed this pattern: The default opt-in system was perceived as more 
diagnostic of true preferences to donate than the default opt-out system [Study 2: t(56) = 3.03, 
p = .004, d = 0.59]; and the mandatory donor system [Experiment 2: t(50) = 4.11, p < .001, d 
= 0.83]. The mandated choice system was also perceived as more diagnostic than the default 
opt-in system [Experiment 2: t(88) = 2.06, p = .042, d = 0.36], the default opt-out system 
[Experiment 2: t(69) = 3.58, p = .001, d = 0.62]; and the mandatory donor system [Experiment 
2: t(67) = 4.04, p < .001, d = 0.70]. Also, the default opt-out system was perceived as more 
diagnostic than the mandatory donor system [Experiment 2: t(164) = 2.62, p = .010, d = 0.38]. 
 
For Experiment 3, the perceived diagnosticity of people’s intention to donate decreased in the 
following order: Mandated choice = Default opt-in > Default opt-out > Mandatory donor. 
Pairwise comparisons confirmed this pattern: The default opt-in system was perceived as more 
diagnostic of true preferences to donate than the default opt-out system [Experiment 3: t(68) = 
3.39, p = .001, d = 0.60];  and the mandatory donor system [Experiment 3: t(333) = 4.91, p < 
.001, d = 0.73]. The mandated choice system was also perceived as more diagnostic than the 
default opt-out system [Experiment 3: t(93) = 3.36, p = .001, d = 0.53]; and the mandatory 
donor system [Experiment 3: t(86) = 4.19, p < .001, d = 0.64]. The default opt-out system was 
perceived as more diagnostic than the mandatory donor system [Experiment 3: t(175) = .88, p 
= .033, d = 0.31]. There was no significant difference between the default opt-in system and 
the mandated choice system [Experiment 3: t(128) = .43, p = .666, d = 0.07]. 
 
The impact of demographics on response patterns in Experiment 1-3  
The demographic questions presented to all participants at the end of each experiment required 
that they indicate: 1) whether they were on the ODR, 2) whether they knew anyone that was 
on the ODR, 3) whether they were blood donors, 4) whether they would consent to donating 
their loved one’s organs even if their wishes were unknown, 5) whether organ donation was 
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deemed as forbidden in their religion, and 6) whether they agree with the idea of a default opt-
out system. In general, the key findings hold when including the above six factors as covariates. 
More specifically, the organ donation legislative system had a significant effect on participants’ 
perceived belief of the donor’s true preference to donate [Experiment 1: F(3, 483) = 80.79, p < 
.001, η2 = .04; Experiment 2: F(3, 391) = 48.30, p < .001, η2 = .02; Experiment 3: F(3, 390) = 
26.54, p < .001, η2 = .01]; perceived signal of donor’s intent to donate [Experiment 2: F(3, 391) 
= 97.26, p < .001, η2 = .09; Experiment 3: F(3, 390) = 63.10, p < .001, η2 = .07]; likelihood 
estimates of the relative’s belief of the donor’s true preference to donate [Experiment 2: F(3, 
391) = 66.57, p < .001, η2 = .03; Experiment 3: F(3, 390) = 31.79, p < .001, η2 = .02]; perceived 
likelihood of the relative’s decision to consent to donate their family member’s organs 
[Experiment 1: F(3, 483) = 25.26, , p < .001, η2 = .008; Experiment 2: F(3, 391) = 23.77, p < 
.001, η2 = .01; Experiment 3: F(3, 390) = 6.14, p < .001, η2 = .002]; and perceived diagnosticity 
of people’s intention to donate [Experiment 1: F(3, 406) = 9.82, η2 = .03, p < .001; Experiment 
2: F(3, 391) = 48.30, p < .001, η2 = .10; Experiment 3: F(3, 295) = 13.12, p < .001, η2 = .08]. 
 
Across the three experiments (N = 1,323), the majority of the samples were non-religious 
(52%), much of the remainder identified themselves as Christian (40%). For 95% of the 
participants, organ donation was not forbidden in their religion. The sample also consisted of 
about 50% blood donors, 66% who knew someone who is registered as an organ donor, and 
56% who agree with the idea of an opt-out system. In the event of death, participants agreed 
that the deceased person’s wishes should be respected (75%), with a small minority believing 
that the family should have a final say (16%), and the remaining participants indicating they 
do not know (7%). Across the three experiments, it appears that less than 50% of the 
participants have knowledge of the current organ donation legislation in their country (Table 
4).  
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Table 4.  
Participants’ knowledge of the current organ donation legislation in their country: Experiment 
1 (US, opt-in system), Experiment 2 (European country, opt-in system), and Experiment 3 
(European country, opt-out system). 
 What is the current legislation in your country? 
(%) 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
Opt-out/Presumed consent 9.2 7.7 18.5 
Mandatory/compulsory 1.8 0.5 1.3 
Need to carry a donor card 0.8 21.9 9.0 
Opt-in 42.8 44.6 18.8 
Family or close friend will decide 8.7 3.7 8.8 
Do not know 36.7 21.4 43.8 
 
 
Regression Analysis. Regression Analysis were conducted to determine the proportion of 
variation in the dependent variables (perceived belief of the donor’s true preference to donate, 
perceived signal of intention to donate, perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s belief 
of the donor’s true preference to donate, perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s 
decision to consent) explained by the independent variables (Experiment, legislative system, 
age, gender, whether organ donation is forbidden in their religion, whether they know anyone 
who is registered as a donor, whether they are a blood donor, whether they agree with an opt-
out system, whether they would donate their loved one’s organs, and who should decide for 
the donor).  
 
For perceived belief of the donor’s true preference to donate, a significant regression equation 
was found F(12, 559) = 11.19, p <.001, with an R2 of .197 (Table 5). Participants’ ratings of 
perceived belief of the donor’s true preference to donate decreased by 18.74 for the default opt-
out system, and increased by 8.90 when the deceased decides for donation.  
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Table 5.  
Summary of Multiple Regression of mean perceived belief of the donor’s true preference to 
donate with predictor variables experiment, legislative system, age, gender, forbidden organ 
donation, organ donor, blood donor, known registered donor, agree with opt-out, willingness 
to donate loved one’s organ, who decides in the event of death. 
Variables B SEß ß 
Intercept 51.618 10.577  
Gender 2.263 1.765 0.052 
Age 0.145 0.077 0.077 
Forbidden Organ Donation 7.472 5.079 0.057 
Organ Donor (2.273) 2.074 (0.052) 
Blood Donor (0.686) 1.707 (0.016) 
Known Organ Donor 1.385 2.035 0.031 
Agree with Opt-out System 3.103 1.952 0.067 
Donate Loved One’s Organ 3.386 2.215 0.064 
Experiment 2 0.39 1.883 0.009 
Mandated Choice System (2.366) 2.046 (0.051) 
Default Opt-out System (18.738) 2.049 (0.409)*** 
Deceased Decides Donation 8.898 2.379 0.147*** 
Note. p  .05*; p  .01**; p   .001***; B = unstandardized coefficient; SEß = Standard 
error of the coefficient; ß = standard coefficient. 
 
 
For perceived signal of the donor’s intention to donate, a significant regression equation was 
found F(12, 362) = 14.88, p <.001, with an R2 of .328 (Table 6). Participants’ ratings of 
perceived signal of intention increased by 6.8 for the European opt-in countries, and decreased 
by 2.48 for mandated choice system and 33.32 for default opt-out systems.  
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Table 6.  
Summary of Multiple Regression of mean perceived signal of the donor’s intention to donate 
with predictor variables experiment, legislative system, age, gender, forbidden organ donation, 
organ donor, blood donor, known registered donor, agree with opt-out, willingness to donate 
loved one’s organ, who decides in the event of death. 
Variables B SEß ß 
Intercept 55.443 15.345  
Gender 2.227 2.514 .039 
Age .060 .108 .025 
Forbidden Organ Donation 9.775 7.369 .058 
Organ Donor (1.565) 2.940 (.027) 
Blood Donor 1.201 2.516 .021 
Known Organ Donor (2.372) 2.941 (.041) 
Agree with Opt-out System 3.382 2.796 .057 
Donate Loved One’s Organ .083 3.234 .001 
Experiment 2 6.803 2.771 .118* 
Mandated Choice System (2.484) 3.032 (.041)* 
Default Opt-out System (33.322) 2.990 (.560)*** 
Deceased Decides Donation 5.627 3.476 .072 
Note. p  .05*; p  .01**; p   .001***; B = unstandardized coefficient; SEß = Standard 
error of the coefficient; ß = standard coefficient. 
 
 
For perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s belief of the donor’s true preference to 
donate, a significant regression equation was found F(12, 547) = 14.86, p <.001, with an R2 of 
.246 (Table 7). Participants’ ratings of perceived likelihood estimates increased with age by 
.15, by 16.16 when organ donation is forbidden in their religion, by 4.82 when the deceased 
decides for donation, decreased by 19.83 for a default opt-out system. 
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Table 7.  
Summary of Multiple Regression of mean perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s belief 
of the donor’s true preference to donate with predictor variables experiment, legislative 
system, age, gender, forbidden organ donation, organ donor, blood donor, known registered 
donor, agree with opt-out, willingness to donate loved one’s organ, who decides in the event 
of death. 
Variables B SEß ß 
Intercept 34.934 10.23  
Gender 3.005 1.707 0.069 
Age 0.149 0.074 0.079 
Forbidden Organ Donation 16.158 4.913 0.124** 
Organ Donor (0.587) 2.006 (0.013) 
Blood Donor (0.362) 1.651 (0.008) 
Known Organ Donor (0.909) 1.968 (0.02) 
Agree with Opt-out System 1.802 1.888 0.039 
Donate Loved One’s Organ 3.257 2.143 0.061 
Experiment 2 3.277 1.821 0.076 
Mandated Choice System 0.323 1.979 0.007 
Default Opt-out System (19.832) 1.982 (0.434)*** 
Deceased Decides Donation 4.824 2.301 0.08* 
Note. p  .05*; p  .01**; p   .001***; B = unstandardized coefficient; SEß = Standard 
error of the coefficient; ß = standard coefficient. 
 
For perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s decision to consent, a significant regression 
equation was found F(12, 392) = 6.64, p <.001, with an R2 of .127 (Table 8). Participants’ 
ratings of perceived likelihood estimates increased with age by .01, by .76 when organ donation 
is forbidden by religion, by .33 when the deceased decides for donation, and decreased by .38 
for a default opt-out system.  
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Table 8.  
Summary of Multiple Regression of mean perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s 
decision to consent with predictor variables experiment, legislative system, age, gender, 
forbidden organ donation, organ donor, blood donor, known registered donor, agree with opt-
out, willingness to donate loved one’s organ, who decides in the event of death. 
Variables B SEß ß 
Intercept 1.958 0.456  
Gender 0.088 0.076 0.049 
Age 0.011 0.003 0.139* 
Forbidden Organ Donation 0.757 0.219 0.141* 
Organ Donor (0.069) 0.089 (0.038) 
Blood Donor (0.051) 0.074 (0.029) 
Known Organ Donor 0.022 0.088 0.012 
Agree with Opt-out System 0.037 0.084 0.019 
Donate Loved One’s Organ 0.189 0.095 0.086 
Experiment 2 0.093 0.081 0.052 
Mandated Choice System 0.004 0.088 0.002 
Default Opt-out System (0.379) 0.088 (0.200)*** 
Deceased Decides Donation 0.325 0.102 0.130** 
Note. p  .05*; p  .01**; p   .001***; B = unstandardized coefficient; SEß = Standard 
error of the coefficient; ß = standard coefficient. 
 
5.4.Discussion  
The aim of this study was to examine the welfare argument, under which nudge undermines 
autonomy. To do so, the current study examined third-party judgements as a way of gaining 
insights into inferred true preference from nudged choices (under default opt-in or default opt-
out systems) in the context of organ donation. The motivation for doing this was to simulate 
the kind of information families are faced with when making decisions as to whether to donate 
their deceased relative’s organs, as a way to consider a possible reason for high family refusal 
rates, namely the strength of signals of true preference to donate that are being perceived from 
choices under different organ donation legislative systems.  
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In the main, the findings across three studies supported Hypothesis 1 which is that people are 
sensitive to the framing of organ donation legislative systems under which a decision to donate 
is made. More specifically, when an individual has been ‘defaulted’ into donation under a 
default opt-out or mandatory donor system, participants perceived the donor’s (i.e. Mark’s) 
true preference to donate as weaker than when that choice was made actively under a mandated 
choice or default opt-in system (Experiment 1-3). This pattern was consistent with the 
perceived signal of the donor’s (i.e. Mark) intent to donate (Experiment 2 and 3 only). 
Subsequently, the findings supported Hypothesis 2, that families making decisions on the basis 
of their beliefs about the deceased’s true preference to donate will be perceived by participants 
as more likely to agree to donate. Indeed, the same pattern was revealed in participants’ 
perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s belief of the donor’s (i.e. Mark) true preference 
to donate (Experiment 2 and 3 only), and perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s 
decision to consent to donate a family member’s organs (Experiment 1 and 2, except for 
Experiment 3 where no difference was found between default opt-in and default opt-out). That 
is, these perceived likelihood estimates were judged as weaker under a default opt-out or 
mandatory donor system compared to a default opt-in or mandated choice system. A multiple 
regression of the respective dependent variables also revealed that ratings decreased 
consistently when a default opt-out system is introduced. Lastly, consistent with the patterns 
found in Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, the perceived diagnosticity of this evidence (i.e. 
Mark’s registration on the ODR across the different organ donation legislative systems) for 
inferring donor’s true preference to donate was stronger when he was registered under the 
default opt-in or mandated choice system compared to default opt-out or mandatory donor 
systems (Experiment 1-3). From a welfare perspective, an autonomous decision is more likely 
to reflect one’s true preference. 
 
Across the three studies, participants gave different reasons for the relative (i.e. John) 
consenting or vetoing donation under each organ donation legislative system. The general 
reason in the default opt-in and mandated choice systems were that “he actively made a choice 
to opt-in and donate his organs” and “it is important to respect the deceased’s wish”. The reason 
for participants consenting to donate in the default opt-out and mandatory donor system was 
“Mark didn’t opt-out during his lifetime means he wants to donate” and “Mark couldn’t opt-
out of becoming a donor anyway” respectively. This shows that, among the reasons for 
consenting to donation, participants were sensitive to the different systems under which the 
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donor (i.e. Mark’s) was registered to donate. Chapter 7 will discuss the implication of these 
findings in further details, with particular focus on the debate between active choosing and 
defaults on welfare grounds.  
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CHAPTER 6: Public Attitude Towards Nudge 
 
The focus of this chapter is to examine the extent to which nudge undermines autonomy if 
people cannot discern the intervention and how it is used to change their behaviour – the 
transparency argument. I explained in Chapter 3.2 that the mechanism by which nudge works, 
by triggering behavioural change without the chooser’s awareness, poses profound questions 
on the ethics of nudging. In particular, nudges that lack transparency are regarded as 
manipulative and manipulation is objectionable because it violates people’s autonomy by 
subverting the decision-making process. To ensure transparency, it has been stated that a 
watchful individual should possess the autonomous power to be able to discern the intention 
of the change in the choice architecture and to opt out of any arrangements if he/she wanted to. 
Given that previous survey findings have shown that people generally prefer transparent 
nudges over non-transparent nudges, there is speculation that public attitudes are influenced by 
the transparency of interventions. However, to date, there has not been explicit examination of 
the transparency of interventions to see how it influences people’s judgments on a variety of 
dimension which are tested in this study. This motivated the current study to investigate the 
extent to which public attitudes towards four factors, namely, ease of identification, willingness 
to change behaviour, perceived effectiveness and acceptability, are dependent on transparency 
of an intervention. In addition, this study also examines the extent to which these four factors 
are dependent on the agent that propose the intervention and the presentation of rationale for 
these interventions across five contexts. This study will be conducted using UK and US 
participants. These two countries have been found to have different views on the use of 
restrictive behaviour change interventions (Branson et al., 2012). Because nudges have been 
extensively applied in both of these countries, the current study will explore the extent to which 
public opinion differ between these two countries across the five behaviour contexts. 
 
The specific hypotheses are investigated here:  
H1 (transparency). Across the five contexts, the public will find it easier to identify the actual 
behavioural intervention and how their behaviour will be changed by the psychological 
method in the transparent condition and in turn, more accurately classify these as 
transparent interventions.    
H2 (transparency). Across the five contexts, the public will be more willing to change their 
behaviour when presented with transparent nudges compared to non-transparent nudges. 
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H3 (transparency). Across the five contexts, the public will generally perceive an intervention 
as more effective in the transparent condition than the non-transparent condition. 
H4 (transparency). Across the five contexts, the public will generally perceive an intervention 
as more acceptable in the transparent condition than the non-transparent condition; and 
there will be a correlation between perceived effectiveness and acceptability. 
H5 (transparency). Public opinion with regard to ease of identification, perceived effectiveness 
and acceptability of an intervention, and their willingness to change will be influenced by 
the presentation of rationale for these interventions and judgements will follow the 
direction of: positive > positive + negative > negative.  
H6 (transparency). Public opinion with regard to ease of identification, perceived effectiveness 
and acceptability of an intervention, and their willingness to change will be influenced by 
the behaviour agent that proposed the intervention, such that judgments overall will be 
most favourable towards scientists proposing nudges as compared to advertisers and 
policy makers. 
 
6.1.Participants and Design  
In each experiment, there were two samples (Table 9), Experiment 1 (US N = 265, UK N = 
237), Experiment 2 (US N = 306, UK N = 305), and Experiment 3 (US N = 301, UK N = 301). 
All Experiments were presented via Qualtrics and launched via Prolific Academic a crowd 
sourcing system for participant recruitment worldwide, and all were financially compensated 
for their time (£1.21). The three experiments differed in terms of the rationale presented for the 
interventions: Positive argument that highlight why the intervention works (Experiment 1) 
negative arguments that highlight why the intervention does not work (Experiment 3), and 
presentation of both positive and negative arguments (Experiment 2). For full details of the 
questionnaires and specific instructions, please see Appendix D. 
 
The design of the experiment was a 3 (Argument: Positive, Positive & Negative, Negative) x 
2 (Sample: US, UK) x 3 (Behavioural Agent: Scientists, Government, Advertisers) x 2 
(Transparency: Transparent, Non-transparent) as between-subject variables, x 5 (Contexts: 
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Smoking, Diet, Alcohol, Exercise, Banking) as the within-subject variable. They were given 
six probative questions regarding behavioural interventions, and five demographic questions6.  
 
Table 9.  
Participants profile from Experiment 1, 2 and 3 combined 
Sample US UK 
Total participants Total combining Experiment 1, 2 
and 3 N = 872 (all US residents or 
nationals, first language English) 
Total combining Experiment 1, 2 and 
3 N = 843 (all UK residents or 
nationals, first language English) 
Females 471 (54%) 413 (49%) 
Age Mean 35 (SD = 12.24) ranging 
from 18-74 
Mean 32.36 (SD = 11.32) ranging 
from 18-71 
Educational 
background 
Mixed, 56.7% qualified with a 
degree (at bachelor degree and 
postgraduate level). 
Mixed, 57.1% qualified with a degree 
(at bachelor degree and postgraduate 
level). 
Political affiliation 51.6% identifying as left, 8.6% as 
centre, 16.7% as right, and 23.1% 
as other 
47% identifying as left, 16.1% as 
centre, 17% as right, and 19.9 % as 
other 
Religion 41.6% reported that they did not 
have one, 19.5% were not sure, 
38.9% reported that they were 
religious 
38.9% reported that they did not have 
one, 23.8% were not sure, 37.3% 
reported that they were religious 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
6 With regards to the demographic questions, participants were asked to type their age in a text 
box [continuous measure], and provide details of their gender (Female [score 1], Male [score 
2]), along with their political affiliation (Left [Score 1], Centre [Score 2], Right [Score 3], Other 
[Score 4]), their educational background (High school [Score 1], diploma/foundation [Score 
2], Bachelors degree [Score 3], Master’s degree [Score 4], PhD [Score 5], Other [Score 6]), 
and religious orientation ( Religious [Score 1], Not sure [Score 2], Not religious [Score 3]). 
These formed the basic question regarding demographics and social/cultural characteristics. 
 101 
Table 10.  
Description of Transparent and Non-Transparent Behavioural Interventions. 
Context Transparent Non-transparent 
Smoking Design cigarette packaging so that it incorporates graphic pictures of 
damaged lungs and warnings such as “Smoking seriously harms you 
and others around you”, “Smoking harms your unborn baby”.     
Increasing the length of the filter by 10mm and at the same time reduce 
the length of the cigarette to 60mm.  
Food Design packaging on food so that the front label includes nutritional 
information, by using a simple traffic light system (red, amber, green) 
to indicate how much saturated fat, salt and sugar, and calories are in 
food products.  
Design the size of plates so that the quantity of food on them is adjusted. 
Large plates and bowls can make servings of food appear smaller, 
whereas smaller plates can lead people to misjudge that very same 
quantity of food as being significantly larger.  
Alcohol Design signage in pubs and restaurants so that they include messages 
such as the following: “men and women are advised not to regularly 
drink more than 14 units a week” and “spread your drinking over three 
days or more if you drink as much as 14 units a week”.   
Design the glassware used in pubs and restaurants in such a way so that 
straight glasses are used, because relative to curvy glasses, it is easier 
to judge and pace the amount of alcohol consumed.  
 
Exercise Design stairwells with ‘point-of-choice’ signage that displays messages 
about the health advantages of taking the stairs, such as “Stair climbing 
burns more calories per minute than tennis”, “7 minutes of stair 
climbing per day protects your heart”, etc.  
Design stairwells by hanging artworks. Pictures are changed 
periodically to keep stair users to prolong effectiveness.   
Finance Design investment schemes in such a way so that customers can 
evaluate the associated riskiness of each product based on a traffic light 
system; red indicates highly risky, green indicates low risk.  
Design investment schemes with an automatic enrolment system so 
Bank/Building Society will decide on an individual’s behalf exactly 
how the money will be allocated to investment schemes. Although if 
the individual didn’t want it, they could opt-out of the scheme, this 
would involve filling in relevant paperwork.     
 102 
6.2.General Materials and Procedure 
Participants were provided with a brief introduction to the use psychological methods used to 
bring about behaviour changes, and were told that these methods are designed to help guide 
people to make better decisions for their own health and wellbeing. First, they were randomly 
assigned to either the transparent or non-transparent condition, then they read a passage about 
the expert that proposed the intervention: “The X in this country is using psychological research 
to help develop a set of simple methods that adjust the way information is presented, so that it 
can help people to make better decisions. The reason for using psychological methods is to 
help improve people’s behaviour, because in many day-to-day contexts people may not make 
a decision that is best for their own health, wellbeing, and their happiness.”, where X represents 
either the Government, Top Advertising Company or Top Researchers in laboratories. They 
then read about the contexts (i.e. Smoking, Food, Alcohol, Exercise, and Banking) for which 
the psychological method has been implemented (Table 10). Depending on which experiment 
participants took part in (i.e., 1, 2, or 3), the rationale for why the interventions work or not 
work were presented. These were either a positive argument for why nudges work (e.g., by 
highlighting the negative physical and moral issues concerning smoking, the negative 
experiences will become more obviously associated with smoking and this will encourage 
smokers to reduce or even stop smoking), a negative argument for why they do not work (e.g., 
by highlighting the negative physical and moral issues concerning smoking, smokers will feel 
more defensive of their smoking habits, and as a result, smokers will end up smoking more, 
meaning that the method will lead to increases in smoking), and both positive and negative 
arguments. These arguments are specific to the psychological methods used in each context. 
Subsequently, they are presented with the definition of two types of psychological methods: 
Transparent and non-transparent. A transparent nudge method worked in such a way that 
anyone can easily identify the psychological method used to change their behaviour, as well as 
easily identify how their behaviour is changed by it. A non-transparent nudge worked in such 
a way that no one can easily identify the psychological method used to change their behaviour, 
and that no one can easily identify how their behaviour is changed by it. Based on these 
definitions, participants were required to answer the following six questions for each of the 
five contexts:  
1. To what extent is it easy to for you to identify the use of psychological methods to change 
your behaviour? [I cannot identify the psychological method used to change my behaviour1 
to I can easily identify the psychological method used to change my behaviour100] 
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2. To what extent is it easy for you to identify HOW your behaviour is changed by the 
psychological method? [I cannot identify how my behaviour is changed by the 
psychological method1 to I can easily identify how many behaviour is changed by the 
psychological method100] 
3. Is the psychological method described above transparent or non-transparent? [Binary 
response: transparent/non-transparent] 
4. To what extent do you want to change your behaviour through the psychological method 
in this particular situation? [Not at all1 to Very Much9] 
5. To extent do you think the psychological method described above would positively change 
YOUR behaviour? [Much less likely1to Much more likely9] 
6. To what extent do you think it is acceptable to use the psychological method described 
above to change your behaviour? [Unacceptable1 toAcceptable9] 
 
Responses to Question 1 and 2 were combined to obtain an average transparency rating of ease 
of identification of a nudge intervention. Question 3 elicited accuracy of identifying the 
intervention as either transparent or non-transparent depending on the conditions participants 
were assigned to. Questions 4 elicited people’s willingness to change their behaviour in 
response to the implementation of a nudge intervention. Question 5 elicited perceived 
effectiveness of a nudge intervention. Question 6 elicited public acceptability of the nudges.  
 
6.3.Results 
Accuracy of Identification. The findings tested Hypothesis 1, in that the public will be more 
accurate at identifying transparent nudges compared to non-transparent nudges. Across the five 
contexts, Table 11 shows that participants are generally accurate at identifying transparent 
interventions as transparent but are less accurate at identifying non-transparent interventions 
(Smoking: χ 2(1) = 701.86, p < .001; Food: χ 2(1) = 458.57, p < .001; Alcohol: χ 2(1) = 185.16, 
p < .001; Exercise: χ 2(1) = 121.59, p < .001; Finance: χ 2(1) = 49.73, p < .001).  
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Table 11.  
Contingency table showing people’s accuracy in identifying the transparency of an 
intervention across the five behavioural contexts.  
Transparency of 
Intervention  
Smoking Food Alcohol Exercise Finance 
ü û ü û ü û ü û ü û 
Transparent (%) 94.8 5.2 83.7 16.3 82.3 17.7 84.6 15.4 70.7 29.3 
Non- Transparent (%) 33.4 66.6 32.7 67.3 51.3 48.7 60.9 39.1 54.3 45.6 
Note. ü = Participants have correctly identified the intervention under the transparent and 
non-transparent condition respectively; û= Participants have incorrectly identified the 
intervention under the transparent and non-transparent condition respectively. 
 
To examine the impact of the manipulations on judgments regarding the ease of identifying the 
actual behavioural intervention designed to change behaviour, a mixed ANOVA was 
conducted on a 3(Argument: Positive, Positive & Negative, Negative) x 2 (Sample: US, UK) 
x 3 (Behavioural Agent: Scientists, Government, Advertisers) x 2 (Transparency: Transparent, 
Non-transparent) as between-subject variables, x 5 (Contexts: Smoking, Diet, Alcohol, 
Exercise, Banking) as the within-subject variable. For the purposes of a clean presentation, 
only effect sizes greater or equal to 0.01 are reported.  Cohen (1988) provided benchmarks to 
define partial ηp2 (R-squared in a multiple regression) of small (0.01), medium (0.09) and large 
(0.25) effects, any effects lower than 0.01 are not reported. 
 
Ease of Identification. The findings supported Hypothesis 1 such that the ease of identification 
is higher for the transparent condition (M = 72.98, SD = 21.10) than the non-transparent 
condition (M = 60.36, SD = 21.14), F(1, 1679) = 299.32, p < .001, ηp2 = .15, 99% CI [10.74, 
14.50].  
 
The findings supported Hypothesis 5 such that the presentation of rationale for the 
interventions influenced people’s judgement of ease of identification, F(2, 1679) = 6.72, p 
= .001, ηp2 = .01. Pairwise comparison was applied to all follow-up analyses. When a positive 
rationale was presented (M = 68.10, SD = 27.54), participants perceived an intervention as 
easier to identify compared to a negative rationale (M = 64.87, SD = 24.91), t(1104) = 3.55, p 
= .001, 99% CI [.56, 5.90]; a combination of a positive & negative rationale (M = 67.03, SD = 
24.91) also lead to higher ease of identification than a negative rationale (M = 64.87, SD = 
25.12), t(1213) = 2.50, p = .037, 99% CI [-.38, 4.70]. There were no significant differences in 
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ease of identification between a positive rationale and a combined positive & negative 
rationale. Overall, independent of transparency, judgement of ease of identification for 
rationale of intervention presented decrease in the following direction: positive = positive & 
negative > negative. Hypothesis 6 was not supported given that participants’ judgement of ease 
of identification was not influence by the agent that proposed the intervention. 
 
There was a main effect of context, F(4, 1676) = 135.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .08, in which all paired 
comparisons between all five context revealed significant differences (p < .001) with perceived 
transparency decreasing in the following direction from most to least ease of identification: 
Diet > Smoking > Exercise > Alcohol > Banking (Figure 11). There was an interaction between 
transparency * context, F(4, 1679) = 63.92, p < .001, ηp2 = .04 (Figure 12). Pairwise comparison 
across all five contexts revealed significant difference between the transparent and non-
transparent condition for the smoking context, t(1713) = 10.03, p < .001, d = .48; the food 
context, t(1713) = 3.81, p < .001, d = .18; the alcohol context, t(1713) = 11.29, p < .001, d = 
.55; the exercise context, t(1713) = 20.66, p < .001, d = 1.00; and the finance context, t(1713) 
= 10.03, p < .001, d = .48. 
 
 
Figure 11. The main effect of context on mean ratings of ease of identification. Error bar at 
99% CI. 
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Figure 12. The interaction between context and transparency of an intervention on mean 
ratings of ease of identification. Error bar at 99% CI. 
 
Willingness to Change Behaviour. The findings supported Hypothesis 2 such that participants 
were more willing to change their behaviour under transparent interventions (M = 4.93, SD = 
2.21) compared to non-transparent interventions (M = 4.27, SD = 2.21), F(1, 1679) = 73.51, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .04, 99% CI [.46, .85].  
 
Also, the findings supported Hypothesis 5 such that the presentation of a rationale for the 
intervention influenced people’s willingness to change their behaviour, F(2, 1679) = 9.14, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .0. Pairwise comparison revealed a higher willingness to change their behaviour 
under a positive rationale (M = 4.83, SD = 2.87) compared to a combined positive & negative 
rationale (M = 4.53, SD = 2.62), t(1113) = 3.19, p = .004, 99% CI [.02, .58]; and a negative 
rationale (M = 4.44, SD = 2.62), t(1104) = 4.14, p < .001, 99% CI [.11, .67]. No significant 
differences were found when comparing combined positive & negative rationales with a 
negative rationale. Overall, independent of transparency, judgement of willingness to change 
behaviour for rationale of intervention presented decreased in the following direction: positive 
> positive & negative = negative. Hypothesis 6 was not supported as the agent proposing the 
intervention did not influence participants’ judgements of willingness to change their 
behaviour.  
 
Looking specifically at context, there was a main effect of context, F(4, 1679) = 249.25, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .13, in which all paired comparisons between all five context revealed significant 
differences (p < .01) with willingness to change behaviour decrease in the following direction 
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from most to least willing to change: Diet > Exercise > Smoking > Alcohol > Banking (Figure 
13). There was an interaction between context * transparency, F(4, 1679) = 34.72, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .02 (Figure 14). Pairwise comparison across all five contexts revealed significant 
difference between the transparent and non-transparent condition for the smoking context, 
t(1713) = 1.95, p = .05, d = .10; the food context, t(1713) = 4.47, p < .001, d = .22; the alcohol 
context, t(1713) = 1.16, p = .25, d = .06; the exercise context, t(1713) = 7.95, p < .001, d = .38; 
and the finance context, t(1713) = 13.78, p < .001, d = .67. 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Main effect of context on mean ratings of willingness to change behaviour. Error 
bar at 99% CI. 
 
 
Figure 14. The interaction between context and transparency on the mean rating of 
willingness to change behaviour. Error bar at 99% CI. 
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Perceived Effectiveness. The findings supported Hypothesis 3 such that participants perceived 
an intervention as more effective when it was transparent (M = 4.98, SD = 2.17) than non-
transparent (M = 4.28, SD = 2.17), F(1, 1679) = 87.35, p < .001, ηp2 = .05, 99% CI [.51, .90].  
 
The findings supported Hypothesis 5 such that perceived effectiveness of an intervention was 
judged differently when different rationales were presented for the intervention, F(2, 1679) = 
4.88, p = .008, ηp2 = .01. Pairwise comparison revealed that the perceived effectiveness of an 
intervention was higher when presented with a positive rationale (M = 4.78, SD = 2.83) 
compared with a negative rationale (M = 4.49, SD = 2.58), t(1104) = 3.13, p = .006, 99% CI[.02, 
.57]. All other comparisons were not statistically significant. Overall, independent of 
transparency, judgement of perceived effectiveness for rationale of intervention presented 
decreased in the following direction: positive > negative. Hypothesis 6 was not supported as 
the agent that proposed the intervention did not influence participants’ judgements of perceived 
effectiveness. 
 
Overall, there was a main effect of context, F(4, 1679) = 231.95, p < .001, ηp2 = .12. All paired 
comparisons between all five contexts revealed significant differences (p < .05), with perceived 
effectiveness of an intervention decreasing in the following direction from most to least 
perceived effectiveness: Diet > Exercise > Smoking > Alcohol > Banking (Figure 15). There 
was also a significant interaction between context * transparency, F(4, 1679) = 36.63, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .02 (Figure 16). Pairwise comparison across all five contexts revealed significant 
difference between the transparent and non-transparent condition for the smoking context, 
t(1713) = 4.73, p < .001, d = .23; the food context, t(1713) = 3.21, p = .001, d = .16; the alcohol 
context, t(1713) = 1.23, p = .22, d = .06; the exercise context, t(1713) = 9.08, p < .001, d = .44; 
and the finance context, t(1713) = 13.71, p < .001, d = .66. 
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Figure 15. The main effect of context on mean ratings of perceived effectiveness of an 
intervention. Error bar at 99% CI. 
 
 
 
Figure 16. The interaction between context and transparency on mean ratings of perceived 
effectiveness of an intervention. Error bar at 99% CI. 
 
Public Acceptability. The findings supported Hypothesis 3 such that participants found an 
intervention more acceptable when it was transparent (M = 6.96, SD = 2.01) than non-
transparent (M = 5.86, SD = 2.01), F(1, 1679) = 251.75, p < .001, ηp2 = .13, 99% CI [.92, 1.28]. 
In general, UK participants (M = 6.53, SD = 2.05) found an intervention more acceptable than 
US participants (M = 6.30, SD = 1.97), F(1, 1679) = 11.75, p = .001, ηp2 = .01, 99% CI [.92, 
1.28]. This was the only variable in which there were sample differences.  
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The findings supported Hypothesis 5 such that public acceptability was significantly different 
between different rationales of an intervention, F(2, 1679) = 11.13, p < .001, ηp2 = .01. An 
intervention was perceived as more acceptable when presented under a positive rationale (M = 
6.65, SD = 2.62) compared to a combined positive & negative rationale (M = 6.33, SD = 2.38), 
t(1113) = 3.67, 99% CI [.06, .57]; and compared with a negative rationale (M = 6.26, SD = 
2.38), t(1104) = 4.51, 99% CI [.13, .64]. Overall, independent of transparency, judgement of 
perceived effectiveness for rationale of intervention presented decrease in the following 
direction: positive > positive & negative = negative. Hypothesis 6 was not supported as the 
agent that proposed the intervention did not influence people’s judgments of acceptability.   
 
Overall, there was a main effect of context, F(4, 1679) = 612.50, p < .001, ηp2 = .27. Pairwise 
comparison between all contexts revealed significant differences (p < .001) except between 
smoking and alcohol. Public acceptability of an intervention from most to least acceptable is 
as follows: Exercise > Diet > Smoking = Alcohol > Banking (Figure 17). There was also an 
interaction between context * transparency, F(4, 1679) = 175.13, p < .001, ηp2 = .09 (Figure 
18). Pairwise comparison across all five contexts revealed significant difference between the 
transparent and non-transparent condition for the smoking context, t(1713) = 6.75, p < .001, d 
= .32; the food context, t(1713) = 9.26, p < .001, d = .45; the alcohol context, t(1713) = 7.92, 
p < .001, d = .38; the exercise context, t(1713) = 2.25, p =.025, d = .11; and the finance context, 
t(1713) = 27.03, p < .001, d = 1.30. 
 
 
Figure 17. The main effect of context on mean rating of public acceptability. Error bar at 
99% CI. 
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Figure 18. The interaction between context and transparency on mean rating of public 
acceptability. Error bar at 99% CI. 
 
 
Regression Analysis. Regression analyses were conducted to determine the proportion of 
variation in the dependent variables (perceived transparency, willingness to change behaviour, 
perceived effectiveness and public acceptability) explained by the independent variables 
(transparency, behaviour agent, and rationale of experiment) and covariates (age, gender, 
political affiliation, religiosity, education level).  
 
For ease of identification, a significant regression equation was found F(14, 1691) = 22.69, p 
< .001, with an R2 of .158 (Table 12). Participants’ ratings of ease of identification decreased 
by 12.45 when the intervention was non-transparent, decreased by 1.72 for US participants, 
and increased by 3.45 for positive rationales, and 2.25 for a combined positive & negative 
rationale.  
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Table 12.  
Summary of Multiple Regression of mean ease of identification with predictor variables 
transparency, sample, behaviour agent, rationale of intervention, age, gender, political 
affiliation, religiosity, education level 
Variables B SEß ß 
Intercept 72.641 1.723  
Sample (1.72) .743 (.052)* 
Transparency (12.45) .733 (.38)*** 
Positive Rationale 3.453 .917 .096*** 
Postive+Negative Rationale 2.246 .872 .066* 
Advertiser (.768) .897 (.022) 
Government Official (1.298) .894 (.037) 
Left Political Affiliation (.663) .954 (.02) 
Right Political Affiliation (.669) 1.2 (.015) 
Centre Political Affiliation (.771) 1.322 (.016) 
Religious (.564) .832 (.017) 
Not Religious .202 .99 .005 
Age .028 .032 .02 
Gender (.831) .742 (.025) 
Education Level  .089 .45 .004 
Note. p  .05*; p   .01**; p   .001***; B = unstandardized coefficient; SEß = Standard 
error of the coefficient; ß = standard coefficient. 
 
For ratings of willingness to change behaviour, a significant regression equation was found 
F(14, 1691) = 10.62, p < .001, with an R2 of .081 (Table 13). Participants’ rating of willingness 
to change behaviour decreased by .67 when the intervention is non-transparent, decreased by 
.185 when the intervention was proposed by Government officials and .20 by Advertisers, and 
increased by .39 in the presence of positive rationales, increased by .491 for religious 
participants, and decreased by .013 with increases in age. 
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Table 13.  
Summary of Multiple Regression of mean willingness to change behaviour with predictor 
variables transparency, sample, behaviour agent, rationale of intervention, age, gender, 
political affiliation, religiosity, education level 
Variables B SEß ß 
Intercept 5.129 .178  
Sample .043 .077 0.013 
Transparency (.67) .076 (.206)*** 
Positive Rationale .387 .095 .108*** 
Postive+Negative Rationale .089 .09 .026 
Advertiser (.2) .093 (.058)* 
Government Official (.185) .093 (.054)* 
Left Political Affiliation (.039) .099 (.012) 
Right Political Affiliation .072 .124 .017 
Centre Political Affiliation .008 .137 .002 
Religious .491 .086 .147*** 
Not Religious .149 .103 .038 
Age (.013) .003 (.095)*** 
Gender (.014) .077 (.004) 
Education Level  (.022) .047 (.011) 
Note. p  .05*; p   .01**; p   .001***; B = unstandardized coefficient; SEß = Standard 
error of the coefficient; ß = standard coefficient 
 
For ratings of perceived effectiveness, a significant regression equation was found F(14, 1691) 
= 11.84, p < .001, with an R2 of .089 (Table 14). Participants’ rating of perceived effectiveness 
decreased by .711 when the intervention is non-transparent, decreased by .244 when the 
intervention was proposed by Advertisers, and increased by .28 in the presence of a positive 
rationales, increased by .498 for religious participants, and decreased by .014 with increases in 
age. 
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Table 14.  
Summary of Multiple Regression of mean perceived effectiveness with predictor variables 
transparency, sample, behaviour agent, rationale of intervention, age, gender, political 
affiliation, religiosity, education level 
Variables B SEß ß 
Intercept 5.342 .174  
Sample .058 .075 .018 
Transparency (.711) .074 (.223)*** 
Positive Rationale .28 .093 .08** 
Postive+Negative Rationale .111 .088 .033 
Advertiser (.244) .091 (.072)** 
Government Official (.164) .09 (.049) 
Left Political Affiliation (.077) .096 (.024) 
Right Political Affiliation .052 .121 .012 
Centre Political Affiliation .018 .134 .004 
Religious .498 .084 .152*** 
Not Religious .045 .1 .012 
Age (.014) .003 (.107)*** 
Gender (.085) .075 (.027) 
Education Level  (.046) .045 (.023) 
Note. p  .05*; p   .01**; p   .001***; B = unstandardized coefficient; SEß = Standard 
error of the coefficient; ß = standard coefficient 
 
For ratings of public acceptability, a significant regression equation was found F(14, 1691) = 
21.42, p < .001, with an R2 of .151 (Table 15). Participants’ rating of public acceptability 
decreased by 1.10 when the intervention was non-transparent, decreased by .21 for US 
participants, decreased by .22 when the intervention was proposed by Government officials, 
and increased by .28 in the presence of a positive rationale, and decreased by .01 with 
increases in age. 
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Table 15.  
Summary of Multiple Regression of mean public acceptability with predictor variables 
transparency, sample, behaviour agent, rationale of intervention. 
Variables B SEß ß 
Intercept 7.18 .163  
Sample (.208) .071 (.067)** 
Transparency (1.099) .07 (.355)*** 
Positive Rationale .382 .087 .112*** 
Postive+Negative Rationale .08 .083 .025 
Advertiser (.154) .085 (.047) 
Government Official (.22) .085 (.067)** 
Left Political Affiliation .049 .091 .016 
Right Political Affiliation .072 .114 .017 
Centre Political Affiliation .139 .125 .03 
Religious .042 .079 .013 
Not Religious .055 .094 .015 
Age (.006) .003 (.048)* 
Gender (.065) .07 (.021) 
Education Level  .018 .043 .009 
Note. p  .05*; p   .01**; p   .001***; B = unstandardized coefficient; SEß = Standard 
error of the coefficient; ß = standard coefficient 
 
 
Relationship with Public Acceptability 
Given that previous studies have emphasized the importance of public acceptability, a 
significant regression equation was found for all three other factors. For mean ease of 
identification, a significant regression equation was found F(1, 1713) = 427.44, p < .001, with 
an R2 of .20. Participants’ rating of public acceptability increased by .042 as the intervention 
became easier to identify. For mean willingness to change behaviour, a significant regression 
equation was found F(1, 1713) = 898.96, p < .001, with an R2 of .219. Participants’ rating of 
public acceptability increased by .446 with an increase in mean willingness to change their 
behaviour. For mean perceived effectiveness, a significant regression equation was found F(1, 
1713) = 444.07, p < .001, with an R2 of .206. Participants’ rating of public acceptability 
increased by .441 with an increase in mean perceived effectiveness of the intervention. 
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6.4.Discussion  
The aim of the study was to empirically explore the extent to which nudge undermines 
perceived autonomy if people cannot discern the intervention and how it is used to changed 
their behaviour – the transparency argument. To do so, the current study investigated public 
attitude towards four factors: ease of identification, willingness to change behaviour, perceived 
effectiveness, and acceptability; and their dependency on the transparency of an intervention, 
the agent that proposed the intervention and the rationale presented for the psychological 
method. In the main, participants were more accurate at identifying transparent compared to 
non-transparent interventions across the five contexts. In line with this, participants’ judgement 
with regard to ease of identification, perceived effectiveness, and acceptability of an 
intervention, and their willingness to change their behaviour were consistently higher in 
transparent condition compared to the non-transparent condition. The four judgements were 
also perceived more favourably when a positive rationale was presented than when a negative 
rationale was presented. Overall, the findings supported all the hypotheses except hypothesis 
6 where there were no significant differences in judgement with respect to the type of agent 
that proposed the nudges. Regression analysis revealed that non-transparent interventions 
decreased the responses for all judgements, and the presentation of positive rationales for 
interventions increased the positive direction of responses for all four judgements. As the age 
of the samples increased, judgements with regard to their willingness to change behaviour, 
perceived effectiveness and acceptability of the intervention decreased.  
 
Also, when looking at regression analyses, interventions proposed by Government officials 
decreased judgments for willingness to change behaviour and acceptability; and judgements of 
willingness to change and perceived effectiveness decreased when the intervention was 
proposed by advertisers. Irrespective of transparency and rationale provided for the 
intervention, the presence of nudges in banking contexts were consistently judged as less 
favourable compared to the other four contexts. There was a sample differences for judgements 
of ease of identification and acceptability where US participants judged these less favourably 
than their UK counterparts. Lastly, acceptability of the intervention increased as the 
intervention become easier to identify, perceived as more effective, and when people were 
more willing to change their behaviour.  
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CHAPTER 7: General Discussion 
7.1.Summary of Thesis Objectives  
Nudging emerged from a branch of economics known as behavioural economics. They claim 
that, unlike econs, homo sapiens have bounded rationality so they sometimes make decisions 
that are not in their best interest. This is due to our limited cognitive capacities in processing 
knowledge and information. Therefore, if people are given sufficiently good information and 
feedback, they can make good decisions. According to nudge theory, our mind can be 
understood relative to the environment in which decisions are made. For example, people have 
a tendency to inertia and procrastination so implementing default rules can encourage people 
to enrol into pension schemes and register as organ donors. The central tenet of nudge is its 
philosophical framework “libertarian paternalism”, which states that it is legitimate for choice 
architects/policy makers to influence people’s behaviour in a welfare-promoting direction 
without restricting people’s freedom of choice. The concept has since attracted governments 
worldwide to incorporate nudge as part of social policy tools. To institutionalize nudge, an 
integral part is to ensure empirical testing, evidence, and transparency (Sunstein, 2014a); along 
with the ethical justifications to support its implementation in public policy making. Amongst 
these is a need for a sound theoretical framework for evaluating the nudge intervention and 
ensuring robust research design.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1 and 2, there is a lack of evidence to indicate the reliable effectiveness 
of nudges and another area that one requires closer inspection is the theoretical description of 
the mechanisms that support the way nudges are purported to work. The first objective was to 
examine the critical issues concerning the Dual System Theory (DST) and propose an 
alternative theoretical framework to re-consider the evidence base in the health domain, as a 
case in point. In addition, the thesis explored the ethical issues that arise from the rationale on 
which nudge is proposed to work, and the extent to which an endeavour that has global appeal 
should be a cause for concern. The second objective of the thesis was to empirically examine 
the extent to which nudge undermines autonomy: 1) the welfarist argument and 2) the 
transparency argument. From a welfarist perspective, if nudges such as defaults do not promote 
reflective thinking in any way, then they may risk promoting choices that are not aligned with 
the chooser’s higher-order desire. To examine the welfare-consequence of implementing 
defaults, the thesis included two empirical studies which investigated the extent to which 
people’s judgements of an individual’s true preference are sensitive to the implementation of 
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pro-self (i.e., maximise individual welfare) and pro-social (i.e., maximise social welfare) 
nudges in the context of retirement savings enrolment and organ donation registration 
respectively. On transparency grounds, an intervention that lacks transparency is typically 
regarded as manipulative. More so, influencing people’s behaviour in a covert manner is 
considered ethically unacceptable. As with any public interventions, communicating policy 
decisions and the rationale behind them in an open and transparent way has been identified as 
one of the critical factors in increasing public acceptance (National Advisory Committee on 
Bioethics, 2015). Hence to successfully select and implement nudges, policy makers need to 
have an understanding of how nudges are perceived. Previous survey findings have shown that 
people generally prefer transparent nudges over non-transparent nudges, however, none of 
these studies have explicitly manipulated transparency to see how it influences people’s 
judgement. This motivated the third empirical study to examine four factors that might 
influence public attitude towards nudge: ease of identification, willingness to change behaviour, 
perceived effectiveness and acceptability; and the dependency of these four factors on the 
transparency of interventions, presentation of rationales for the interventions and the agent that 
proposed the interventions. The main focus of this chapter is to provide an overview of the 
findings in relation to each research objectives proposed in this thesis and discuss the 
implication of these findings for informing public policy making. 
 
7.2.Research Objective 1: Theoretical and Empirical Re-consideration 
The first objective of this thesis was to provide a simple way of conceptualizing nudges that 
accounts for its evidence base in order to critically evaluate its effectiveness and any 
subsequent ethical justifications. In general, Type 1 nudges appeared to be short-lived and 
ineffective whereas Type 2 nudges seem to be more effective in reducing poor health 
behaviours such as alcohol consumption and cigarette smoking. In terms of survey findings, 
Type 1 nudges (e.g., default rules) were judged as least revealing people’s preference because 
they do not deliberate over choices in the same way as active choice set-up. They were also 
perceived as less transparent compared to Type 2 nudges. These findings were in line with the 
proposed single system framework such that Type 1 nudges do not engage the decision maker 
on any substantial level to re-examine the basis on which the decisions are made, whereas Type 
2 interventions encourage re-evaluation of behaviour to maintain coherence between 
information and behaviour change. The theoretical foundations of nudge, and the evidence-
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base examining the efficacy of nudges in the health domain, therefore, suggested that there are 
good reasons to focus on implementing Type 2 over Type 1 nudges. In other words, there are 
theoretical grounds on which Type 2 nudges can be argued to have a more sustainable and 
deeper impact on generating positive behavioural change, and in line with this, the current 
evidence-base indicates, to some degree, that they are more effective than Type 1 nudges. Type 
1, on the other hand, lacks empirical evidence to suggest that they work, and if they do, there 
is no good evidence to suggest that they are influencing behaviour on a non-conscious level 
(Osman, 2014a). From the outlook, any meaningful behaviour change in the long term (i.e. 
over a period of one year) is likely to result from the ability of the chooser to re-evaluate 
information from the choice context and their behaviour, and to do so requires making the 
chooser aware of the intention behind which the behaviour change is pursued.  
 
7.3.Research Objective 2: The Welfarist Argument 
The second objective of the thesis was evaluated in two parts. In part one, the thesis empirically 
examined the extent to which nudge is an intrusion on autonomy if nudges do not reflect 
chooser’s higher-order desire (“true” preference) – the welfarist argument. The central claim 
of the nudge concept is “to influence choice in a way that will make choosers better off, as 
judged by themselves” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 5). The emphasis here is the clause “better 
off, as judged by themselves” which explicitly states that the interpretation of one’s welfare 
should be based on the individual’s judgement rather than that of policy makers or other choice 
architects. This is also what underlies nudge’s philosophical framework “libertarian 
paternalism”. Within this, the choice architect has the right to reconstruct the choice 
architecture to reflect the individual’s true preference. The crux of this lies in the interpretation 
of true preference, but these are hardly easy to identify. This is where the choice architect faces 
knowledge problems. In other words, the choice architect does not possess information about 
one’s higher order preferences (“true” preference). Given that the choice architect can only go 
as far as observing the choices that people make, 7  he/she will inevitably determine the 
chooser’s true preference based on some general presumption of what the majority would 
choose and/or design the choice architecture based on his/her own value. On this view, the 
choice architect holds strong paternalistic views of his/her own about which available options 
                                                
7 Sunstein and Thaler (2003) argue that people lack clear, stable, well-defined preferences in 
many domains and observing the choices they make does not reflect what they genuinely prefer.  
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will make decision-makers better off (Goldlin, 2015). For instance, if choice architects believe 
that people should eat healthier food, they will design the cafeteria to reflect that goal. This 
kind of value substitution can potentially undermine what people genuinely want and hence 
threaten their welfare. Chapter 4 and 5 presented the findings for third-party judgements of an 
individual’s true preference to enrol onto retirement savings scheme and organ donation 
registers respectively. These two contexts have received much attention in the literature and 
represents major policy interventions. Even though these defaults promoted different ends (pro-
self vs pro-social), the results seem to converge on one core finding. The key finding from both 
studies supported the general hypothesis that people’s perceived true preference to register in 
a retirement savings scheme or donate their organs were perceived as higher in active choice 
systems (e.g., default opt-in and mandated choice) compared to passive choice system (default 
opt-out). These findings challenge the claim that nudges make people better off as judged by 
themselves. Even though the findings do not speak to issues regarding efficacy of different 
defaults in the pension enrolment contexts or the organ donation context, they do however 
address the issue with respect to the overall goodness of the consequence of a default. In the 
following section, I will discuss whether pro-self and pro-social can be best conceived as 
maximizing welfare and the implication of these findings. 
 
Pro-self Default. As mentioned, the aim of the present study was to investigate how the public 
perceives, the preservation of an investor’s free choice given their registration in different 
enrolment systems. If, as indicated in the present findings, choices made via a default opt-
in/mandated choice system in the case of UK or a default opt-in system in the case of HK are 
perceived as more indicative of an investor’s true preference to register in a retirement savings 
scheme, then it suggests that the public lean towards a form of active choice as signalling true 
preference. This would, in turn, indicate that the preservation of choice is important (Chapman, 
2014; Osman, 2014a, 2016). In line with this finding, Carroll et al. (2009) contrasted mandated 
choice, default opt-out and default opt-in enrolments in savings plan and found that mandated 
choice was optimal (when participants procrastinate and/or have heterogeneous preference). 
The stickiness of defaults supports the concern that employees delay opting out of unsuitable 
defaults; it typically takes more than two years for the median employees to opt-out of with a 
savings rate of 2 or 3%. Similarly, Brown, Farrell, and Weisbenner (2011) found that 
individuals who are passively defaulted are substantially more likely to regret their decisions 
than those who made an active choice. This pattern of findings is also consistent with studies 
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examining preferences for automatic enrolment on organ donation registers (Johnson & 
Goldstein, 2003; Lin, Osman, Harris, & Read, 2018). Here too, the evidence suggests that 
preservation of free-choice is important and, critically, the implementation of a default opt-out 
system may lead to greater misclassification of individuals’ preferences compared to a default 
opt-in system or a mandated choice system (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). At a policy level, in 
line with these empirical findings, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) proposed that the 
choice architecture should enable consumers to make an active decision rather than offer ‘a 
default’ (Wells, 2014). However, this returns us back to the problem of people requiring 
considerable ‘extra’ help in navigating the information required to make a sensible long-term 
financial decision (Wells, 2014). Though from an ethical perspective, mandating people to 
choose where to invest their savings for retirement is a stronger alternative to the default opt-
out system provided people are financially literate enough to make this kind of decision. It 
allows the investor to make a nuanced decision that fits their own needs and avoids the one-
size-fits-all problem of defaults.  
 
Pro-social Default. The findings show that when participants know that an individual has 
registered their decision to donate through some overt signal (i.e., under a mandated choice or 
a default opt-in system) this is likely perceived as a less ambiguous signal of a preference to 
donate. The signal generated from an active decision process typically encourages the agent to 
explicitly express a positive statement of intent, that is, request to donate or objection to donate. 
In line with this, there is evidence to suggest that people believe that the best way to obtain 
consent is for each individual to decide for themselves rather than leaving this decision to the 
family (Spital, 1993, 1995, 1996). Indeed, the study shows that a large majority of participants 
indicated that the deceased’s wishes should be respected no matter what the family thinks. 
From the relatives’ perspective, an active decision is easier to infer what the deceased would 
have wanted because the deceased recorded a positive wish to donate or objection to donate, 
as opposed to no objections to donate in the case of the default opt-out system. Ultimately, the 
question to ask is whether presumed consent can increase the number of people on the ODR, 
and at the same time represent a good signal of preference so that it maintains a high family 
consent rate as well. Based on the evidence from this study, it appears that presumed consent 
acts as a weak signal of true preference to donate, and may lead to sustained or higher family 
refusal rates than active choice to donate.   
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Although defaults are powerful solutions for decreasing intention-behaviour gaps in retirement 
savings and organ donation, the nudgers (choice architects – policy makers) can only go as far 
as constructing the choice architecture to increase the number of people registered on the ODR; 
because as aforementioned, they do not have sufficient information about the chooser’s true 
preference. Sunstein (2015c) argue that realistically if the cost of opt-out is low, and if publicity 
and transparency are guaranteed, then there is far less threat to autonomy and welfare. 
However, transparency does not appear to be the case, at least not in the context of organ 
donation. The findings from Chapter 5 show that fewer than 50% of the participants in the 
default opt-in countries and only 19% from the default opt-out countries correctly identified 
the organ donation legislative system in their country, despite  a recent survey showing around 
80% of the population support organ donation ‘in principle’ (Department of Health & Social 
Care, 2017). Though this cannot be taken as a direct comparison to the findings presented in 
Chapter 5, and given the selected samples recruited from a different sampling technique (i.e. 
Mturk and Prolific Academic), the implication of this finding should be read with care. 
Nonetheless, this illustrates a potential issue with the public’s lack of awareness of organ 
donation systems being implemented in their country, in particular, in presumed consent 
countries. This may help explain the weaker signal of perceived true preference to donate under 
a default opt-out system which was found in the study presented in Chapter 5. If this is the 
case, then families acting as proxy consent are likely to be unaware that a default opt-out system 
has been implemented and are equally likely to believe that the deceased were unaware of a 
default opt-out system. Hence the reason the deceased is registered on the ODR is because 
he/she may have forgotten to record an objection to donate during his/her lifetime. By inference, 
families are more likely to veto donation because, as revealed by our findings, signals attached 
to a default opt-out system suggest a weaker perceived underlying preference to donate; 
because a passive choice was made as opposed to an active one. This in part illustrates 
Rebonato's (2013) concern that even though both Germans (opt-in country) and Austrians (opt-
out country) can reverse the default at low cost, the fact that almost 100% of Austrians and 
only 12% of Germans are organ donors suggest that in practice, they do not  opt out for 
cognitive reasons (i.e. status quo bias, decisional inertia). This questions Thaler and Sunstein's  
(2003) claim that fewer opt-out means more people are satisfied with the default. The problem 
is that those who opt out are those that overcome inertia but this does not say much about the 
preferences of those that do not opt out. In Rebonato’s view, the Austrians were given nominal 
freedom of choice but not effective freedom of choice.  
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On Welfare Grounds: Passive Choosing vs Active Choosing  
Sunstein (2016c) claim that a good default is hard to reject on welfarist grounds. If we prefer 
active choosing, then we might as well rely on the theory that individuals usually know what 
is best for them. However, these findings suggest the welfare consequences of implementing 
either pro-self or pro-social defaults is questionable. The implementation of pro-social defaults 
in the organ donation context suggest that when someone has been defaulted into being an 
organ donor, his/her family member might hesitate before honouring the relevant choices for 
the reasons that both responsibility and intentions are ambiguous (Sunstein, 2015a). That is, 
they worry that the chooser’s decisions might be a result of inertia and inattention. In the 
retirement savings context, the stickiness of default savings rate means that many employees 
delay opting out of defaults that are unsuitable for them. Certainly, if the barrier to opting out 
is high and if the default is not salient (i.e. inability to identify how and why an intervention is 
implemented), then it can potentially be consequential for matters that have a high stake (such 
as organ donation and retirement savings).  
 
To implement welfare-promoting choice architectures, an alternative option is to adopt active 
choosing. This could eliminate a one-size-fits-all problem because it attends to a heterogeneous 
population and handles the issue of changing preferences and values over time (Sunstein, 
2015a). Active choosing also encourages learning about a problem and promote the 
development of preferences. This has important implications as the learning process allows the 
strengthening of our “muscle” for future choice making (Sunstein, 2015a), for instance, while 
the invention of calculators meant that we save time on solving arithmetic, it has weakened our 
“muscle” for mental arithmetic over time. Similarly, if choices are made on behalf of us to 
choosing retirement savings plans, it simultaneously weakens our “muscle” for making 
autonomous decisions in the future. People whom made an active choice are also more likely 
to become invested in it. In areas such as organ donation where families act as proxy consent, 
active choosing offers distinctive signals (the deceased’s intended decision as unambiguous 
preference) and has a distinctive meaning (Sunstein, 2015a). For these reasons, active choosing 
is believed to be welfare-enhancing. Therefore, it makes sense to ensure that the system which 
records an individual’s choice to donate signals a genuine preference to donate. In the context 
of retirement savings, Carroll et al. (2009) found evidence that mandated choice increased 
initial enrolment by 28% compared to standard enrolment methods, producing a savings 
distribution three months after hire that would instead take 30 months to achieve under default 
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opt-in enrolment. In other domains, active choosing was found to have a larger effect in 
promoting green energy use than did green energy defaults (Hedlin & Sunstein, 2016). 
Admittedly, there are also drawbacks to active choosing because they can be cognitively 
effortful (including emotional effort and mental effort). For those who do not want to choose 
due to a lack information or experience, forcing to choose becomes a burden and may decrease 
welfare (Sunstein, 2015a). Indeed, we cannot possibly attend to every little detail in life, we 
simply do not have the cognitive capacities to do so. It is a fiction to be autonomous about 
everything in life, but for stakes that are high, there is a prima facie reason to take control. So, 
what is the “right balance” of choosing that would promote autonomy and welfare? 
  
Choosing How to Choose 
Given the nature of these findings, I do not argue against the use of default nor do I suggest 
that active choosing is necessarily the best choice architecture for everything in life. Having 
established the powerful effect of defaults and their lack of saliency, they should be used 
cautiously, especially when the choice architect does not have perfect information about 
people’s true preference.8 The current findings suggest that making a choice on their behalf 
without their awareness is likely to threaten their welfare. Whilst in the short-run at t+0, 
defaults may increase welfare as the cost of making a decision is reduced, in the long-run at 
t+1, it relieves an individual from learning about complex and important life decisions which 
are likely to be costly in the long-term (Binder & Lades, 2014). In this view, defaults would be 
less suitable if people have a defined preference or when learning matters (Sunstein, 2015a). 
Neither should they be adopted for situations where the stakes are high (e.g., contexts like 
organ donation, retirement savings). For example, the ends of not choosing your computer 
settings or adding a radio to your car are trivial whereas defaults implemented in the matters 
of life and death, or those that could impact one’ future savings for retirement can have 
consequences for one’s future welfare. But what is the right choice architecture to govern one’s 
welfare? In other words, what is the right balance between default and active choosing. I agree 
with Sunstein that defaults are unavoidable, after all, they are part of a choice architecture 
(Sunstein, 2015c). So perhaps, on welfare grounds, instead of choosing not to choose, we 
                                                
8 A crucial goal is to determine people’s true preference and to ensure that nudges do in fact 
improve people’s welfare by influencing their behaviour in line with their true preference. This 
can be made possible by adopting preference identification methods such as revelatory frame 
for a more detailed discussion on this, see Goldlin (2015).  
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should promote choosing how to choose along with providing information and education. My 
view is therefore in line with Appelt, Gao, Johnson, and von Glahn's (2014): “Giving people a 
choice of how to choose preserves their autonomy and helps them make better choices”. For 
those that enjoy the intrinsic value of making a choice, they will choose to choose by taking 
matters in their own hands, and for those who do not enjoy choosing, then there is the option 
to opt into a default that takes care of things for them. In a way, this works similarly to direct 
debits in the commercial context, where people can either set up automatic monthly payment 
or opt to manually make a payment quarterly. This approach overcomes the common claim 
that people have inconsistent preferences (Sunstein & Thaler, 2003; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) 
or the claim that individuals are in the best position to know what is best for them (Mill, 1863) 
because choosing how to choose is in itself a learning process about one’s own preference.  
 
However, it is worth noting that this proposition may not work so well with the organ donation 
context because the decision in these contexts are one-off and there isn’t any corrective 
measure if one forgets to make a choice. Whatever choice one makes during his/her lifetime 
(whether actively opt-in, default opt-out, or made no choice at all) and the signals inferred from 
these systems will have an influence on the relative’s decisions to consent or veto. If the goal 
of the policy maker is to increase the number of actual donation by encouraging those who 
genuinely want to donate to register on the ODR, then I recommend that efforts in this area 
should focus on information framing which will be more likely to reflect people’s true 
preference (or in other words, to avoid ambiguous signal being perceived by relatives). For 
instance, the Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) conducted one of the largest randomized 
controlled trials (1,085,322 individuals) ever run in the UK testing the effect of including 
different messages on a high traffic website on GOV.UK that encourages people to actively 
join the NHS ODR. The results showed that the best performing message was “if you needed 
an organ transplant, would you have one? If so please help others.” and the least performing 
message was “Every day thousands of people who see this page decide to register” which 
contained a picture (Behavioural Insights Team, 2013). The best performing message by itself 
lead to over 350,000 registrations for organ donation via the GOV.UK link (Loosemore, 2014). 
These findings suggest that a simple change of message can make a vast difference to the 
number of people actively signing up to the register. This type of online trial would also be 
more cost effective and less risky compared to implementing a default opt-out system, and 
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would be more likely to increase family consent rate because the strength of true preference to 
donate is stronger when an active choice is made. 
 
Overall, the welfarist argument for nudges such as default rules is that if transparency and cost 
of opt-out cannot be guaranteed then the policy maker must be able to show evidence that the 
nudge implemented allows some level of deliberative action so as to avoid value substitution. 
Otherwise, it seems the better alternative is to leave it to people to choose how they want to 
choose as a default that lacks saliency could project different perceive preference. Last but not 
least, autonomy and welfare go hand in hand. If people can identify the how and the why of an 
intervention then they have the autonomous power to act according to their true preference. 
For the policy maker, this means they are also less likely to impose value substitution as the 
threat to welfare is minimized by token transparency.  
 
7.4.Research Objective 2: The Transparency Argument 
The second objective of the thesis was evaluated in two parts. In part two, the thesis empirically 
examined how autonomy is best preserved from the perspective of transparency. A central tenet 
in the criticism of nudges states that interventions lacking transparency are regarded as 
manipulation of choice. Certainly, if people have not consented to manipulative interventions, 
nudges can undermine both autonomy and dignity which can be ethically objectionable 
(Sunstein, 2015c). For people to consent to manipulative intervention, people must be able to 
detect the intervention in the first place. If nudges are to become a social policy instrument, 
then influencing people without their awareness can potentially threaten their autonomy and 
welfare. Sunstein (2014a) argue that although nudges are considerably less overt than 
traditional policy measure, it should “never take forms of manipulation or trickery. The public 
should be able to review and scrutinize nudges no less than government actions of any other 
kinds”. However, the covertness of nudge raises questions as to whether it provides sufficient 
transparency and accountability (Baldwin, Cave, & Lodge, 2011). For example, if a nudge 
bypasses people’s cognitive capacity for reasoning to make a choice other than what they 
would normally have chosen, then this leads to questions around the government’s intentions. 
Given the mechanism by which nudges works (e.g., Type 1 nudges), it would seem difficult 
for people to able to review and scrutinize a nudge even if they want to. In this view, 
transparency is the guiding principle for most ethical justifications of nudges, with the foremost 
being autonomy. However, it appears that much of the debate concerning autonomy has largely 
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proceeded without taking into account public attitudes towards a diverse range of dimensions 
associated with nudges (i.e. their efficacy, their acceptability, the ease with which the 
underlying basis for behavioral change can be identified, and one’s willingness to change as a 
result of a nudge being implemented). Public attitudes towards nudge interventions are likely 
to be a key barriers for facilitating policy implementations (Hagman et al., 2015). This 
motivated the aim of the third empirical study to examine the extent to which public attitudes 
are dependent on the transparency of interventions. To do so, the thesis provided a notion of 
transparency from the perspective of those being nudged. This is because the definition of 
transparency to date has been defined in relation to the intention of the choice architect/policy 
maker, though this is important, what really matters is whether those being nudged can actually 
identify the intervention being implemented. Subsequently, this definition was used to assess 
public attitude towards transparency of interventions in relation to four factors: ease of 
identification, perceived effectiveness and acceptability, and people’s willingness to change 
their behaviour under transparent and non-transparent conditions. In addition, the study also 
investigated the extent to which these judgements are dependent on the expert that proposed 
the intervention and the rationale presented for the intervention. Below I will discuss these four 
judgements in turn. 
 
Transparency. To distinguish nudge from its manipulative use, the intervention must be 
transparent enough so that the chooser can discern the intention and means of the behaviour 
change being pursued (Hansen & Jespersen, 2013). Thus, an increase in transparency will 
enable the chooser to recognize how and why an intervention has been implemented (Bovens, 
2009). In the main, the findings from Chapter 6 suggested that across all five contexts, 
participants found it easier to identify the intervention and how it changes their behaviour when 
the intervention is transparent as opposed to non-transparent. In line with this finding, over 70% 
of the participants were generally accurate at identifying transparent nudges compared to only 
50% correctly identifying non-transparent nudges. This shows that people’s assessment of 
transparency is somewhat similar to those of the researcher’s for transparent interventions but 
the notion of transparency becomes less clear in the non-transparent conditions. In this regard, 
it is worth considering the fact that public surveys of nudges also suggest that the public show 
much higher approval ratings for transparent over non-transparent nudges (Arad & Rubinstein, 
2015; Felsen et al., 2013; Hagman et al., 2015; Hedlin & Sunstein, 2016; Jung & Mellers, 2016; 
Mazzocchi et al., 2015; Reisch & Sunstein, 2016; Reisch, Sunstein, & Gwozdz, 2016; Sunstein, 
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2016c; Sunstein, Reisch, & Rauber, 2017). Again, this goes to show that, whether or not people 
are going to modify their behaviour in light of nudges, or more typical policy methods of 
behavioural change, they are supportive of explicit methods that signal what methods are being 
used and how they change behaviour over those that seek to do this covertly, especially without 
their consent (Osman, 2016). In line with this, most recently, Sunstein, Reisch, & Reauber 
(2017) showed that many people do care about freedom of choice and they will reject many 
well-motivated policies that do not allow for that kind of freedom. 
 
Willingness to Change Behaviour. The findings subsequently showed that people were more 
willing to change their behaviour when the intervention was transparent as opposed to non-
transparent. In other words, their propensity to identify with the goals of the intervention 
increases when the intention and means of the behaviour change being pursued is clear. This 
also suggests that transparent interventions were more likely to be in line with their first-order 
desire (i.e., “true” preference) either to eat healthier, smoke less, or to save more, and so on. 
This is important because without sufficient motivation or the “brain processes that energize 
and direct behaviour” (Michie, van Stralen, & West, 2011), behaviour change is less likely to 
succeed. Furthermore, it can be suspected that people’s willingness to change their behaviour 
is also dependent on the objective of the nudge. Reisch & Sunstein (2016) found that people’s 
judgements are usually dependent on whether a nudge is well-motivated and leads to good 
consequences (from the standpoint of most people whom they affect). In the case of transparent 
nudges, the intention and means with respect to improving health and welfare are 
comprehensible to the chooser. This is an important contributing factor in terms of the 
individual’s objective and capacity to influence their own behaviour. Nudging in this manner 
makes it easier to adopt and carry out behaviour change as a habit, and eventually be integrated 
into the social environment that further endorse the behaviour (Junghans, Cheung, & De Ridder, 
2015).  
 
Perceived Effectiveness. There is concern that making nudges transparent reduces their 
effectiveness (Bovens, 2009; House of Lords, 2011) while others argue that revealing a nudge 
may cause people to protest against the intervention (Arad & Rubinstein, 2015). The findings 
suggest otherwise: transparent interventions were perceived as more effective than non-
transparent interventions. Junghans, Cheung, & De Ridder (2015) found that what made 
nudges potentially effective was that they subtly facilitated the targeted behaviours. According 
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to the authors, the intervention is more likely to be perceived as effective if it made behaviours 
easier or more fun to perform, and made the choices more salient. In line with this, Loewenstein 
et al. (2015) found that informing people about the use of defaults for decisions about advance 
directive did not lower their effectiveness. Similarly, Bruns, Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, 
Klement, Jonsson, & Rahali (2016) found that nudges in the form of defaults to increase 
contributions to carbon emission can be transparent, and effective. These empirical findings so 
far have all suggest that nudges can be transparent without compromising effectiveness.  
 
Public Acceptability In line with ease of identification, perceived effectiveness, and 
willingness to change behaviour, people also found transparent interventions more acceptable 
than non-transparent interventions. This conforms with previous evidence showing that overt 
interventions are perceived as more acceptable than covert interventions (Felsen et al., 2013). 
Hence,  people tend to prefer transparent nudges that target deliberative process than non-
transparent nudges that target non-conscious processing (Sunstein, 2016b). Although Hall et 
al. (2018) found that this was not the case for pictorial warnings on cigarette packaging (non-
transparent) as these were perceived as more acceptable, they did not examine support for text-
only warnings on packs so it would be difficult to see how the outcomes would have differed 
if they included text-only warnings as well. Finally, regression analyses showed that all three 
judgements increased public acceptability which are in the right direction. This shows that 
people will find the intervention more acceptable as people find an intervention easier to 
identify, perceived it as more effective, and are more willing to change their behaviour. In line 
with this, Petrescu et al. (2016) found that the public will be more likely to accept an 
intervention if it is perceived as more effective. Similarly, Pechey, Burge, Mentzakis, Suchrcke, 
and Marteau (2014) found that both the type of intervention and its anticipated effectiveness 
influenced public acceptability for interventions designed to decrease alcohol consumption. By 
far, this is good news for nudge because a policy without public support does not stand its 
ground. Similarly, it means it will be easier for policy makers to publicly defend a policy if the 
public find it acceptable. 
 
Rationale for the Intervention. Intuitively, to perceive an intervention as effective requires 
knowing its psychological mechanism, in other words the psychological basis on which it is 
designed to work. Bovens (2009) concluded that revealing how an intervention works is also 
part of token transparency. The current findings suggest that presenting positive rather than 
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negative rationale for the psychological mechanism behind an intervention increased all four 
judgements. For judgements regarding willingness to change and public acceptability, 
presentation of positive rationales was perceived more favourably compared to presentation of 
positive & negative rationales, though there were no difference between these rationales for 
judgements of ease of identification and perceived effectiveness. To my knowledge, there has 
not been any literature on the effect of providing rationale on people’s judgements. These 
findings provide insights into Susntein’s (2016c) and Bovens (2009) speculation as to whether 
disclosing the psychological mechanism of nudge might increase its impact. By revealing how 
an intervention positively works to change people’s behaviour, people will find it easier to 
identify the intervention, perceived it as more effective and acceptable, and would be more 
willing to change their behaviour. Therefore, the results would have implications as to whether 
government action is justifiable, because Sunstein (2016c) argues that government action 
requires the provision of reasons for why the intervention is being introduced. Consistent with 
the current finding, a qualitative interview study of UK consumers found that most consumers 
approved of the concept of nudge if it was explained to them, especially in the health domain, 
provided that nudges are designed to benefit individuals and society; and that consumer 
comprehended the decision-making context and the reasoning behind the promotion of the 
targeted behaviour (Junghans et al., 2015). 
 
Lastly, across all four judgements, the banking context were consistently judged less 
favourably than the health contexts. But, perhaps, the largest difference between banking and 
these other four contexts was the judgement concerning acceptability. Most recently, Sunstein, 
Reisch, & Reauber (2017) conducted a global survey examining consensus of nudging, and 
found that most citizens are enthusiastic about nudge so long as they are consistent with 
people’s values and interests. One reason for the difference in findings between the banking 
and the health context is likely to have been due to the banking nudge intervention being 
perceived as less consistent with people’s interest or values. Though it is also possible that 
people simply do not want choice architects to interfere with their finances. Intuitively, one 
would not trust either the government, researcher or an advertising agent with her money at 
least not in the context set out in this study, but without further empirical testing these 
interpretations should be read with care. 
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Furthermore, the study found that people’s willingness to change their behaviour and their 
acceptability of nudges were perceived less favourably when the interventions were proposed 
by government officials. Similarly, both willingness to change and perceived effectiveness 
were judged less favourably when nudges were proposed by advertisers. The reason for this is 
possibly because the psychological methods are implemented in contexts in which the two 
agents (Government, Advertiser) are not seen as experts in the field. Junghans, Cheung, & De 
Ridder (2015) found that nudges are more highly approved when they are implemented by 
experts and industry as opposed to policy makers. More specifically, they would have greater 
trust in actors who are credible such as specialised expertise in a specific subject, for example, 
for nudges that target particularly at healthy eating, health experts may be seen are more 
credible than policy makers.   
 
Taken together, these results are consistent with previous findings that a person’s autonomy is 
better preserved when an intervention is transparent as opposed to non-transparent. In line with 
Jung and Mellers' (2016) findings that System 2 (transparent) nudges were viewed as effective 
for better decision making and more necessary for changing behaviour, whereas System 1 (non-
transparent) nudges were perceived as more autonomy-threatening. Similarly, Sunstein 
(2016c) argue that System 2 nudges are better on welfare grounds and will best promote 
autonomy. Certainly, if people can detect how their behaviour is being changed then they can 
either accept or reject a nudge on the basis of whether it aligns with their true preference. It 
also becomes possible for people to acknowledge a potential problem caused by their current 
suboptimal decisions, for example, to think about whether they should be saving for their 
retirement. A non-transparent nudge, on the other hand, means that it is difficult to for people 
to rationalise how it might change their behaviour positively. Transparent nudges therefore 
allow individuals to act reflectively so that their propensity to change is aligned with the goal 
of the intervention. In other words, transparent nudges respect the chooser’s autonomy because 
under these conditions the chooser can be said to have control over his/her deliberative capacity 
to act in accordance with the his/her understanding of welfare. Last but not least, transparent 
interventions are more likely to be perceived as effective and acceptable, and people are more 
willing to change their behaviour under these conditions. These findings provide insights for 
policy making and provide a strong rationale for choosing transparent over non-transparent 
nudges.  
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7.5.A Lesson on Autonomy 
The empirical findings from this thesis converges to one view, that is, transparency is the 
cornerstone to preserving autonomy and promoting welfare. This view is in line with Sunstein 
(2016c) who states that transparency is a necessary condition for both nudge and choice 
architecture. From a welfarist perspective, a lack of transparency means people are being 
defaulted into a programme that may not align with their higher-order desire and this is 
consequential for matters that have a high stake (e.g., in organ donation context and pension 
enrolment). In line with this, the public will generally favour transparent nudges because it is  
easier to identify the interventions, and how their behaviour are changed. The public will also 
perceive an intervention as more effective and more acceptable, and more likely to reflect their 
values and interests (i.e., more willing to change their behaviour because they actually want to 
change their behaviour in that context). If people are manipulated into making choices without 
their awareness then naturally they are also relieved of the responsibility associated with these 
choices. Rather we should hold people responsible for the choice they make even if it means 
that they do not make the optimal choices, but nonetheless they are more likely to make choices 
that reflect their true preferences without introducing moral hazard in the form of intruding 
their autonomy. Additionally, choice making is a learning process during which people come 
to an understanding about  the possible effects of  their decision-making, and it enables them, 
if they are willing and able to integrate new knowledge that they encounter, to implement 
corrective measures in future decisions. As explained by Hausman and Welch (2010): “the risk 
of exploiting decision-making foibles will ultimately diminish people’s autonomous decision-
making capacities”, they becomes less willing to invest the effort in making decisions. For 
example, this would mean, through learning, enabling a  transition of eating less in a restaurant 
to eating healthy at home. Therefore, holding people more responsible for their choices 
encourages both learning by education and learning by error.  
 
7.6.Conclusion  
The choice architecture forms the basis of our everyday decision making and the history of 
judgment and decision-making research in psychology suggests that we are susceptible to 
cognitive biases, and in turn we often make suboptimal decisions. Most of us value our health 
yet act in ways that undermines it. Nudges have been proposed as a tool to address this gap 
between value and behaviour by rearranging the choice context. But because nudges mainly 
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work by exploiting our cognitive biases, there are reasons to believe they are ethically more 
worrisome than traditional policy instruments which are considered more explicit. Since 
nudges bypass reflective thinking, it is said to work best in the dark (i.e. non-transparent to the 
decision-maker). The inability to detect how and why the intervention was implemented 
therefore could infringe upon autonomy and welfare. But since the literature on nudge has been 
rooted in different theories of agency that are incompatible with the nudge approach, the thesis 
proposed an alternative framework to account for its evidence base before evaluating where 
the current ethical concerns stand. The more we understand how nudges work, the better armed 
we (social scientists, policy makers, practitioner) are in designing ways of intervening on 
behaviours to achieve the best outcome for individuals that need and want it and which are 
ethically justifiable on these grounds. Hence, any meaningful change in behaviour arises from 
developing a consistently coherent basis on which people understand the reasons for their 
decisions and how they enact them.  
 
The proposed single system framework suggested that to encourage people to help themselves, 
for example, in targeting serious problems around NCDs, we need to make the goal of helping 
oneself making better lifestyle choices through a coherent and sustained approach. From a 
theoretical perspective, this is best achieved through Type 2 rather than Type 1 nudges. This 
proposition corroborated with the empirical findings on ethical concerns related to intrusion on 
autonomy. The evidence suggests that Type 1 nudges fair less well with respect to autonomy 
and welfare because Type 1 nudges do not engage the decision maker on any substantial level 
for the decision-maker to make autonomous decisions in line with his/her true preference. If 
nudge is to promote sustainable behaviour on a long-term basis, there needs to be a sufficient 
level of transparency so that the decision-maker can re-evaluate his/her behaviour to maintain 
the greatest coherence between information and behavioural change. To incorporate nudging 
as part of social policy tool, transparency should be built into practice. This includes being 
transparent and open about their intention so that their decisions are subject to public scrutiny 
and review, but equally important is, the intervention being implemented should be transparent 
to those being nudged. This applies to any democratic governments. On theoretical, empirical 
and ethical grounds, Type 2 nudges that work in a more transparent manner are easier to 
identify and are more likely to be perceived as effective and acceptable in promoting behaviour 
change that are in line with people’s high-order desires (or “true” preference). In this view, 
transparency and scrutiny reduce the likelihood of welfare-reducing choice architectures. 
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Lastly, the private sector (e.g., advertising) inevitably nudge (in a non-transparent manner) 
with the goal of promoting suboptimal choices for commercial purposes. To combat these 
opposing forces, nudges should enable people to exercise their autonomy so that they can 
discern the intention of the nudge used to change their behaviour. This is because transparency 
will promote re-evaluation of their behaviour and their own values (e.g., acknowledging their 
suboptimal decisions) and to “learn” to resist potentially seductive options promoted through 
nudges from advertisers and other private-sector agents. Without transparency, it would be akin 
to two invisible forces attacking each other. Nudging, in a sense, acts like a catalyst to lower 
the “activation energy” (effort) in a “chemical reaction” (behaviour change). Because most 
suboptimal behaviours arise from limited self-control, a lack of relevant knowledge, and 
effort/motivation required to carry out the action as intended. Therefore, for nudge to lower the 
effort for effective behaviour change (here, effective refers to sustainable or habitual changes), 
it should be sufficiently transparent for people to exercise their autonomy in order for people 
to re-evaluate the information and behaviour for coherence. For example, to lose weight, one 
has to learn the nutritional value and calorie content in order to understand the content of a 
healthy balanced diet. Type 2 nudges like calorie labelling or traffic light labelling will enable 
an individual to re-evaluate that information in connection to their own values or interests, 
which in turn lowers the effort required to implement behavioural change (i.e., adopting a low-
calorie meal). In closing, a prerequisite requirement for any liberal democratic society is to be 
transparent about the working principles of its policy, and to design interventions that enhance 
people’s autonomy and welfare. The thesis suggests that on theoretical, empirical, and ethical 
reasons, this is best achieved through Type 2 rather than Type 1 nudges.   
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APPENDIX A 
CHAPTER 2: Empirical Evidence Review 
Unhealthy Diet Effectiveness 
Type 1 Wansink and van Ittersum (2013) 
- Estimate the visual fill-level size of one’s consumption norm relative to perceive level based on 219 students 
visually anchor around the 70% fill level for dinnerware 
- The influence of consumption norm on serving and consumption in a natural eating environment based on 43 diners, 
selected the larger plats served themselves 52% more total food than those who selected smaller plates 
- The influence of large plate bias on conference buffet service behaviour involved 237 professionals were consistent 
with expectations, that those who were given large plates served 90% more volume of food.  
 
Robinson et al. (2014) 
- A meta-analysis of nine studies showed that the difference in food consumption between small and large dishware 
conditions was marginally statistically significant and the magnitude of effect was small, with a large amount of 
heterogeneity. The authors concluded that the use of smaller vs. larger dishware to limit energy consumption was 
premature. 
 
Hollands et al. (2015) 
- A meta-analysis of 56 studies (6603 participants) found a small to moderate effect of portion, package, individual 
unit or tableware size on increasing quantities of food consumed. This effect, if sustained, could reduce average 
daily energy intake by 12% to 16%.  
 
Holden, Zlatevska, and Dubelaar (2016) 
- A meta-analysis of 56 studies showed that varying the size of the container holding food (e.g., plate or bowl) has a 
substantial effect on amount self-served and/or consumed; and doubling of plate size increased the amount of self-
served and/or consumed by 41%. Overall, plate size had a strong effect when participants were unaware that they 
were participating in a food study. 
Type 1 nudges designed to 
change plates-size have 
been proven effective in 
reducing over-
consumption in food study 
or natural setting such as 
restaurants but it is unclear 
how this can be sustained 
in a more generalizable 
way (i.e. positive 
behavioral change 
extending beyond the 
immediate nudged 
context).  
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Type 2 Harnack and French (2008) 
- A review of six studies provided support for the positive influence on calorie information on food choices in a 
cafeteria or restaurant setting, though the magnitude of the effects seen tended to be small. 
 
Elbel, Gyamfi, and Kersh (2011) 
- A study of 349 children and adolescents found no evidence that labelling influenced adolescent food choices or 
parental food choices for children in this population.   
 
Swartz, Braxton, and Viera (2011) 
- Only two of the seven studies reported a statistically significant reduction in calories purchased among consumers 
using calorie-labelled menus. The current evidence suggests that calorie labelling does not have the intended effect 
of decreasing calorie purchasing or consumption.  
 
Nikolaou, Hankey, and Lean (2014) 
- A systematic review of seven studies on the effect on calorie-labelling on calories purchased found no overall 
effect, but a reduction of -124.5 kcal among those who noticed the calorie-labelling.  
 
Gorton, Ni Mhurchu, Chen, and Dixon (2009)  
- A study of 1525 shoppers in New Zealand found that Simple Traffic Light format let to increased ability to correctly 
determine if a food was healthy. 
 
Sacks, Rayner, and Swinburn  (2009) 
- The introduction of traffic light labels increased the sales of ready-meals in the 4-weeks after intervention, though 
there was no association between changes in product sales and the healthiness of the product.  
  
Kiszko, Martinez, Abrams, and Elbel (2014) 
- A review of 31 studies assess the evidence on the effectiveness of calorie labelling at the point of purchase, of 
which 12 are natural experiments. The results of these studies suggest future research are required to establish 
effectiveness.  
Type 2 nudges that use 
calorie labelling do not 
seem to significantly 
change consumption of 
healthy food. The use 
traffic light labelling on the 
other hand have been 
effective at increasing the 
consumption of healthier 
food items in supermarket 
purchases. But future 
researches are required to 
establish its long-term 
effectiveness.  
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Emrich et al. (2017) 
- The calorie intake consumed by 19,915 Canadian adults were reduced by 5% after the introduction of traffic light 
labelling.  
 
House of Lords (2011) 
- A field study at Sainsbury fond that sales of food item with mostly green traffic light grew 46.1% whereas those 
with red traffic light decreased by 24%. 
 
Physical Inactivity Effectiveness 
Type 1 Åvitsland, Solbraa, and Riiser (2017) 
- Intervention site stair climbing at baseline (79.0%) was significantly reduced with footprints. 
 
There are limited evidence 
to establish effectiveness 
of Type 1 nudges 
employing footprints to 
increase physical activity. 
Type 2 Andersen, Franckowiak, Snyder, Bartlett, and Fontaine (1998) 
- A study of the effectiveness of signs to encourage use of stairs instead of escalators using 17901 shoppers found 
stair use increased from 4.8% to 6.9%.  
 
Blamey, Mutrie, and Aitchison (1995) 
- A total of 22,275 observations at underground station found that stair use increase to the order of 15-17% during 
the three weeks when the intervention signs were present.  
 
Brownell, Stunkard, and Albaum (1980) 
- A total of 45,694 observations at a shopping mall, train station and bus terminal found that stair use more than 
doubled for both obese and nonobese persons during two-week period when colourful sign encouraging use of 
Type 2 nudges employing 
motivational intervention 
signs have seen small 
increased in stair use in the 
short-term and no evidence 
to suggest that the effect is 
sustained in the long-term, 
particularly taking into 
account that they are 
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the stairs was positioned at the stairs/escalator choice point. Stair use remained elevated for 15 consecutive days 
while the sign was present and decreased during a 1-month follow-up period, returned to baseline by 3 months. 
 
Kerr, Eves, and Carroll (2001) 
- A total of 45,361 observations at a shopping mall found stair use increased significantly during intervention 
period and when the banners were removed, remained higher than at baseline.  
 
Lewis and Eves (2012) 
- A total of 14,138 observations at four university buildings found that stair climbing increased significantly when 
volitional components was added.  
 
Marshall, Bauman, Patch, Wilson, and Chen (2002) 
- Self-reported data on the use of stairs in the hospital were obtained from 53 staff increased after the first 
intervention, but after the invention was removed stair use decreased back towards baseline levels.  
  
Nomura, Yoshimoto, Akezaki, and Sato (2009) 
- A total of 43,241 observations on the effectiveness of motivational signs in promoting stair use instead of 
escalators found that stair use increased significantly from 3.58 to 4.93% during the intervention period of 1-2 
weeks, 5.80% during 2-4 weeks.  
 
Webb and Eves (2007) 
- A 13-week intervention in which banners carry health promotion message were introduced at intervention site 
found stair climbing increased by 161% and remained significantly elevated 5 weeks after the banner was 
removed. 
unlikely to lead to any 
meaningful health benefits.  
Harmful Use of Alcohol Effectiveness 
Type 1 Wansink and van Ittersum (2005) 
- To determine whether people pour different amounts into short, wide glasses and into tall, slender ones. 198 
college students and 86 bartenders poured more into short, wide glasses than tall slender glasses.  
The effectiveness of Type 
1 nudges is unclear, 
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Attwood, Scott-Samuel, Stothart, Munafò, and Campanella (2012) 
- The influence of glass shape on the rate of consumption of alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages of 159 
customers found that they were 60% slower to consume an alcoholic beverage from a straight glass compared to a 
curved glass. This effect was not observed for non-alcoholic beverages.  
 
Hollands et al. (2015) 
- One study found that adults provided with shorter, wider bottles drank larger amounts of water from them, having 
already poured more, compared with those provided with taller, narrower bottles. However, these was not enough 
evidence to estimate the effect of shape of glassware on consumption.  
especially with alcoholic 
beverages.  
Type 2 Bullers, Cooper, and Russell (2001) 
- A study of the association between individuals’ drinking patterns and the drinking patterns of their social network 
members on a sample of 1933 adults suggest that selection and influence affect the association between 
individual and network drinking patterns.  
 
Perkins, Meilman, Leichliter, Cashin, and Presley (1999) 
- Data from surveys of students representing 100 college students found that they typically misperceived their peer 
norms by substantially overestimating how often the average student used drugs (such as alcohol, tobacco, 
marijuana, etc).  
 
 
Gomberg, Schneider, and DeJong (2001) 
- A social marketing campaign to change the perception of peer drinking norms among University students found 
that exposure to be campaign may be associated with lower estimates of student drinking norms.  
 
Haines and Spear (1996) 
- A 5-year study of 23,000 student using an intervention to change perceptions of drinking norms found that the 
amount of binge drinking showed an 18.5% drop in the number of students who perceived binge drinking as the 
norm and a corresponding reduction in self-reported binge drinking of 8.8%. the apparent effectiveness of this 
The evidence for the 
effectiveness of Type 2 
nudges are encouraging at 
establishing the association 
between drinking pattern 
and peer drinking norms, 
with the effect of social 
norm sustained beyond the 
immediate short-term of 4+ 
months post-intervention.  
   
 
 
162 
prevention effort suggested that changing college students’ perceptions of drinking norms may lower the 
proportion of students who engage in binge drinking.  
 
Thombs, Dotterer, Olds, Sharp, and Raub (2004) 
- A study of social norm campaign based on 616 students before the camping’s implementation and a follow-up 
survey of 723 students 4 academic years later, found that 66.5% of the students were aware of the campaign yet 
survey revealed no reduction in perceived drinking norm or alcohol use in this group. Further analysis revealed 
that (1) a majority of the students did not find the statistics used in the campaign message credible, (2) higher 
levels of alcohol use predicted lower levels of perceived campaign credibility, and (3) only 38.5% of the students 
understood the campaign’s intended purpose.  
 
Foxcraft, Moreira, Santimano, and Smith (2015) 
- A total of 66 studies (43,1235 participants) included in the review, and 59 studies (40.951 participants) in the 
meta-analyses to determine whether social norm intervention reduce alcohol-related negative consequences, 
alcohol misuse or alcohol consumption found that the effect on social norm was sustained beyond the immediate 
short-term at 4+ months post intervention.  
 
Tobacco Use Effectiveness 
Type 1 Hollands et al. (2015) 
- Three studies found no effect of longer compared with shorter cigarettes on the amounts of tobacco consumed.  
There are limited evidence 
to establish the 
effectiveness of shorter 
cigarettes at reducing 
tobacco use.  
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Type 2 Hammond et al. (2006) 
- A telephone survey conduct with 9058 adults smokers from USA, UK, Canada and Australia found that smokers 
in the four countries exhibited significant gap in their knowledge of the risks of smoking. Smokers who noticed 
the warnings were significantly more likely to endorse health risks, including lung cancer and heart disease. 
Overall, smokers are not fully informed about the risks of smoking. Warnings that are graphic, larger, and more 
comprehensive in content are more effective in communicating the health risks of smoking.  
 
Hammond, Daniel, and White (2013) 
- An online survey with 947 participants rated different packs on measures of appeal and health risk, positive 
smoker image, and completed a behaviour pack selection task. Plain packs were rated as the least appealing and 
worst tasting compared with all other conditions. Respondents are also significantly less likely to accept a pack of 
cigarettes when offered only plain versus branded packs. 
 
Moodie et al. (2012) 
- A 4-week study showed that 48 smokers rated plain packaging with increased negative perceptions and feelings 
about the pack and about smoking as compared with branded packaging. Plain packaging also increased avoidant 
behaviour, certain smoking cessation behaviours, such as smoking less around others and forgoing cigarettes, and 
thinking about quitting.  
 
Moodie and Mackintosh (2013) 
- A survey study on 187 young women smokers found that in comparison to fully branded packaging, plain 
packaging associated with more negative perceptions and feelings about the pack and about smoking. No 
significant overall difference in salience, seriousness or believability of health warnings were found between the 
pack types, but participants reported looking more closely at the warnings on plain packs and also thinking about 
what the warnings were telling them as well as being more likely to take on cessation behaviour.  
 
Brose, Chong, Aspinall, Michie, and McEwen (2014) 
- Following abstinence of at least 12 h, 98 regular and occasional smokers were randomised to exposure to their 
own cigarette package, another branded package or a standardised package found that there was no significant 
main effect of or interaction for motivation to stop smoking. The standardised pack was perceived to be 
The evidence for Type 2 
nudges involving graphic 
health warnings seem 
promising, especially with 
the introduction of plain 
packaging to enhance the 
visibility of health 
warnings.  
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significantly less appealing and less motivating to buy cigarettes, smokers using them were perceived as less 
popular and cigarettes from them expected to taste worse.  
Dunlop, Dobbins, Young, Perez, and Currow (2014) 
- A survey with 15,745 adults had a significant increase in cognitive and avoidant responses to on-pack health 
warnings after the introduction of new plain packaging. Similarly, there was a significant increase in the 
proportion of smokers strongly disagreeing that the look of the cigarette pack is attractive, says something good 
about them, influences the brand they biy, makes their pack stand out, is fashionable and matches their style. 
Changes in these outcomes were maintained 6 months postintervention. 
 
Wakefield et al. (2015) 
- A survey with 2,716 cigarette smokers one year after the introduction of plain packaging found that more 
smokers dislike their pack, perceived lower pack appeal, lower cigarette quality, lower satisfaction and lower 
value and disagree brands differed in prestige. More smokers noticed graphic health warnings, attributed 
motivation to quite due to these warning, avoided specific graphic health warnings when purchasing and covered 
packs, with no change in perceived exaggerations of harms. 
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APPENDIX B 
CHAPTER 3: Underlying Wishes and Nudged Choice in Pro-self Context 
 
Questionnaire: Experiment 1a (UK Sample) 
COVER STORY 
In this part of the survey, we are going to ask a number of questions on the subject of Individual 
Savings Account (ISA). Psychologists have found that sometimes people's true preferences 
(what they really want) differ from what they indicate in questionnaires. This is why we are 
asking you what you think a person's true preferences are in the following. Please read each 
question carefully and response as you see fit. There are no right or wrong answers. Again as 
a reminder, ISA is a voluntary, tax-free, retirement protection. The aim of ISAs was to help 
UK residents make money from investments, or make money from their savings. In both cases 
this was without having to pay tax on the money that is made. This is also why ISAs are seen 
as a scheme to help people prepare for retirement.           
1. Out of 100 people who live in the UK, for how many do you think their true 
preference is to be registered in the ISA Scheme?  
 
 
OPT-OUT CONDITION 
Mark lives in an area in the City with an OPT OUT banking system. Under this system, 
everyone is automatically registered as ISA default, meaning that they will automatically have 
their money invested for them by their bank/building Society. The Bank/Building Society will 
decide on the individual’s behalf exactly how the money will be allocated to investment 
schemes. Anyone who wishes NOT to be registered in the ISA default scheme MUST make an 
extra effort by going online and changing their preferences or by calling the bank/building 
society.     Under the OPT OUT system Mark is REGISTERED AS ISA-Default meaning that 
he is entered into the ISA-DEFAULT SCHEME.     
2. How likely do you think it is that Mark’s true preference was to be registered in 
the ISA default scheme?  
3. If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is to be a member of the ISA 
default scheme, how many of them do you think will be registered in the ISA 
default scheme on the OPT OUT system?  
4. If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is NOT TO be a member of 
the ISA default system, how many of them do you think will be registered in 
the ISA default scheme in the OPT OUT system?  
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Imagine that you live now in the same city as Mark does (in which the OPT OUT system is in 
place). Again, if you wish not to be a ISA-default member, you will need to make extra effort 
by contacting your ISA provider.         
5. How likely do you think that you will be registered in the ISA default scheme? (0 - 
very unlikely; 100 - very likely). 
 
 
MANDATED CHOICE CONDITION 
Mark lives in an area in the City with a CHOICE banking system. Under this system, everyone 
is legally required by their bank/building society to choose between being a NON-ISA-Default 
MEMBER or a ISA-Default MEMEBER.    Under the CHOICE system Mark is 
REGISTERED AS ISA-Default meaning he is entered into the ISA-DEFAULT SCHEME.   
2. How likely do you think it is that Mark’s true preference was to be registered in 
the ISA default scheme?  
3. If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is to be a member of the ISA 
Default scheme, how many of them do you think will be registered in the ISA Default 
scheme on the CHOICE system?  
4. If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is NOT TO be a member of 
the ISA Default system, how many of them do you think will be registered in the ISA 
Default scheme on the CHOICE system?  
Imagine that you live now in the same city as Mark does (in which the CHOICE system is in 
place).    
5. How likely do you think that you will be registered in the ISA default scheme? (0 - very 
unlikely; 100 - very likely).  
 
OPT-IN CONDITION 
Mark lives in an area in the City with an OPT IN banking system. Under this system, 
everyone is automatically registered as NON-ISA Default, meaning that they will NOT 
have their money automatically invested by their bank/building society in the NON-ISA 
Default SCHEME. Anyone who wishes to be registered in ISA default scheme must make 
an extra effort by going online and changing their preferences or by calling the 
bank/building society.    Under the OPT IN system Mark is REGISTERED AS ISA default 
meaning he is entered into the ISA-DEFAULT SCHEME.   
2. How likely do you think it is that Mark’s true preference was to be registered in ISA 
default scheme?  
3. If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is to be a member of the ISA Default 
scheme, how many of them do you think will be registered in the ISA Default scheme 
on the OPT IN system?  
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4. If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is NOT TO be a member of the ISA 
Default system, how many of them do you think will be registered in the ISA Default 
scheme on the OPT-IN system?   
Imagine that you live now in the same city as Mark does (in which the OPT IN system is in 
place). Again, if you wish to be a ISA-default member, you will need to make extra effort by 
contacting your ISA provider.        
5. How likely do you think that you will be registered in the ISA default scheme? (0 - very 
unlikely; 100 - very likely) 
 
 
 
Questionnaire: Experiment 1b HK Sample 
In this part of the survey, we are going to ask a number of questions on the subject of Mandatory 
Provident Fund (MPF).  Psychologists have found that sometimes people's true preferences 
(what they really want) differ from what they indicate in questionnaires. This is why we are 
asking you what you think a person's true preferences are in the following. Please read each 
question carefully and response as you see fit. There are no right or wrong answers. Again as 
a reminder, MPF is a mandatory retirement protection scheme. Almost all employers, 
employees and self-employed persons aged within 18 to 64 are legally required to contribute 
to MPF fund(s). MPF funds are offered by approved banks or insurers. 
1. Out of 100 people who live in HK, for how many do you think their true preference 
is to be registered in the MPF Scheme?  
 
 
OPT-OUT CONDITION 
Mark lives in an area in the City with an OPT OUT banking system. Under this system, 
everyone is automatically registered as MPF default, meaning that they will automatically have 
their money invested for them by their Bank/Insurer. The Bank/Insurer will decide on the 
individual’s behalf exactly how the money will be allocated to investment schemes. Anyone 
who wishes NOT to be registered in the MPF default scheme MUST make an extra effort by 
going online and changing their preferences or by calling the bank/insurer. Under the OPT 
OUT system Mark is REGISTERED AS MPF-default meaning he is entered into the MPF-
DEFAULT SCHEME.      
2. How likely do you think it is that Mark’s true preference was to be registered in the 
MPF-default scheme?  
3. If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is to be a member of the MPF 
default scheme, how many of them do you think will be registered in the MPF 
default scheme on the OPT OUT system?  
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4. If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is NOT TO be a member of the 
MPF default system, how many of them do you think will be registered in the MPF 
default scheme in the OPT OUT system?   
Imagine that you live now in the same city as Mark does (in which the OPT OUT system is in 
place). Again, if you wish not to be a MPF-default member, you will need to make extra effort 
by contacting your MPF provider.   
5. How likely do you think that you will be registered in the MPF default scheme? (0 - 
very unlikely; 100 - very likely).  
 
 
MANDATED CHOICE CONDITION 
Mark lives in an area in the City with a CHOICE banking system. Under this system, everyone 
is legally required by their bank/insurer to choose between being a NON-MPF-Default 
MEMBER or a MPF-Default MEMEBER.   Under the CHOICE system Mark is 
REGISTERED AS MPF-Default meaning he is entered into the MPF-DEFAULT SCHEME.   
2. How likely do you think it is that Mark’s true preference was to be registered in the 
MPF default scheme?  
3. If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is to be a member of the MPF 
Default scheme, how many of them do you think will be registered in the MPF 
Default scheme on the CHOICE system?  
4. If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is NOT TO be a member of the 
MPF Default system, how many of them do you think will be registered in the MPF 
Default scheme on the CHOICE system?  
Imagine that you live now in the same city as Mark does (in which the CHOICE system is in 
place).   
5. How likely do you think that you will be registered in the MPF default scheme? (0 - 
very unlikely; 100 - very likely).  
 
 
OPT-IN CONDITION 
Mark lives in an area in the City with an OPT IN banking system. Under this system, everyone 
is automatically registered as NON-MPF Default, meaning they will NOT have their money 
automatically invested by their bank/insurer in the NON-MPF DEFAULT SCHEME. Anyone 
who wishes to be registered in the MPF default scheme must make an extra effort by going 
online and changing their preferences or by calling the bank/insurer.     Under the OPT IN 
system Mark is REGISTERED AS MPF-default meaning he is entered into the MPF-
DEFAULT SCHEME.    
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2. How likely do you think it is that Mark’s true preference was to be registered in the 
MPF default scheme?  
3. If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is to be a member of the MPF 
Default scheme, how many of them do you think will be registered in the MPF 
Default scheme on the OPT IN system?  
4. If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is NOT TO be a member of the 
MPF Default system, how many of them do you think will be registered in the MPF 
Default scheme on the OPT-IN system? 
Imagine that you live now in the same city as Mark does (in which the OPT IN system is in 
place). Again, if you wish to be a MPF-default member, you will need to make extra effort by 
contacting your MPF provider.  
5. How likely do you think that you will be registered in the MPF default scheme? (0 - 
very unlikely; 100 - very likely).  
 
 
 
 
 
Questionnaire: Experiment 2aUK Sample 
OPT-OUT CONDITION 
Mark lives in an area in the City with an OPT OUT banking system. Under this system, 
everyone is automatically registered as ISA default, meaning that they will automatically 
have their money invested for them by their bank/building Society. The Bank/Building 
Society will decide on the individual’s behalf exactly how the money will be allocated to 
investment schemes. Anyone who wishes NOT to be registered in the ISA default scheme 
MUST make an extra effort by going online and changing their preferences or by calling the 
bank/building society.     Under the OPT OUT system Mark is REGISTERED AS ISA 
meaning that he is entered into the ISA-DEFAULT SCHEME.     
1. How likely do you think it is that Mark’s true preference was to be registered in 
the ISA default scheme?  
 
Recall that Mark’s area in the city has an OPT OUT banking system. Under this system, 
everyone is automatically registered as ISA default, meaning they will automatically have 
their money invested for them by their bank/building society. The Bank/Building Society will 
decide on the individual’s behalf exactly how the money will be allocated to investment 
schemes. Anyone who wishes NOT to be registered in the ISA default scheme must make an 
extra effort by going online and changing their preferences or by calling the bank/building 
society.     
2. Out of 100 people who live in the same area as Mark, for how many do you think 
their true preference is to be registered in the ISA Default Scheme?  
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3. If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is to be a member of the ISA 
default scheme, how many of them do you think will be registered in the ISA default 
scheme on the OPT OUT system?  
4. If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is NOT TO be a member of 
the ISA default system, how many of them do you think will be registered in the ISA 
default scheme in the OPT OUT system?  
 
MANDATED CHOICE CONDITION 
Mark lives in an area in the City with a CHOICE banking system. Under this system, everyone 
is legally required by their bank/building society to choose between being a NON-ISA-Default 
MEMBER or a ISA-Default MEMEBER. Under the CHOICE system Mark is REGISTERED 
AS ISA-Default meaning he is entered into the ISA-DEFAULT SCHEME.   
1. How likely do you think it is that Mark’s true preference was to be registered in the ISA 
default scheme?  
 
Recall that Mark’s area in the city has a CHOICE banking system. Under this system, everyone 
is legally required by their bank/building society to choose between being a NON-ISA-Default 
MEMBER or a ISA-Default MEMEBER.    
1. Out of 100 people who live in the same area as Mark, for how many do you think 
their true preference is to be registered in the ISA Default Scheme? 
2. If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is to be a member of the ISA 
Default scheme, how many of them do you think will be registered in the ISA Default 
scheme on the CHOICE system?   
3. If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is NOT TO be a member of 
the ISA Default system, how many of them do you think will be registered in the ISA 
Default scheme on the CHOICE system?   
 
 
OPT-IN CONDITION 
Mark lives in an area in the City with an OPT IN banking system. Under this system, everyone 
is automatically registered as NON-ISA Default, meaning that they will NOT have their money 
automatically invested by their bank/building society in the ISA SCHEME. Anyone who 
wishes to be registered in ISA default scheme must make an extra effort by going online and 
changing their preferences or by calling the bank/building society.     Under the OPT IN system 
Mark is REGISTERED AS ISA default meaning he is entered into the ISA-
DEFAULT SCHEME.    
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1. How likely do you think it is that Mark’s true preference was to be registered in ISA 
default scheme?  
Recall that Mark’s area in the city has an OPT IN banking system. Under this system, everyone 
is automatically registered as NON-ISA DEFAULT MEMBER, meaning they will NOT have 
their money automatically invested by their bank/building society in the ISA SCHEME. 
Anyone who wishes to be 
registered in ISA default scheme must make an extra effort by going online and changing their 
preferences or by calling the bank/building society.   
2. Out of 100 people who live in the same area as Mark, for how many do you think 
their true preference is to be registered in the ISA DEFAULT Scheme?   
3. If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is to be a member of the ISA 
Default scheme, how many of them do you think will be registered in the ISA Default 
scheme on the OPT IN system?   
4. If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is NOT TO be a member of 
the ISA Default system, how many of them do you think will be registered in the ISA 
Default scheme on the OPT-IN system?  
 
 
 
Questionnaire: Experiment 2bHK Sample 
OPT-OUT CONDITION 
Mark lives in an area in the City with an OPT OUT banking system. Under this system, 
everyone is automatically registered as ISA default, meaning that they will automatically have 
their money invested for them by their bank/building Society. The Bank/Building Society will 
decide on the individual’s behalf exactly how the money will be allocated to investment 
schemes. Anyone who wishes NOT to be registered in the ISA default scheme MUST make an 
extra effort by going online and changing their preferences or by calling the bank/building 
society.     Under the OPT OUT system Mark is REGISTERED AS ISA meaning that he is 
entered into the ISA-DEFAULT SCHEME.     
1. How likely do you think it is that Mark’s true preference was to be registered in 
the ISA default scheme?  
 
Recall that Mark’s area in the city has an OPT OUT banking system. Under this system, 
everyone is automatically registered as ISA default, meaning they will automatically have their 
money invested for them by their bank/building society. The Bank/Building Society will 
decide on the individual’s behalf exactly how the money will be allocated to investment 
schemes. Anyone who wishes NOT to be registered in the ISA default scheme must make an 
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extra effort by going online and changing their preferences or by calling the bank/building 
society.     
2. Out of 100 people who live in the same area as Mark, for how many do you think 
their true preference is to be registered in the ISA Default Scheme?  
3. If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is to be a member of the ISA 
default scheme, how many of them do you think will be registered in the ISA default 
scheme on the OPT OUT system?   
4. If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is NOT TO be a member of 
the ISA default system, how many of them do you think will be registered in the ISA 
default scheme in the OPT OUT system?  
 
 
MANDATED CHOICE CONDITION 
Mark lives in an area in the City with a CHOICE banking system. Under this system, everyone 
is legally required by their bank/building society to choose between being a NON-ISA-Default 
MEMBER or a ISA- Default MEMEBER. Under the CHOICE system Mark is REGISTERED 
AS ISA-Default meaning he is entered into the ISA-DEFAULT SCHEME.   
1. How likely do you think it is that Mark’s true preference was to be registered in the ISA 
default scheme?  
Recall that Mark’s area in the city has a CHOICE banking system. Under this system, everyone 
is legally required by their bank/building society to choose between being a NON-ISA-Default 
MEMBER or a ISA-Default MEMEBER.    
2. Out of 100 people who live in the same area as Mark, for how many do you think their 
true preference is to be registered in the ISA Default Scheme? 
3. If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is to be a member of the ISA Default 
scheme, how many of them do you think will be registered in the ISA Default scheme 
on the CHOICE system?   
4. If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is NOT TO be a member of the ISA 
Default system, how many of them do you think will be registered in the ISA Default 
scheme on the CHOICE system?  
 
 
OPT-IN CONDITION 
Mark lives in an area in the City with an OPT IN banking system. Under this system, everyone 
is automatically registered as NON-ISA Default, meaning that they will NOT have their money 
automatically invested by their bank/building society in the ISA SCHEME. Anyone who 
wishes to be registered in ISA default scheme must make an extra effort by going online and 
changing their preferences or by calling the bank/building society.     Under the OPT IN system 
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Mark is REGISTERED AS ISA default meaning he is entered into the ISA-
DEFAULT SCHEME.    
1. How likely do you think it is that Mark’s true preference was to be registered in ISA 
default scheme?  
 
Recall that Mark’s area in the city has an OPT IN banking system. Under this system, everyone 
is automatically registered as NON-ISA DEFAULT MEMBER, meaning they will NOT have 
their money automatically invested by their bank/building society in the ISA SCHEME. 
Anyone who wishes to be registered in ISA default scheme must make an extra effort by going 
online and changing their preferences or by calling the bank/building society.   
2. Out of 100 people who live in the same area as Mark, for how many do you think their 
true preference is to be registered in the ISA DEFAULT Scheme?  
3. If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is to be a member of the ISA Default 
scheme, how many of them do you think will be registered in the ISA Default scheme 
on the OPT IN system?   
4. If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is NOT TO be a member of the ISA 
Default system, how many of them do you think will be registered in the ISA Default 
scheme on the OPT-IN system?   
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APPENDIX C 
CHAPTER 4: Underlying Wishes and Nudged Choice in Pro-social Context 
 
Study 1 (US Sample) 
COVER STORY 
In this survey, we are going to ask you a number of questions on the subject of organ donation. 
Please read each question carefully and respond as you see fit. There are no right or wrong 
answers. AN ORGAN DONOR is a person who donates their organs for transplant in the event 
of their death.  
Q1 Out of 100 people in the U.S., for how many do you think their true preference is to donate 
their organs? 
 
OPT-IN CONDITION 
Mark lives in an area with an OPT IN system of organ donation. Under this system, everyone 
is automatically registered to be a NON-DONOR, meaning they will NOT have their organs 
used in the event of their death. Anyone who wishes to be a donor must make an extra effort 
by going online and changing their preferences or by calling the donor line.  Mark is involved 
in a fatal accident that leaves many of his vital organs intact. Under the OPT IN system Mark 
was REGISTERED AS AN ORGAN DONOR. We want to know how you think Mark felt 
about being an organ donor.   
Q2 How likely do you think it is that Mark’s true preference was to donate his organs?  
 
As you know Mark is involved in a fatal accident that leaves many of his vital organs 
intact. John is Mark’s nephew. John has just found out that his uncle Mark has unfortunately 
been in a fatal accident. The doctor informs John that his uncle is registered as an organ donor 
under the OPT IN system, but as Mark’s nearest relative John has to make the final decision 
about what actually happens to his uncle’s organs. John has no opinion one way or another 
about what should be done, so he wants to base his decision on his Uncle Mark’s 
preferences.       
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Q3 How likely is it that John will agree to his Uncle’s organs being donated?    
Highly 
Unlikely (1) 
Moderately 
Unlikely (2) Likely (3) 
Moderately 
Likely (4) 
Highly 
Likely (5) 
m  m  m  m  m  
Q4 What will John decide to do, will he donate his Uncle’s organs?  
m Yes  
m No  
 
Recall that Mark’s area has an OPT IN system of organ donation. Under this system, everyone 
is automatically registered to be a NON-DONOR. This means people in the area will NOT 
have their organs used in the event of their death. Anyone who wishes to be a donor must make 
an extra effort by going online and changing their preferences or by calling the donor line.   
 
Q5 If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is to DONATE their organs, how many 
of them do you think will be registered as organ donors on the OPT IN system?  
Q6 If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is NOT TO DONATE their organs, how 
many of them do you think will be registered as organ donors on the OPT IN system?  
 
 
OPT-OUT CONDITION 
Mark lives in an area with an OPT OUT system of organ donation. Under this system, everyone 
is automatically registered to be a DONOR, meaning they will have their organs used in the 
event of their death. Anyone who wishes to be a NON-DONOR must make an extra effort by 
going online and changing their preferences or by calling the donor line.  Mark is involved in 
a fatal accident that leaves many of his vital organs intact. Under the OPT OUT system Mark 
was REGISTERED AS AN ORGAN DONOR. We want to know how you think Mark felt 
about being an organ donor.   
Q2 How likely do you think it is that Mark’s true preference was to donate his organs? 
 
As you know Mark is involved in a fatal accident that leaves many of his vital organs 
intact. John is Mark’s nephew. John has just found out that his uncle Mark has unfortunately 
been in a fatal accident. The doctor informs John that his uncle is registered as an organ donor 
under the OPT OUT system, but as Mark’s nearest relative John has to make the final decision 
about what actually happens to his uncle’s organs. John has no opinion one way or another 
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about what should be done, so he wants to base his decision on his Uncle Mark’s 
preferences.       
Q3 How likely is it that John will agree to his Uncle’s organs being donated?    
Highly 
Unlikely (1) 
Moderately 
Unlikely (2) Likely (3) 
Moderately 
Likely (4) 
Highly 
Likely (5) 
m  m  m  m  m  
Q4 What will John decide to do,will he donate his Uncle’s organs?  
m Yes  
m No  
 
Recall that Mark’s area has an OPT OUT system of organ donation. Under this system, 
everyone is automatically registered to be a DONOR. This means that they WILL have their 
organs used in the event of their death. Anyone who wishes to be a NON-DONOR must make 
an extra effort by going online and changing their preferences or by calling the donor line.      
 
Q5 If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is to DONATE their organs, how many 
of them do you think will be registered as organ donors on the OPT OUT system?  
Q6 If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is NOT TO DONATE their organs, how 
many of them do you think will be registered as organ donors on the OPT OUT system?  
 
 
 
MANDATED CHOICE CONDITION 
Mark lives in an area with a CHOICE system of organ donation. Under this system, everyone 
is legally required to choose between being a DONOR OR NON-DONOR before they register 
for their driver’s license. Mark is involved in a fatal accident that leaves many of his vital 
organs intact. Under the CHOICE system Mark was REGISTERED AS AN ORGAN 
DONOR.  We want to know how you think Mark felt about being an organ donor.   
Q2 How likely do you think it is that Mark’s true preference was to donate his organs? 
 
As you know Mark is involved in a fatal accident that leaves many of his vital organs 
intact.      John is Mark’s nephew.      John has just found out that his uncle Mark has 
unfortunately been in a fatal accident.      The doctor informs John that his uncle is registered 
as an organ donor under the CHOICE system, but as Mark’s nearest relative John has to make 
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the final decision about what actually happens to his uncle’s organs.      John has no opinion 
one way or another about what should be done, so he wants to base his decision on his Uncle 
Mark’s preferences.       
Q3 How likely is it that John will agree to his Uncle’s organs being donated?    
Highly 
Unlikely (1) 
Moderately 
Unlikely (2) Likely (3) 
Moderately 
Likely (4) 
Highly 
Likely (5) 
m  m  m  m  m  
Q4 What will John decide to do, will he donate his Uncle’s organs?  
m Yes  
m No  
 
Recall that Mark’s area has a CHOICE system of organ donation. Under this system, everyone 
is legally required to choose between being a DONOR OR NON-DONOR before they register 
for their driver’s license. 
 
Q5 If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is to DONATE their organs, how many 
of them do you think will be registered as organ donors on the CHOICE system?  
Q6 If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is NOT TO DONATE their organs, how 
many of them do you think will be registered as organ donors on the CHOICE system?  
 
 
MADATORY DONOR CONDITION 
Mark lives in an area with a DONOR system of organ donation. Under this system, everyone 
is automatically REGISTERED AS A DONOR. There is no option for changing this.Mark is 
involved in a fatal accident that leaves many of his vital organs intact. Under the DONOR 
system Mark was REGISTERED AS AN ORGAN DONOR. We want to know how you think 
Mark felt about being an organ donor.   
Q2 How likely do you think it is that Mark’s true preference was to donate his organs?  
 
As you know Mark is involved in a fatal accident that leaves many of his vital organs 
intact. John is Mark’s nephew. John has just found out that his uncle Mark has unfortunately 
been in a fatal accident. The doctor informs John that his uncle is registered as an organ donor 
under the DONOR system, but as Mark’s nearest relative John has to make the final decision 
about what actually happens to his uncle’s organs. John has no opinion one way or another 
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about what should be done, so he wants to base his decision on his Uncle Mark’s 
preferences.       
Q3 How likely is it that John will agree to his Uncle’s organs being donated?    
Highly 
Unlikely (1) 
Moderately 
Unlikely (2) Likely (3) 
Moderately 
Likely (4) 
Highly 
Likely (5) 
m  m  m  m  m  
 
Q4 What will John decide to do, will he donate his Uncle’s organs?  
m Yes  
m No  
 
Recall that Mark’s area has a DONOR system of organ donation. Under this system, everyone 
is automatically registered as a donor. There is no option for changing this. 
 
Q5 If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is to DONATE their organs, how many 
of them do you think will be registered as organ donors on the DONOR system? 
Q6 If we assembled 100 people whose true preference is NOT TO DONATE their organs, how 
many of them do you think will be registered as organ donors on the DONOR system?  
 
DEMOGRAPHIC  
We will now present you with the description of four different organ donation systems. OPT-
IN: Under this system, everyone is automatically registered to be a NON-DONOR, meaning 
they will NOT have their organs used in the event of their death. Anyone who wishes to be a 
donor must make an extra effort by going online and changing their preferences or by calling 
the donor line.   
OPT-OUT: Under this system, everyone is automatically registered to be a DONOR, meaning 
they will have their organs used in the event of their death. Anyone who wishes to be a NON-
DONOR must make an extra effort by going online and changing their preferences or by calling 
the donor line.   
CHOICE: Under this system, everyone is legally required to choose between being a DONOR 
OR NON-DONOR before they register for their driver’s license.  
MANDATORY DONOR: Under this system, everyone is automatically REGISTERED AS A 
DONOR. There is no option for changing this. 
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Q7 What system do you think the U.S. should adopt? 
m Opt-In  
m Opt-Out  
m Choice  
m Mandatory Donor  
 
Q8 What is your gender? 
m Male  
m Female  
 
Q9 What is your age? 
 
Q10 What is your nationality? 
 
Q11 Are you an organ donor? 
m Yes  
m No  
 
Q12 What is your religion do you belong to? 
 
Q13 Is organ donation forbidden in your religion? 
m Yes  
m No  
 
Q14 Have you given blood before? 
m Yes  
m No  
 
Q15 Do you know anyone who is registered as an organ donor? 
m Yes  
m No  
 
Q16 Do you agree with the idea that everyone should be automatically included on the Organ 
Donor register with the ability to opt out if they wish? 
m Yes  
m No  
 
Q17 Would you be willing to agree to donation when your loved one's wishes are unknown? 
m Yes  
m No  
 
Q18 In the event of a death, which of these do you believe should apply in respect of organ 
donation? 
m The family / close friend should have a final say on whether a deceased person's 
organs are donated or not.  
m The deceased persons' wishes about donating their organs or not should be 
respected no matter what the family thinks.  
m Don't know.  
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Q19 What is the current organ donation legislation in the U.S.? 
m Opt out  
m Presumed consent  
m Mandatory/compulsory  
m Need to carry an opt out card  
m Opt in  
m Family or close friend will decide  
m Don't know  
 
 
 
 
Study 2 (European Opt-In Country) and Study 3 (European Opt-Out Country) 
COVER STORY 
In this survey, we are going to ask you a number of questions on the subject of organ donation. 
Please read each question carefully and respond based on answers that are closest to what you 
think. There are no right or wrong answers. In this experiment, the country in consideration 
has an OPT-IN system of organ donation. Under this system, everyone is automatically 
registered to be a NON-DONOR, meaning they will NOT have their organs used in the event 
of their death. Anyone who wishes to be a DONOR must make an extra effort by going online 
and register their decision or by calling the donor line.  
Q1 Out of 100 people living in this country, for how many do you think would want to donate 
their organs? 
 
OPT-IN CONDITION 
Mark currently lives in this country with an OPT-IN system of organ donation. Remember that 
under this system everyone is automatically registered to be a NON-DONOR, meaning they 
will NOT have their organs used in the event of their death. Anyone who wishes to be a 
DONOR must make an extra effort by going online and registering their decision or by calling 
the donor line. Mark is involved in a fatal accident that leaves many of his vital organs 
intact. Under the OPT-IN system Mark was REGISTERED AS AN ORGAN DONOR. We 
want to know how you think Mark felt about being an organ donor.   
Q2 How likely do you think it is that Mark wanted to donate his organs?  
 
As you know Mark is involved in a fatal accident that leaves many of his vital organs intact. 
John is Mark’s nephew.  John has just found out that his uncle Mark has unfortunately been in 
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a fatal accident.  The doctor informs John that his uncle is registered as an organ donor under 
the OPT-IN system, but as Mark’s nearest relative John has to make the final decision about 
what actually happens to his uncle’s organs.  John has no opinion one way or another about 
what should be done, so he wants to base his decision on his Uncle Mark’s decision to donate.    
Q3 To what extent does being registered to donate his organs under the OPT-IN system provide 
a clear indication that Mark wanted to donate his organs? 
 
Q4 How likely do you think it is that John believes that Mark wanted to donate his organs? 
 
Q5 How likely is it that John will agree to his Uncle’s organs being donated?    
Display This Question: 
If How likely is it that John will agree to his Uncle’s organs being donated?     - Highly 
Unlikely Is Selected 
Q6 Why do you think it is High Unlikely that John will donate Mark's organs? 
m It is a highly traumatic time for relatives and it’s just not something they can think 
about  
m Lack of understanding of the organ donation process  
m Denial and rejection of brain-death criteria  
m The hope for a miracle  
m Fear about organ trade and unknown organ destination  
m Religious beliefs  
m Insecurity about the brain-death diagnosis (if doctor knows you are a registered 
donor they won’t do everything they can to save your life)  
m Unsure about Mark’s wish to donate   
m Belief in body integrity about death  
m Fear of objection by other family members   
m There is a lack of evidence to indicate that Mark wanted to donate his organs  
m None of the above  
 
Highly 
Unlikely (1) 
Moderately 
Unlikely (2) Likely (3) 
Moderately 
Likely (4) 
Highly Likely 
(5) 
m  m  m  m  m  
   
 
 
204 
Display This Question: 
If How likely is it that John will agree to his Uncle’s organs being donated?     - Moderately 
Unlikely Is Selected 
Q6 Why do you think it is  Moderately Unlikely that John will donate Mark's organs? 
m It is a highly traumatic time for relatives and it’s just not something they can think 
about  
m Lack of understanding of the organ donation process 
m Denial and rejection of brain-death criteria 
m The hope for a miracle  
m Fear about organ trade and unknown organ destination  
m Religious beliefs 
m Insecurity about the brain-death diagnosis (if doctor knows you are a registered 
donor they won’t do everything they can to save your life 
m Unsure about Mark’s wish to donate   
m Belief in body integrity about death  
m Fear of objection by other family members   
m There is a lack of evidence to indicate that Mark wanted to donate his organs  
m None of the above  
Display This Question: 
If How likely is it that John will agree to his Uncle’s organs being donated?     - Likely Is 
Selected 
Q6 Why do you think it is Likely that John will donate Mark's organs? 
m It is important to respect the deceased's wish  
m This is a gift of life  
m The act of good citizenship  
m There is evidence to suggest that Mark wanted to donate his organs  
m Mark actively made a choice to opt-in and donate his organs  
m None of the above  
Display This Question: 
If How likely is it that John will agree to his Uncle’s organs being donated?     - Moderately 
Likely Is Selected 
Q6 Why do you think it is Moderately Likely that John will donate Mark's organs? 
m It is important to respect the deceased's wish  
m This is a gift of life  
m The act of good citizenship  
m There is evidence to suggest that Mark wanted to donate his organs  
m Mark actively made a choice to opt-in and donate his organs  
m None of the above  
Display This Question: 
If How likely is it that John will agree to his Uncle’s organs being donated?     - Highly 
Likely Is Selected 
Q6 Why do you think it is Highly Likely that John will donate Mark's organs? 
m It is important to respect the deceased's wish  
m This is a gift of life  
m The act of good citizenship  
m There is evidence to suggest that Mark wanted to donate his organs  
m Mark actively made a choice to opt-in and donate his organs  
m None of the above  
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Recall that Mark lives in a country that has an OPT-IN system of organ donation. Under this 
system, everyone is automatically registered to be a NON-DONOR. This means people in this 
country will NOT have their organs used in the event of their death. Anyone who wishes to be 
a DONOR must make an extra effort by going online and registering their decision or by calling 
the donor line.   
Q7 If we assembled 100 people who want to DONATE their organs, how many of them do 
you think will be registered as organ donors on the OPT-IN system?        
 
Q8 If we assembled 100 people who DO NOT WANT to DONATE their organs, how many 
of them do you think will be registered as organ donors on the OPT-IN system?  
 
 
OPT-OUT CONDITION 
In this experiment, the country in consideration has an OPT-OUT system of organ 
donation.   Under this system, everyone is automatically registered to be a DONOR, meaning 
they WILL have their organs used in the event of their death. Anyone who wishes to be a NON-
DONOR must make an extra effort by going online and registering their decision or by calling 
the donor line.  
Q1 Out of 100 people living in this country, for how many do you think would want to donate 
their organs? 
 
Mark currently lives in this country with an OPT-OUT system of organ donation.      Remember 
that under this system everyone is automatically registered to be a DONOR, meaning they 
WILL have their organs used in the event of their death. Anyone who wishes to be a NON-
DONOR must make an extra effort by going online and registering their decision or by calling 
the donor line. Mark is involved in a fatal accident that leaves many of his vital organs intact. 
Under the OPT-OUT system Mark was REGISTERED AS AN ORGAN DONOR. We want 
to know how you think Mark felt about being an organ donor.   
Q2 How likely do you think it is that Mark wanted to donate his organs?  
 
As you know Mark is involved in a fatal accident that leaves many of his vital organs intact. 
John is Mark’s nephew. John has just found out that his uncle Mark has unfortunately been in 
a fatal accident. The doctor informs John that his uncle is registered as an organ donor under 
the OPT-OUT system, but as Mark’s nearest relative John has to make the final decision about 
what actually happens to his uncle’s organs. John has no opinion one way or another about 
what should be done, so he wants to base his decision on his Uncle Mark’s decision to donate.    
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Q3 To what extent does being registered to donate his organs under the OPT-OUT system 
provide a clear indication that Mark wanted to donate his organs? 
 
Questions 4, 5, and 6 are the same as the OPT-IN CONDITION 
 
Recall that Mark lives in a country that has an OPT-OUT system of organ donation. Under this 
system, everyone is automatically registered to be a DONOR. This means people in this 
country WILL have their organs used in the event of their death. Anyone who wishes to be a 
NON-DONOR must make an extra effort by going online and registering their decision or by 
calling the donor line.   
Q7 If we assembled 100 people who want to DONATE their organs, how many of them do 
you think will be registered as organ donors on the OPT-OUT system?        
 
Q8 If we assembled 100 people who DO NOT WANT to DONATE their organs, how many 
of them do you think will be registered as organ donors on the OPT-OUT system?     
 
 
MANDATED CHOICE CONDITION 
In this experiment, the country in consideration has a CHOICE system of organ 
donation.   Under this system, everyone is legally required to choose between being a DONOR 
or NON-DONOR before they register for their driver's license.  
Q1 Out of 100 people living in this country, for how many do you think would want to donate 
their organs? 
 
Mark currently lives in this country with a CHOICE system of organ donation. Remember 
that under this system, everyone is legally required to choose between being a DONOR or 
NON-DONOR before they register for their driver's license. Mark is involved in a fatal 
accident that leaves many of his vital organs intact. Under the CHOICE system Mark was 
REGISTERED AS AN ORGAN DONOR. We want to know how you think Mark felt about 
being an organ donor.   
Q2 How likely do you think it is that Mark wanted to donate his organs?  
 
As you know Mark is involved in a fatal accident that leaves many of his vital organs intact. 
John is Mark’s nephew. John has just found out that his uncle Mark has unfortunately been in 
a fatal accident. The doctor informs John that his uncle is registered as an organ donor under 
the CHOICE system, but as Mark’s nearest relative John has to make the final decision about 
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what actually happens to his uncle’s organs. John has no opinion one way or another about 
what should be done, so he wants to base his decision on his Uncle Mark’s decision to donate.    
Q3 To what extent does being registered to donate his organs under the CHOICE system 
provide a clear indication that Mark wanted to donate his organs? 
 
Questions 4, 5, and 6 are the same as the OPT-IN CONDITION 
 
Recall that Mark lives in a country that has a CHOICE system of organ donation. Under this 
system, everyone is legally required to choose between being a DONOR or NON-DONOR 
before they register for their driver's license. 
Q7 If we assembled 100 people who want to DONATE their organs, how many of them do 
you think will be registered as organ donors on the CHOICE system?          
 
Q8 If we assembled 100 people who DO NOT WANT to DONATE their organs, how many 
of them do you think will be registered as organ donors on the CHOICE system?     
 
 
MANDATORY DONOR CONDITION 
In this experiment, the country in consideration has a DONOR system of organ 
donation.   Under this system, everyone is automatically REGISTERED AS A DONOR. There 
is no option for changing this.  
Q1 Out of 100 people living in this country, for how many do you think would want to donate 
their organs? 
 
Mark currently lives in this country with a DONOR system of organ donation. Remember 
that under this system, everyone is automatically REGISTERED AS A DONOR. There is no 
option for changing this. There is no option for changing this. Mark is involved in a fatal 
accident that leaves many of his vital organs intact.  Under the DONOR system Mark was 
REGISTERED AS AN ORGAN DONOR. We want to know how you think Mark felt about 
being an organ donor.   
Q2 How likely do you think it is that Mark wanted to donate his organs?  
 
As you know Mark is involved in a fatal accident that leaves many of his vital organs intact. 
John is Mark’s nephew.  John has just found out that his uncle Mark has unfortunately been in 
a fatal accident. The doctor informs John that his uncle is registered as an organ donor under 
the DONOR system, but as Mark’s nearest relative John has to make the final decision about 
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what actually happens to his uncle’s organs. John has no opinion one way or another about 
what should be done, so he wants to base his decision on his Uncle Mark’s decision to donate.    
Q3 To what extent does being registered to donate his organs under the DONOR system 
provide a clear indication that Mark wanted to donate his organs? 
 
Questions 4, 5, and 6 are the same as the OPT-IN CONDITION 
 
Recall that Mark lives in a country that has a DONOR system of organ donation. Under this 
system, everyone is automatically REGISTERED AS A DONOR. There is no option for 
changing this. 
Q7 If we assembled 100 people who want to DONATE their organs, how many of them do 
you think will be registered as organ donors on the DONOR system?          
 
Q8 If we assembled 100 people who DO NOT WANT to DONATE their organs, how many 
of them do you think will be registered as organ donors on the DONOR system?     
 
 
 
DEMOGRAPHIC 
We will now present you with the description of four different organ donation systems:    
OPT-IN: Under this system, everyone is automatically registered to be a NON-DONOR, 
meaning they will NOT have their organs used in the event of their death. Anyone who wishes 
to be a DONOR must make an extra effort by going online and registering their decision or by 
calling the donor line.  
OPT-OUT: Under this system, everyone is automatically registered to be a DONOR, meaning 
they will have their organs used in the event of their death. Anyone who wishes to be an NON-
DONOR must take extra effort by going online and registering their decision or by calling the 
donor line.  
CHOICE: Under this system, everyone is legally required to choose between being a DONOR 
OR NON-DONOR before they register for their driver’s license.  
MANDATORY DONOR: Under this system, everyone is automatically REGISTERED AS A 
DONOR. There is no option for changing this. 
 
 
Q9 What is your nationality? 
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Q10 What system do you think your country should adopt? 
m Opt-In  
m Opt-Out  
m Choice  
m Mandatory Donor  
 
Q11 Gender 
m Male  
m Female  
 
Q12 Age 
 
Q13 Are you an organ donor? 
m Yes  
m No  
 
Q14 What religion do you belong to? 
 
Q15 Is organ donation forbidden in your religion? 
m Yes  
m No  
Q16 Have you given blood before? 
m Yes  
m No  
Q17 Do you know anyone who is registered as an organ donor? 
m Yes  
m No  
Q18 Do you agree with the idea that everyone should be automatically included on the Organ 
Donor Register with the ability to opt-out if they wish? 
m Yes  
m No  
Q19 Would you be willing to agree to donation when your loved one's wishes are unknown? 
m Yes  
m No  
Q20 In the event of a death, which of these do you believe should apply in respect of organ 
donation? 
m The family/close friend should have a final day on whether a deceased person’s 
organs are donated or not  
m The deceased persons wishes about donating their organs or not should be 
respected no matter what the family thinks  
m Don’t know  
 
Q21 What is the current organ donation legislation in your country? 
m Opt out/ Presumed consent  
m Mandatory/compulsory  
m Need to carry a donor card  
m Opt in  
m Family or close friend will decide   
m Don’t know 
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APPENDIX D 
CHAPTER 6: Transparency on Autonomy Grounds 
COVER STORY 
Behaviour plays an important role in people’s health and wellbeing. There’s evidence to show 
that these behaviours are deeply embedded in people's social, economic and environmental 
context. Recently, psychological methods have been used in many day-to-day situations 
(canteens, supermarkets, doctors waiting rooms, leisure centres, high street banks) to bring 
about behavior change (e.g., quit smoking, eat healthily, reduce alcohol consumption, increase 
physical activity, etc.). Typical psychological methods involve changing the type of 
information we use to base our decisions. This can be done by presenting the order of 
information in certain ways, highlighting certain information to make it more distinctive, and 
even simplifying the information itself to get the message across more directly. All of these 
methods are designed to help guide people to make the best decision for their own health and 
wellbeing. 
 
Behaviour Agent (Participants will be presented with one of the description below) 
The Government in this country is using psychological research to help develop a set of 
simple methods that adjust the way information is presented, so that it can help people to make 
better decisions. The reason for using psychological methods is to help improve people’s 
behavior, because in many day-to-day contexts people may not make a decision that is best for 
their own health, wellbeing, and their happiness. 
 
The Top Advertising Company in the country is using psychological research to help 
develop a set of simple methods that adjust the way information is presented, so that it can help 
people to make better decisions. The reason for using psychological methods is to help improve 
people’s behavior, because in many day-to-day contexts people may not make a decision that 
is best for their own health, wellbeing, and their happiness. 
 
The Top Researchers in laboratories across this country are using psychological research 
to help develop a set of simple methods that adjust the way information is presented, so that it 
can help people to make better decisions. The reason for using psychological methods is to 
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help improve people’s behavior, because in many day-to-day contexts people may not make a 
decision that is best for their own health, wellbeing, and their happiness. 
 
Experiment 1 (Positive Rationale for Interventions) 
Transparent Behaviour Context 
 [SMOKING]      
Recommended Psychological Method: Design cigarette packaging so that it incorporates 
graphic pictures of damaged lungs and warnings such as ‘Smoking seriously harms you and 
others around you”, “Smoking harms your unborn baby'. 
Argument for it to work: By highlighting the negative physical and moral issues concerning 
smoking, the negative experiences will become more obviously associated with smoking, and 
this will encourage smokers to reduce or even stop smoking. 
 
[FOOD & NUTRITION]      
Recommended Psychological Method: Design packaging on food so that the front label 
includes nutritional information, by using a simple traffic light system (red, amber, green) to 
indicate how much saturated fat, salt and sugar, and calories are in food products. 
Argument for it to work: By making it easier for people to interpret the nutritional content of 
food items through a traffic-light labelling system, people will be more aware of which foods 
are healthier than others, and in turn adopt/maintain a healthier diet.  
 
[ALCOHOL]      
Recommended Psychological Method: Design signage in pubs and restaurants so that they 
include messages such as the following: “men and women are advised not to regularly drink 
more than 14 units a week” and “spread your drinking over three days or more if you drink as 
much as 14 units a week”.       
Argument for it to work: By informing people about the actual appropriate amount of alcohol 
consumption that is reasonable to be consumed in a typical week, because people will be more 
aware of exceeding the limit and this should in turn reduce alcohol overconsumption. 
 
[EXERCISE] 
Recommended Psychological Method: Design stairwells with ‘point-of-choice’ signage that 
displays messages about the health advantages of taking the stairs, such as ‘Stair climbing 
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burns more calories per minute than tennis’, ‘7 minutes of stair climbing per day protects your 
heart’, etc. 
Argument for it to work: By presenting messages at strategic positions, people will be 
encouraged to use stairs instead of lifts or escalators/elevators, and this in turn will encourage 
people to value being more active and in turn, exercise more in general.  
[FINANCE]   
Recommended Psychological Method: Design investment schemes in such a way so that 
customers can evaluate the associated riskiness of each product based on a traffic light 
system; red indicates highly risky, green indicates low risk. 
 Argument for it to work: By making it easier for people to interpret the riskiness of an 
investment scheme through a traffic-light labelling system, people will be more aware of 
which financial products are risker than others, and in turn help them make a better financial 
decision.  
 
Non-Transparent Behaviour Context 
[SMOKING] 
Recommended Psychological Method: Increasing the length of the filter by 10mm and at 
the same time reduce the length of the cigarette to 60mm. 
Argument for it to work: If a standard cigarette is 70mm then cutting back on the harmful 
chemicals and replacing it with more filter would seem as if the size of 
cigarette haven’t changed but the amount of harmful chemical is reduced. By reducing nicotine 
content adequately, this method helps smokers gradually adapt to lower nicotine levels, and 
this will encourage smokers to reduce or even stop smoking. 
 
[FOOD & NUTRITION] 
 Recommended Psychological Method: Design the size of plates so that the quantity of food 
on them is adjusted. Large plates and bowls can make servings of food appear smaller, 
whereas smaller plates can lead people to misjudge that very same quantity of food as being 
significantly larger. 
Argument for it to work: By making the plates smaller, people would be better able to 
adjust the amount of food they put on their plate, and avoid overconsumption of food, and in 
turn adopt/maintain a healthier diet. 
  
   
 
 
213 
[ALCOHOL] 
 Recommended Psychological Method: Design the glassware used in pubs and restaurants 
in such a way so that straight glasses are used, because relative to curvy glasses, it is easier to 
judge and pace the amount of alcohol consumed. 
Argument for it to work: By changing the containers that are used to serve alcohol, this 
will in turn reduce the actual amount of alcohol consumed at any one sitting, and this 
should in turn reduce alcohol overconsumption. 
  
[EXERCISE] 
Recommended Psychological Method: Design stairwells by hanging artworks. Pictures are 
changed periodically to keep stair users to prolong effectiveness. 
Argument for it to work: By presenting artworks along the stairwell this is more likely to 
encourage people to use stairs instead of lifts or escalators/elevators, and this in turn will 
encourage people to value being more active and in turn, exercise more in general. 
 
[FINANCE] 
Recommended Psychological Method: Design investment schemes with an automatic 
enrolment system so Bank/Building Society will decide on an individual’s behalf exactly 
how the money will be allocated to investment schemes. Although if the individual didn’t 
want it, they could opt-out of the scheme, this would involve filling in relevant paperwork.   
Argument for it to work: Because people find it difficult to think about their future financial 
status, so making the investment schemes a default would encourage people to invest their 
savings, and in turn help them make a better financial decision.  
 
 
Experiment 2 (Positive & Negative Rationale for Interventions) 
*Experiment adopted the same experimental set up as Experiment 1, except with the additional 
presentation of negative rationale for interventions. 
Transparent Behaviour Context 
[SMOKING]   
Recommended Psychological Method: Design cigarette packaging so that it incorporates 
graphic pictures of damaged lungs and warnings such as ‘Smoking seriously harms you and 
others around you”, “Smoking harms your unborn baby'. 
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Argument for it to work: By highlighting the negative physical and moral issues concerning 
smoking, the negative experiences will become more obviously associated with smoking, and 
this will encourage smokers to reduce or even stop smoking. 
Argument for it NOT to work: By highlighting the negative physical and moral issues 
concerning smoking, smokers will feel more defensive of their smoking habit, and as a result, 
smokers will end up smoking more, meaning that the method will lead to increases in 
smoking. 
 
[FOOD & NUTRITION]      
Recommended Psychological Method: Design packaging on food so that the front label 
includes nutritional information, by using a simple traffic light system (red, amber, green) to 
indicate how much saturated fat, salt and sugar, and calories are in food products. 
Argument for it to work: By making it easier for people to interpret the nutritional content 
of food items through a traffic-light labelling system, people will be more aware of which 
foods are healthier than others, and in turn adopt/maintain a healthier diet. 
Argument for it NOT to work: By making it easier for people to interpret the nutritional 
content of food items, people change their eating habit and as a result consume more food to 
compensate for eating healthily, meaning that this method increases people’s overall daily 
calorie intake. 
 
[ALCOHOL]     
Recommended Psychological Method: Design signage in pubs and restaurants so that they 
include messages such as the following: “men and women are advised not to regularly drink 
more than 14 units a week” and “spread your drinking over three days or more if you drink as 
much as 14 units a week”.       
Argument for it to work: By informing people about the actual appropriate amount of 
alcohol consumption that is reasonable to be consumed in a typical week, because people will 
be more aware of exceeding the limit and this should in turn reduce alcohol 
overconsumption. 
Argument for it NOT to work: By informing people about the actual appropriate amount of 
alcohol consumption that is reasonable to be consumed in a typical week, those who drink 
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lightly will consume more alcohol as they believe it is safe to drink 14 units a week, meaning 
that this method will increase overall alcohol consumption. 
 
[EXERCISE] 
Recommended Psychological Method: Design stairwells with ‘point-of-choice’ signage that 
displays messages about the health advantages of taking the stairs, such as ‘Stair climbing 
burns more calories per minute than tennis’, ‘7 minutes of stair climbing per day protects 
your heart’, etc. 
Argument for it to work: By presenting messages at strategic positions, people will be 
encouraged to use stairs instead of lifts or escalators/elevators, and this in turn will encourage 
people to value being more active and in turn, exercise more in general. 
Argument for it NOT to work: By presenting messages at strategic positions, people will 
avoid the stairs and hence the messages for the reason that they don’t want to feel guilty 
about not exercising enough, meaning that this method will lead people to being less active. 
 
[FINANCE]   
Recommended Psychological Method: Design investment schemes in such a way so that 
customers can evaluate the associated riskiness of each product based on a traffic light 
system; red indicates highly risky, green indicates low risk. 
Argument for it to work: By making it easier for people to interpret the riskiness of an 
investment scheme through a traffic-light labelling system, people will be more aware of 
which financial products are riskier than others, and in turn help them make a better financial 
decision.  
Argument for it NOT to work: By making it easier for people to interpret the riskiness of an 
investment scheme through the traffic-light labelling system, the method highlights the 
potential financial gains through risky choices, meaning that it will lead people to taking more 
gambles with their money and be worse off in the long run. 
 
 
Non-Transparent Behaviour Context 
[SMOKING] 
Recommended Psychological Method: Increasing the length of the filter by 10mm and at 
the same time reduce the length of the cigarette to 60mm. 
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Argument for it to work: If a standard cigarette is 70mm then cutting back on the harmful 
chemicals and replacing it with more filter would seem as if the size of 
cigarette haven’t changed but the amount of harmful chemical is reduced. By reducing nicotine 
content adequately, this method helps smokers gradually adapt to lower nicotine levels, and 
this will encourage smokers to reduce or even stop smoking. 
Argument for it NOT to work:  By reducing the length of the cigarette and cutting back on 
nicotine content, people will change their smoking habit and as a result smoke more to 
compensate for the shorter cigarette, meaning that this method will lead to people increasing 
their consumption of cigarettes. 
[FOOD & NUTRITION] 
 Recommended Psychological Method: Design the size of plates so that the quantity of food 
on them is adjusted. Large plates and bowls can make servings of food appear smaller, 
whereas smaller plates can lead people to misjudge that very same quantity of food as being 
significantly larger. 
Argument for it to work: By making the plates smaller, people would be better able to 
adjust the amount of food they put on their plate, and avoid overconsumption of food, and in 
turn adopt/maintain a healthier diet. 
Argument for it NOT to work: By making the plates smaller, people change their eating 
pattern and as a result consume more food to compensate for the smaller plate, meaning that 
this method will lead to increases in peoples overall daily calorie intake. 
 
[ALCOHOL] 
 Recommended Psychological Method: Design the glassware used in pubs and restaurants 
in such a way so that straight glasses are used, because relative to curvy glasses, it is easier to 
judge and pace the amount of alcohol consumed. 
Argument for it to work: By changing the containers that are used to serve alcohol, this 
will in turn reduce the actual amount of alcohol consumed at any one sitting, and this 
should in turn reduce alcohol overconsumption. 
Argument for it NOT to work:  By changing the shape of the containers that are used to 
serve alcohol, people change their drinking habit and as a result consume more alcohol to 
compensate for the smaller container, meaning that this method will increase people’s overall 
alcohol consumption. 
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[EXERCISE] 
Recommended Psychological Method: Design stairwells by hanging artworks. Pictures are 
changed periodically to keep stair users to prolong effectiveness. 
Argument for it to work: By presenting artworks along the stairwell this is more likely to 
encourage people to use stairs instead of lifts or escalators/elevators, and this in turn will 
encourage people to value being more active and in turn, exercise more in general. 
 Argument for it NOT to work:  The artwork along the stairwell is not changed regularly 
enough, and people get bored looking at it, and so to avoid looking at it most people end up 
taking the lift to avoid it, and in turn overall get less exercise.   
  
[FINANCE] 
Recommended Psychological Method: Design investment schemes with an automatic 
enrolment system so Bank/Building Society will decide on an individual’s behalf exactly 
how the money will be allocated to investment schemes. Although if the individual didn’t 
want it, they could opt-out of the scheme, this would involve filling in relevant paperwork.   
Argument for it to work: Because people find it difficult to think about their future financial 
status, so making the investment schemes a default would encourage people to invest their 
savings, and in turn help them make a better financial decision.  
Argument for it NOT to work: The default investment scheme doesn’t take into account the 
fact that people have different needs because their lifestyles are different, and as a result the 
scheme means that in the long run, overall people will end up saving less. 
 
 
Experiment 3 (Negative Rationale for Interventions) 
*Experiment adopted the same experimental set up as Experiment 1, exception negative 
rationale for interventions are presented instead of positive rationale. 
 
Transparent Behaviour Context 
[SMOKING]   
Recommended Psychological Method: Design cigarette packaging so that it incorporates 
graphic pictures of damaged lungs and warnings such as ‘Smoking seriously harms you and 
others around you”, “Smoking harms your unborn baby'. 
Argument for it NOT to work: By highlighting the negative physical and moral issues 
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concerning smoking, smokers will feel more defensive of their smoking habit, and as a result, 
smokers will end up smoking more, meaning that the method will lead to increases in 
smoking. 
 
[FOOD & NUTRITION]      
Recommended Psychological Method: Design packaging on food so that the front label 
includes nutritional information, by using a simple traffic light system (red, amber, green) to 
indicate how much saturated fat, salt and sugar, and calories are in food products. 
Argument for it NOT to work: By making it easier for people to interpret the nutritional 
content of food items, people change their eating habit and as a result consume more food to 
compensate for eating healthily, meaning that this method increases people’s overall daily 
calorie intake. 
 
[ALCOHOL]     
Recommended Psychological Method: Design signage in pubs and restaurants so that they 
include messages such as the following: “men and women are advised not to regularly drink 
more than 14 units a week” and “spread your drinking over three days or more if you drink as 
much as 14 units a week”.      
Argument for it NOT to work: By informing people about the actual appropriate amount of 
alcohol consumption that is reasonable to be consumed in a typical week, those who drink 
lightly will consume more alcohol as they believe it is safe to drink 14 units a week, meaning 
that this method will increase overall alcohol consumption. 
 
[EXERCISE] 
Recommended Psychological Method: Design stairwells with ‘point-of-choice’ signage that 
displays messages about the health advantages of taking the stairs, such as ‘Stair climbing 
burns more calories per minute than tennis’, ‘7 minutes of stair climbing per day protects your 
heart’, etc. 
Argument for it NOT to work: By presenting messages at strategic positions, people will 
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avoid the stairs and hence the messages for the reason that they don’t want to feel guilty about 
not exercising enough, meaning that this method will lead people to being less active. 
 
[FINANCE]   
Recommended Psychological Method: Design investment schemes in such a way so that 
customers can evaluate the associated riskiness of each product based on a traffic light system; 
red indicates highly risky, green indicates low risk. 
Argument for it NOT to work: By making it easier for people to interpret the riskiness of an 
investment scheme through the traffic-light labelling system, the method highlights the 
potential financial gains through risky choices, meaning that it will lead people to taking more 
gambles with their money and be worse off in the long run. 
 
Non-Transparent Behaviour Context 
[SMOKING] 
Recommended Psychological Method: Increasing the length of the filter by 10mm and at the 
same time reduce the length of the cigarette to 60mm. 
Argument for it NOT to work:  By reducing the length of the cigarette and cutting back on 
nicotine content, people will change their smoking habit and as a result smoke more to 
compensate for the shorter cigarette, meaning that this method will lead to people increasing 
their consumption of cigarettes. 
 
[FOOD & NUTRITION] 
Recommended Psychological Method: Design the size of plates so that the quantity of food 
on them is adjusted. Large plates and bowls can make servings of food appear smaller, 
whereas smaller plates can lead people to misjudge that very same quantity of food as being 
significantly larger. 
Argument for it NOT to work: By making the plates smaller, people change their eating 
pattern and as a result consume more food to compensate for the smaller plate, meaning that 
this method will lead to increases in peoples overall daily calorie intake. 
  
 [ALCOHOL] 
 Recommended Psychological Method: Design the glassware used in pubs and restaurants 
in such a way so that straight glasses are used, because relative to curvy glasses, it is easier to 
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judge and pace the amount of alcohol consumed. 
Argument for it NOT to work:  By changing the shape of the containers that are used to 
serve alcohol, people change their drinking habit and as a result consume more alcohol to 
compensate for the smaller container, meaning that this method will increase people’s overall 
alcohol consumption. 
 
[EXERCISE] 
Recommended Psychological Method: Design stairwells by hanging artworks. Pictures are 
changed periodically to keep stair users to prolong effectiveness. 
Argument for it NOT to work:  The artwork along the stairwell is not changed regularly 
enough, and people get bored looking at it, and so to avoid looking at it most people end up 
taking the lift to avoid it, and in turn overall get less exercise.   
 
[FINANCE] 
Recommended Psychological Method: Design investment schemes with an automatic 
enrolment system so Bank/Building Society will decide on an individual’s behalf exactly 
how the money will be allocated to investment schemes. Although if the individual didn’t 
want it, they could opt-out of the scheme, this would involve filling in relevant paperwork.   
Argument for it NOT to work: The default investment scheme doesn’t take into account the 
fact that people have different needs because their lifestyles are different, and as a result the 
scheme means that in the long run, overall people will end up saving less. 
 
Definition Transparency (This is presented after participants read about each context) 
There are two types of psychological methods: Transparent and non-transparent.  
A transparent psychological method works in such a way that anyone can easily identify 
the actual psychological method used to change their behavour, as well as easily identify 
how their behavior is changed by it. 
A non-transparent psychological method works in such a way that no one can identify the 
actual psychological method used to change their behaviour, and no one can identify how 
their behavior is changed by it. 
1. To what extent is it easy for you to identify the actual psychological method used to 
change your behaviour? Please indicate your answer on the slider between [I cannot 
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easily identify the psychological method used to change my behaviour0– I can easily 
identify the psychological method used to change my behaviour100] 
2. To what extent is it easy for you to identify HOW your behaviour is going to be 
changed by the psychological method? Please indicate your answer on the slider 
between [I cannot easily identify how my behaviour is changed by the psychological 
method0– I can easily identify how my behaviour is changed by the psychological 
method100] 
3. Is the psychological method described above transparent or non-transparent?  
m Transparent   
m Non-transparent   
4. To what extent do you want to change your behaviour through the psychological 
method in this particular situation? Please indicate your answer on a scale between [Not 
at all1 / Very Much9]  
5. To what extent do you think the psychological method described above would 
positively change YOUR behaviour?  
 Please indicate your answer on a scale between [Much less likely1 / Much more 
likely9] 
6. To what extent do you think it is acceptable to use the psychological method 
described in this context to change your behaviour? 
 
Demographic Questions 
1. Age  
2. Gender  
m Male  
m Female  
3. Education Level 
m High School  
m Diploma/foundation 
m Bachelors degree 
m Masters’ degree 
m PhD 
m Others 
4. Political Affiliation 
m Left 
m Centre 
m Right 
m Other 
5. Religion 
m Religious 
m Unsure 
m Not Religious 
